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ABSTRACT 
 Education reform has grown into a major policy issue at the state and national level in 
the United States and for that matter around the world.  The purpose of this study was to 
determine the political and social forces supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and 
impact of education reform policies in the K-12 public education system of the United States 
from 2001-2011.  Through mixed-methods data analysis a descriptive and analytical picture 
of education reform was able to be concluded.  The results of the analysis showed that with 
an increase in education reforms from 2001-2011, legislators, predominantly Republican, 
created state level education reforms which fell in line with both neoliberal economic 
(market based policies) and neoconservative political (smaller government and increased 
individualism) ideals.  With a focus on accountability, achievement, and choice, reformers, 
proliferated in profiles of corporations, PACs and other organizations outside the realm of 
traditional public education, school systems in the United States continued on similar paths 
of education reform as other post-industrialized countries that have grown out of an 
economically globalized world.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO STUDY 
 
Introduction 
With the release of the 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, the call for reform in public 
education grew in congressional corridors and in the minds of the public; a new crisis in 
the American way of life was unearthed.  Parents were told that the public education 
system in which they grew up was not on par with the other new powers of the world; the 
bipolarity of the Cold War was over and new forces in economics, science, math and 
education were emerging (Gardner, 1983).  Furthermore, America's youth were not 
reaching the same academic achievement as the generations before them (Gardner, 1983).  
To compete with these foreign foes and domestic failings, America's education system 
needed an overhaul.  To the members of the National Committee on Education 
Excellence, the researchers and authors of A Nation at Risk, as well as President Ronald 
Reagan, education had become the new battleground of global competition and only 
through massive educational reform and a demand for academic excellence would the 
United States win the war. 
Meant to bring about change that would increase student achievement while also 
developing a strong publicly educated workforce, the education reform movement, 
brought forth by the report and later state and federal legislation altered the identity of 
public education.  Free market capitalism, popular in America's modern economic 
system, was the basis for the new educational reforms meant to increase accountability of 
schools and students through competition with and deregulation of America's educational 
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system (Clabaugh, 2009).  Federal reforms such as America 2000, Goals 2000 and No 
Child Left Behind were introduced on a federal level to push America's youth to find 
greater success in their public education system while also reassuring the public that the 
government was taking care of an education system that supposedly had fallen behind in 
the post-Cold War world (Ravitch, 2010). 
The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people" (U.S. Const. amend. X).  With 
its’ focus on authority, this amendment is the guiding principle regulating government 
control over the nation’s public education system.  Reforming said public education 
system is a state issue and as such, reforms must come from the within states.  To create a 
national education policy, almost every state fell subservient to the requirements of the 
federal government in order to receive the fiscal benefits that came with following the 
new education policy.  Throughout the country, state after state continued on the path of 
education reform in hopes of reaching the academic excellence that was espoused in A 
Nation at Risk.  With each legislative session bringing about an increase in the number of 
bills and an increase in the diversity of education reform platforms, the United States' 
educational system remained on a continuous cycle of educational reformation with hope 
of reaching the renaissance. 
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Statement of Problem 
To date, no study existed which focused on determining the root cause of 
America's education reform-mindedness while also examining education reform in all 
facets from theory to policy.  With education reform being a major policy issue on the 
state and national level, an analysis of this reform was needed to determine the forces 
which drove educational reform, who this reform benefited, the impact that reform had 
on the k-12 educational system of the United States and to create an illustration of 
education reform as viewed in modern context.  America's public education pendulum 
had swung from the pivot of policy and practice as the forces laid upon it had changed 
through events and actions of history.  It was the swing of the education pendulum 
beginning in 2001 and the forces that controlled its momentum which drove the paradigm 
shift in education policy.  
 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of the study was to determine the political and social forces 
supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and impact of education reform policies 
in the K-12 public education system of the United States.  This research studied ten states 
with a propensity for education reform-mindedness: Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan.  These states 
showed the highest propensity for education reform policy as measured by three major 
education reform organizations:  The Center for Education Reform, Students First, and 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).   
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Background of the Study 
Calls to reform America's public education system grew in volume and intensity 
with the 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk.  With President Reagan as a supporter, the 
National Committee on Educational Excellence reported that America's schools were 
failing the youth of the country.  Students had fallen behind their counterparts across the 
globe and domestically failed to reach the educational levels of the generation before 
them (Gardner, 1983).  With this publication, the call to action was sounded.  Researchers 
in universities and think tanks across the country began to look for the best methods to 
increase student achievement for America's supposedly failing students. 
Education reforms increased in the late 1980's and early 1990's as states began to 
take the leadership role in implementing these policies.  While the reforms of the 1980's 
focused on increasing access to more challenging courses for students while also 
introducing the use of standardized assessment tests to measure student achievement and 
progress, reforms in the 1990's focused on using these assessments as accountability tools 
for both school and faculty evaluation.  Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act in both 1994 and under the title No Child Left Behind in 2001 further 
increased the use of testing and other accountability measures.  Beyond accountability, 
the 1990's education reform movement also included an increase in school choice 
programs, standards-based teacher certification reforms, and an increase in school 
funding through accountability measurements (Hurst et al., 2003).   
With the publication of Teaching the New Basic Skills: Principles for Educating 
Children to Thrive in a Changing Economy in 1996, American political leaders learned 
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what knowledge, skills and abilities businesses leaders wanted in their workforce.  These 
characteristics included the ability to read and compute math at a ninth grade level, the 
ability to work in diverse groups, and the knowledge and skills necessary to use 
computers and other new technologies (Murnane & Levy, 1996).  The political leaders 
were eager to oblige and brought forth further education reforms focused on creating a 
workforce capable of meeting the demands of the 21st century workplace. 
It was these varying, multiple education reforms that drove the research in this 
dissertation.  Public reforms are meant to improve the lives of citizens for the public good 
and are rooted in the desire of leaders to do what is best for the populace.  Public reforms 
in food safety and child labor laws that sprang out of the Gilded Age were designed to 
enhance the lives of not only those citizens directly involved with these segments of 
society, but the lives of everyone residing in the country.  It had been 30 years since the 
publication of A Nation at Risk, the impetus of school reforms, yet public school reforms 
were still being instituted at a torrential pace.  It was this pace, alongside the magnitude 
by which these reforms impacted public education and the country as a whole, which 
required research to be conducted to determine the truth behind America's addiction with 
public education reform. 
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Theoretical Framework 
"The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself." 
                                                                                                            -Plato 
Education reform is a multifaceted issue encompassing a myriad of social, 
financial, bureaucratic, political and judicial concepts.  Despite these various aspects, 
education reform is rooted in Plato's classic work the Republic, written sometime around 
380 B.C.E. (Scharffenberger, 2004).  It is within the Republic that the first flirtation with 
education reform was seen and acts as the framework for this dissertation.  When 
discussing the youth in an education system of a fictitious city or polis, Plato asked the 
question, “... we have found the desired natures ... how are they to be reared and 
educated?" (Scharffenberger, 2004).  It is this question that laid the premise of Plato's 
education reform; once it was decided who received education, the question arose as to 
what and how they should be taught.  Furthermore, Plato raised the issue of justice with 
the question: "How do justice and injustice grow up in states?" (Scharffenberger, 2004).  
It was these guiding inquiries where Plato pondered the importance of a just education 
system.  The society he created in the Republic was based upon the idea that through 
specialization in education a just society could be created; it was this idea of justice in 
education that was the basis for education reform for Plato and his utopian vision.  
Beyond this definition of justice and despite the nearly 2,400 year gap between the 
writing the Republic and modem American education reform legislation, the theoretical 
issues regarding education remain the same. 
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The Republic is more a text about justice than society or education; however 
Plato goes into detail explaining how a civilization should be set up, how the education 
should appear, and who should govern the utopian civilization.  It is in the word "should" 
that education reform was first seen.  Plato wrote, "Educators should devise the simplest 
and most effective methods of turning minds around.  It shouldn't be the art of implanting 
sight in the organ, but should proceed on the understanding that the organ already has the 
capacity, but is improperly aligned and isn't facing the right way" (Scharffenberger, 
2004).  Modern American education reform fell under the shadow of the word "should”; 
who should fund education, what should education look like, how should students be 
educated, who should teach students, how should schools be evaluated, what should be 
taught in school; these questions that drove modern education reform legislation were the 
same questions that Plato examined in the Republic. 
Reforming the utopia’s education system meant that all children, male or female, 
received some form of education and that all education was controlled by the polis. This 
is not to say that the schooling was equal, a just education in the Republic meant an 
education based upon your abilities.  Plato wrote, "The result (of the education system), 
then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each 
person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is 
released from having to do any of the others" (Scharffenberger, 2004).  To Plato, the 
utopian polis had to control education because those who taught would be the 
philosopher-kings, the best of society.  To accomplish this, private and home schooling 
was not allowed in Plato’s reformed education system (Scharffenberger, 2004).  This 
reform conflicted with modem American educational reform, which focused on parent 
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choice and an increase in voucher and charter school programs throughout the country.  
Also, it is in this area that a stark contrast with the view of teachers was observed; instead 
of being few and respected, such as the philosopher kings, modem American education 
reform was purposed to bring a multitude of people into the role of educator through 
various alternative certification programs and organizations such as Teach for America. 
It is book two of the Republic where Plato laid out the structure of society; in his 
view, society was made up of three groups of people: producers, auxiliary and guardians. 
The producers were those who provided a good or service to the utopian polis and made 
up the largest population of the city.  The auxiliary were the men who made up the 
military units that defended the utopia from outside forces and kept the producers from 
causing domestic conflict.  The guardians were the rulers of the city, though a special 
group of guardians, the philosopher-kings, truly led the polis.  Mobility up and down the 
classes was possible as a child, but each group had a purpose for the betterment of society 
and required different forms of education, with the philosopher-kings receiving the 
mathematical and dialectical education necessary to lead (Scharffenberger, 2004).  One 
piece of education reform legislation in the United States, Florida's Senate Bill 1076, also 
known as the Career and Professional Education Act, allowed for specialization in high 
school education for careers and higher education (Legg, 2013).  As Plato envisioned a 
polis of specialized, class divided citizens, modem education reform legislation brought 
back this ancient idea. 
Further in the Republic, Plato introduced the allegory of the cave.  In this tale, 
citizens were in a cave, tied down at the legs, with their eyes forced to look at the back 
wall of the cave, their backs to the entrance; they had been tied this way since birth and 
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knew no other state.  On the wall they saw shadows of objects; behind them were the 
objects, a fire behind the objects, and finally the entrance to the cave.  To the person 
staring at the wall, the shadows they saw on the wall was their entire world; there was 
nothing more, nothing less.  When released from the shackles, the citizens turned around, 
saw the objects in form as well as the fire and the light from the entrance of the cave. 
Making their way out of the cave, the people were blinded by the sun; confusion and 
chaos ensued and some returned to the safety of the cave; however they could not see the 
shadows anymore because they had gone too quickly into the light.   
This blindness lead to ostracizing those left behind in the cave who never dared to 
run into the light.  For those who left the cave and stayed in the light, these citizens 
eventually saw the greater world around them and their place in it.  They learned the 
workings of the world and society and became educated leaders. With this education, 
they had to return to the cave in time as philosopher-kings to help the shackled citizens 
understand what was outside the cave (Scharffenberger, 2004). 
This allegory was Plato’s way of explaining that at different stages of life, a 
student learned different subjects and practices.  From fictional stories of heroes who 
complete noble deeds, to music and math, students needed to learn certain subjects, 
through different pedagogy, at specific times in their life.  If shown too much, too early, 
the student would not understand what they learned and would retreat to what felt safe.  It 
was through this allegory that Plato described what should be taught in Athens, who 
should learn which subjects, and when they should learn them.  Plato felt that few people 
could and should leave the cave, but it was equally important that all citizens at least 
became knowledgeable to the existence of the exit.  
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The basic education reform that Plato argued for using the allegory of the cave 
was not seen in modern America's education reform policies.  Laws such as No Child Left 
Behind and Race to the Top pushed education reform in the direction of excellence for 
all, with all held to one standard.  Specialization of education through one's predisposed 
skills was gone in modern American education reform as students were held to a standard 
of achievement and knowledge gain that had not been seen in the past. 
Plato discussed that justice in society could be achieved through education, 
however Plato’s definition of justice in education reform was starkly different than that 
seen in modern education reform.  Justice in Plato's Republic was when all members of 
society did what they had an inclination for and were educated enough to fulfill their 
purpose in society.  Some people were meant to be farmers, others auxiliary; but not 
everyone was held to the same standard because different people had various levels of 
abilities both intellectually and morally (Scharffenberger, 2004).  Beyond this form of 
justice however, laid a more personal meaning of justice through education.  By 
reforming the city’s education system, justice not only occurred in society, but sprouted 
within one's self.  By being a just person through education, a citizen understood the 
scope of the world and their place in it (Dillon, 2004). 
The purpose of Plato's education reform was to make the polis an unprejudiced 
and just utopia and provide it with an educated citizenry that could sustain the way of life 
necessary for its further existence.  As the head of the Delian League, the polis of Athens 
saw itself as the leader of the Aegean Sea and Plato felt that through education Athens 
could grow into the hegemon of the area and become that utopia he described in the 
Republic. (Scharffenberger, 2004).  As the impetus for education reform in the United 
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States, A Nation at Risk, claimed that only through broad, extensive reforms would the 
U.S. be competitive with new enemies foreign and domestic (Gardner, 1983).  Plato's 
Republic advocated the same purpose; reform to education would bring security and 
prosperity to the polis and would result in the betterment of its citizenry.  Though the 
specifics of education reform may differ to some extent between 380 B.C.E. and 2013 
C.E., the theory of reforming to create something better remained timeless. 
 
Definition of Terms 
The definitions offered are meant to facilitate the understanding of the terms used 
in analyzing the rationale, growth and impact of education reform in the k-12 public 
education system of the United States. 
Accountability. A measure of student achievement in relation to teacher effectiveness. 
Alternative Certification. Programs offered to would-be teachers not coming from 
traditional university based teacher education programs. 
Charter School. A tax funded institution established by a charter between an outside 
group and an education governing body; the institution operates without most local and 
state regulations in order to reach its charter goals. 
Choice. Process in which parents/guardians choose the educational institution most 
appropriate for their child; this includes traditional public school, charter school, home 
school, private school, or virtual school. 
Collective Bargaining. The right of teachers to negotiate with school boards regarding 
issues pertaining to teacher salary, tenure, etc. 
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Evaluation. The method by which it will be determined the success of a teacher and 
school. 
Economic Neoliberalism.  Economic philosophy focusing on free markets, decreased 
regulation and increased individualism. 
Parent Power. A measurement of parental rights in public education choice regarding 
school selection. 
Education Reform.  Policy and legal changes which alter the current practices in public 
education.   
Private School. A school maintained and funded through private funding and/or tuition 
costs; open only to students selected and/or admitted based upon religious affiliation or 
other qualifications. 
Political Neoconservatism.  Political philosophy focusing on increased individualism, 
American international dominance and decreased government interference in economic 
affairs with increased social regulation. 
Political Platform Affiliation. Registered as a member of a political party or non-party 
independent. 
Public School. An educational institution funded through public taxation. 
Tax Credit Scholarship. State program used by businesses to fund scholarships for 
students in return for tax credits. 
Testing Mandates. Requirements placed on local school districts to administer annual 
standardized tests to measure achievement and accountability. 
Tenure. Continuing contracts given to teachers after a certain number of years of 
teaching service. 
13 
 
Sectarian or Religious Private Schools. Private school affiliated with a religious 
institution. 
Statute. A law passed by a legislative body. 
Digital Learning Education system primarily based on computer programs with little 
physical interaction between teacher and student. 
Voucher. Scholarship of public funds used by students to attend private k-12 institutions. 
 
Delimitations 
This study was delimited to ten states within the United States, Indiana, Florida, 
Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan, as 
ranked by three education reform organizations, American Legislative Exchange 
Council, The Center for Education Reform, and Students First.  The study focused solely 
on K-12 legislation in the ten states aforementioned.  State legislation enacted was 
delimited to legislative sessions from 2001-2011.  Types of bills examined were 
delimited to those relating to alternative certification, charter schools, collective 
bargaining/ unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or 
voucher programs.  Legislators were delimited to those who were the named as the 
original, lead author of the bill introduced.  The study was further delimited to per-pupil 
spending on an annual basis, excluding capital outlay, interest on debt and other 
programs for fiscal years 2001-2011.  Vendor contracts were delimited to open contracts 
at the time of review. 
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Limitations 
The conclusion regarding state funding was limited by the overall economic cycle 
which impacts legislative budgets.  The results of the analysis of political platform 
affiliation and legislation introduced was limited to bills enacted into law.  The sample 
used is limited to the three organizations used to calculate the state rankings.  As two of 
the three organizations are known to have conservative or Republican political ties, the 
states ranked by education reform legislation could be construed due to the political 
leanings.  The final limitation focuses on the purpose of education reform; the cited 
legislation of this research was categorized by education reform theme.  These themes did 
not focus on the actual meaning of the legislation, but simply the theme in name only.  
For example, one of the major themes of the legislation was Charter Schools, however 
this does not show whether the legislation was supportive or restrictive of charter schools. 
 
Research Questions 
Using the theoretical framework as a guide, the researcher developed seven 
guiding research questions regarding the education reform movement in the k-12 public 
education system of the United States. 
1. What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States 
between 2001-2011? 
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and 
support for education reform legislation? 
3. What are the themes of the enacted state education reform legislation? 
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4. Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
5. Who is financing education reform legislation? 
6. Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
7. Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits 
for their support? 
 
Overview of Methodology 
To answer question one, determining the rationale behind the education reform 
movement, an examination of literature regarding multiple facets of educational reform 
was conducted.  Each reform was analyzed for impact on student achievement and affects 
that the reform had on the public education system in regards to efficiency, effectiveness, 
and teacher quality.  Research question two was meant to determine if a legislator's 
political platform impacted the number of education reform bills introduced and 
supported by that legislator which were enacted into state law. To answer this question, 
an examination of every education reform bill enacted into each state legislative house 
from the ten states from 2001-2011 was conducted; every legislator who authored each 
education reform bill was coded for political platform affiliation. Each bill was then 
broken down by type of education reform and entered into SPSS.  An independent 
samples t-test was conducted to determine if a difference existed between political 
platform affiliation and support for overall education reform legislation.  In addition, a 
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cross-tabulation and Chi-square test was used to determine if a statistically significant 
relationship existed between political platform affiliation and support for certain types of 
education reform.  A comparison table was also created to show the amount of total 
education reform legislation introduced by each political party. 
Descriptive statistics were used to address question three.  Each bill examined 
from 2001-2011 was given a number based upon theme of education reform.  The mode 
of all pieces of legislation was then used to determine which education reforms are more 
widely introduced, giving a better understanding of the themes of modern education 
reform.  Question four focused on funding for public education and its relationship to the 
number of education reform bills passed.  To answer this question, state funding for 
public education from 2001-2011 was analyzed for each of the ten states on a per-pupil 
basis; a correlation was conducted using SPSS to determine if the number of education 
reform bills enacted had an impact on the amount of education funding spent on a per 
pupil basis. 
To answer questions five, six and seven determining who was supporting, 
financing and benefiting from education reform legislation, a multifaceted examination 
was conducted.  First, legislation enacted in the ten states from 2001-2011 regarding 
education reform was found.  Each piece of legislation was then researched to determine 
which legislator authored the bill.  Research into the political donations to each of these 
legislators was then used to connect each legislator with political campaign contributions 
made by organizations that consider education reform a major policy issue and were 
connected to the specific reform issue.  Additionally, state vendor contracts regarding the 
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education reform legislation were examined to determine if a connection between 
financial legislative support and benefits exists. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter one outlined a brief history of education reform in the United States 
dating from 1983 to present day.  Also included in Chapter one was the introduction, 
statement of the problem, purpose of study, background of the study, theoretical 
framework, definition of terms, delimitations, limitations, research questions, and an 
overview of the methodology. 
Chapter two presented a literature review regarding the themes and impact of 
education reform in the K-12 public education system in the United States.  
Philosophical, ideological and educational arguments focused on education reform were 
also included in the review of literature; major education reform organizations were also 
discussed. 
Chapter three included an overview of the methodology used to answer the 
research questions; use of specific qualitative and quantitative methods was discussed.  
Chapter four offered an explanation of the results of the research; qualitative and 
statistical findings were provided as well as a discussion regarding the implications for 
future education policy and reform.  Included in Chapter five were the final conclusions 
and recommendations for future research. 
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Summary 
Education reform was a policy issue that continued to grow in importance since 
the publication of the 1983 report A Nation at Risk.  The impact that this document had 
on the development of education reform in the United States cannot be understated.  By 
framing education as national security issue, the federal government intensified the 
pressure on public education to achieve success as defined by parameters created by 
federal legislation.  A national education policy brought forth through the report caused 
countless national and state level education reform bills to be fast tracked into law.  It is 
was this flood of reform that required analysis and was the provocation for the research 
within this report. 
Using Plato's the Republic as the theoretical framework, the researcher discussed 
the relationship between the theories of education reform in Plato’s time to the current 
reform legislation that will be examined in through the research.  An explanation of the 
methodology, both qualitative and quantitative methods being used, was given, and 
further clarification regarding the specifics of the methodology was included.  
Explanation of research questions, definitions and limitation/delimitations was also 
given; an organization of the research was shown in conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Education reform is a broad term used to describe policy and legal changes which 
alter the current practices in public education.  For this research, this general definition of 
education reform was used as the starting for further delineation.  An extensive review of 
literature was conducted; this review focused on the nine types of education reform 
which were previously used as delimitations.  These reforms include alternative 
certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit 
scholarships, digital learning, tenure and voucher programs in no particular order.  
Though these reforms could be categorized as impacting either teacher or student, it is 
difficult to keep effects of such reform to one group without influencing the other; for 
this reason these reforms were not classified in any manner beyond the term education 
reform.   
Beyond these education reforms, a further review of literature was conducted to 
give the history and description of the three major education reform organizations used in 
the research, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), The Center for 
Education Reform, and Students First.  The final aspect of the review of literature 
focused on basic protocols, policies and designs of the ten states to which this research 
was delimited, Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan.  These states were the top ten education reform 
minded as measured by the three education reform organization aforementioned.   
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Education Reforms 
Alternative Certification 
 Alternative certification is a broad term used to describe the process of obtaining 
teacher certification credentials outside the traditional university undergraduate method.  
Alternative certification programs (ACP) began to grow in abundance during the 1980’s 
with the publication of A Nation at Risk.  Fears of teaching shortages and ineffective 
teachers allowed these programs to multiply; today every state and the District of 
Columbia (D.C.) has some form of alternative certification (Ludlow, 2013).  Each year 
35,000 teachers, or one-third of the nation’s total, are hired after receiving teacher 
training through an ACP (Kane et al, 2008a).  The goal this education reform is to 
increase student achievement and diversify the teaching population with individuals from 
various educational and social backgrounds; to this extent, a literature review was 
conducted to determine if the results of ACPs are meeting the stated goals. 
It is difficult to paint a picture of a standard ACP because one simply does not 
exist.  These programs can be affiliated with public universities, school districts, private 
institutions, corporations, and/or various levels of government.  Though these programs 
are required to adhere to state guidelines involving what knowledge and skills must be 
gained, there are over 140 different routes by which one can obtain teaching certificate 
through an ACP (Ludlow, 2013).  Compared to students in traditional certification 
programs (TCP), students in ACPs are more likely to be minorities, male, entering 
teaching as a second career, and teach in poor, urban schools.  No major differences 
between TCP and ACP students were reported in regards to grade point average and 
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ACT/SAT test score (Zeichner and Schulte, 2001); however teacher attrition rates are 
higher with ACP teachers as compared to TCP (Linek et al, 2012).   
 Countless research comparing TCPs and ACPs has been conducted regarding how 
well new teachers are prepared for the profession after taking part in the programs.  
Studies have shown mixed results regarding self-efficacy and readiness of TCP and ACP 
graduates.  Shen (1997) conducted extensive survey research of 14,000 respondents and 
concluded that ACP teachers were not as academically successful, not as likely to stay in 
the teaching profession and more likely to be in a low income school than their TCP 
counterparts.  Survey research by Darling-Hammond et al. (2002) concluded TCP 
graduates had higher self-efficacy and felt more prepared for their first year of teaching 
than their ACP counterparts; however Fox and Peters (2013) and Caprano et al. (2010) 
found no difference in self-efficacy between the two groups.   
Research by Peterson and Nadler (2009) concluded that TCP and ACP teacher 
had similar levels of confidence in instructional skills and Unruh and Holt (2001) 
reported ACP and TCP teacher reported the same stresses, fears and experiences in their 
first year of teaching.  No statistically significant difference was reported between ACP 
and TCP teachers and their annual teaching evaluation in their first year of service (Yao 
and Williams, 2010).  These results were supported by Zeichner and Schulte, (2001); 
however, Linek et al. (2012) showed graduates of TCPs received higher teacher 
evaluations than their ACP counterparts. 
 Research regarding the curriculum of ACPs have shown that these programs do 
not give students enough opportunity to work with students in the classroom setting and 
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lack the pedagogical basis found in traditional, university-based programs (Boyd et al. 
2009).   Darling-Hammond et al. (2001) concluded that the more time a future teacher 
has teaching, the more likely their students will increase in achievement.  However, 
Humphrey and Wechsler (2007) determined that comparing ACP and TCP programs is 
invalid because of the diversity of the ACP models compared with the TCP systems.  
Pedagogy and service time with students have shown to have a positive impact on student 
achievement Boe et al. (2007).  (Darling-Hammond, 2010) and Laczko-Kerr and Berliner 
(2002) concluded that TCP teachers have two months more of pedagogical knowledge 
than their ACP counterparts.  
Comparative analysis of ACP and TCP programs as they relate to student 
achievement have shown varying results.  Multiple studies have shown that certification 
from a TCP with a major in education had a strong positive correlation with student 
achievement in Reading and Math (Darling-Hammond, 1999, Darling-Hammond, 2000, 
Darling-Hammond et al, 2005).  Laczko-Kerr and Berliner (2002) concluded that 
students of non TCP teachers have shown 20% less achievement growth than those 
students with TCP graduates.  Kane et al. (2008b) concluded in an analysis of New York 
City teachers that the difference in student achievement of ACP and TCP students was 
negligible and that teaching evaluations in the first two years of service was a better 
predictor of teacher effectiveness and type of graduation program.   
Continuing with the comparison of ACP and TCP programs, Goldhaber and 
Brewer (2000) found that students of TCP teachers achieved higher standardized test 
scores in Reading but found no difference between the two groups on Science scores and 
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found TCP teachers had a negative impact on students’ Math scores.  Peterson and 
Nadler (2009) concluded that students of ACP teachers scored 4.8 and 7.6 points higher 
on the NAEP exam in 4th and 8th grade Math.   Ludlow (2013) and Boyd et al. (2009) 
both showed mixed results in regards to student achievement and teacher preparation.  
The results of the literature review regarding alternative certification indicate that 
the ACPs are diverse in design and population.  The graduates are more likely to teach in 
low socioeconomic areas, more likely to be men, minorities and on second careers; 
however these graduates are also more likely to leave the teaching profession than their 
TCP counterparts.  Literature regarding the impact that ACP teacher have on student 
achievement data is inconclusive; this does not come as a surprise because the diversity 
of the design ACPs should result in varying effects on student achievement.   
 
Charter Schools 
The growth of charter schools as an alternative to the traditional public school 
(TPS) setting has been steady since the founding of the first of such schools in the state of 
Minnesota in 1991.  As the calls for educational reform increased with the introduction of 
No Child Left Behind in 2001, enrollment in charter schools has more than tripled  
(Frankenberg et al., 2011).  Charter schools are autonomous, publicly funded institutions 
which operate on a renewable contract, or charter, with the authoritative decision making 
body of state.  Each state differs in regards to which government entity authorizes charter 
schools, handles their evaluation and distributes public education funding.  Charter 
schools can be profitable or nonprofit, have various regulations regarding teacher 
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certifications, uniforms, curriculum models, academic focus and student acceptance rates.  
One thing that does apply to all charter schools however, is the requirement at state 
accountability standards apply to the curriculum of the school.  Currently, charter schools 
operate in 42 states and D.C. and reach 3.7% of all k-12 students in the United States 
(Davis, 2013).  From a national review of charter schools, on average a charter school has 
300 students, but this varies greatly depending on location and level of education 
(elementary, middle, high school), is housed in a variety of locations and building types 
and on a national scale, four percent of charter schools will have their charters revoked 
each year, with the main cause being financial mismanagement of the institution 
(Fusarelli, 2002). 
Examination of charter school teachers shows that teachers of charter schools 
have a teacher attrition rate twice that of the TPS.  This high turnover rate is likely to 
cause issues when a discussion of school culture, learning communities, and shared 
vision occurs.  The turnover rate may also show that charter schools principals, free from 
government regulation, are more likely to get rid of poor teachers than the TPS principal.  
Furthermore, teachers in charter schools are more likely to be inexperienced, under 
certified, lack union membership, have lower undergraduate GPAs and report lower 
FTCE pass rates than their TPS counterparts.  Conversely, charter teachers also have 
higher verbal SAT scores; higher ACT scores and are more selective when it comes to 
choosing their undergraduate institution  
(Stuit & Smith 2012).   
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The first question that must be raised when discussing charter schools is why 
charter schools were created?  Proponents of charter schools argue that because charter 
schools do not fall under the same regulation as TPSs, charter schools have the ability to 
be more innovative in regards to teaching practices, administrative design, and school 
function (Clabaugh, 2009).  Further, it is believed that charter schools have the 
opportunity to encourage more public/parental involvement in schools, provide for 
internal accountability, increase access for learning to all students, and perhaps the 
cornerstone of the charter school proponents’ argument, charters will bring about 
competition in education and therefore increase the achievement of both public and 
charter school through capitalistic market forces (Clabaugh, 2009).  It is deregulation of 
the charter school and the competition of the marketplace that has driven the charter 
school movement into 42 states and D.C. (Alabama, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia do not have charter legislation 
currently adopted) (Carruthers, 2012). 
 Opponents to the charter school movement argue that free market principles 
applied to public education will take away funds from an already struggling system, 
competition will only benefits those students whose parents are motivated to send their 
child to a charter school, the students who are left behind in public schools will suffer 
from a brain drain, that good schools will keep the best teachers leading to further 
stratification and segregation of public schools and that these charter schools cannot meet 
the needs of special needs students and English Language Learners (Fusarelli, 2002).  
These opponents feel that market driven forces, meant to start competition among 
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schools, students, and parents, does not have any place in the public education system 
founded on idea of equal access to a universal education.  
The cornerstone to the charter school movement is that charter schools will raise 
student achievement not only of those students who attend the school, but also those 
students who are left behind in the public school system.  A 2005 study by Carnoy et al. 
in which researchers examine charter schools in 11 states showed that students did not 
have higher achievement levels in charter schools compared to their TPS counterparts, 
but in fact were achieving at a lower level than TPS students (Carnoy et al, 2005).  The 
Center for Research on Education Outcomes concluded from a 2009 longitudinal study of 
15 states and the D.C. that 83% of students in charter schools did significantly worse or 
no better than their TPS counterpart on Math and Reading assessment scores  
(Miron & Applegate, 2009). 
Continuing with the focus on achievement, a study on charter schools in the state 
of Florida concluded that charter school students underperform their TPS counterparts up 
until the fifth year that the school has been in existence; after the fifth year students 
appear to match achievement of TPS students, but never achieve at a higher level than 
their counterparts.  Further, this competition that is hypothesized to bring about higher 
achievement in all students caused TPS students to achieve higher math scores on state 
standardized test, but lowered the average reading score (Sass, 2006).  A similar study 
conducted in North Carolina over a twelve year period showed that it took six years for a 
charter school to be in existence before its’ students reached achievement levels of the 
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TPS counterparts in reading and that students in all grades of the charter schools failed to 
reach the achievement levels of the TPS students in Math (Carruthers, 2012).     
A 2012 study by Ni and Rorrerr compared charter school students to their TPS 
counterparts over a five year period.  Similar to previous research, Ni and Rorrerr 
concluded that the longer a charter school was open, the higher the students achieved; 
however students of the charter schools in Utah never met the achievement levels of their 
public school matches (Ni & Rorrerr, 2012).  Another five year longitudinal study, this 
time of six states bordering the Great Lakes, showed that students in charter schools 
performed at lower levels on the state standardized tests than their TPS counterparts and 
also concluded that states with older charter school laws had the higher achievement 
scores of the charter schools.  This follows similar research previously reviewed where 
the longer the charter school is in existence the higher the achievement level is the 
student in attendance (Miron et al, 2007). 
Moving to Texas, an examination in 2007 concluded that students who entered 
charter schools had modest, yet statistically significant drops in their math and language 
arts achievement scores in their first year of charter attendance.  These students would 
make up this drop after three years and eventually match their TPS counterparts (Booker 
et al, 2007).  Further research in a large urban district in the Southwest United States 
showed that students in charter schools showed a slowdown in achievement growth upon 
entering the charter school and that these students never recuperated this loss, even if 
leaving the charter school and re-entering the TPS system.  
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Furthering the examination of student achievement, a meta-analysis of charter 
school achievement research by Jeynes (2012), concluded that public and charter schools 
performed at relatively similar levels on student achievement examinations.  Research 
regarding North Carolina students in grades four through eight concluded that students of 
charters schools achieved lesser gains in Reading and Math compared to TPS students.  
Echoing previous research, the newer the charter school, the more likely it was that 
students performed worse on the student achievement test (Bifulco & Ladd, 2005).   
Research regarding the achievement of charter school students is not all negative.  
A meta-analysis of literature by Betts and Tang concluded that students of charter schools 
show mixed results regarding achievement with some student underperforming and 
others matching public school students; however literature did not show charter school 
students achieving higher success than their TPS twins (Betts & Tang, 2011).  New York 
State’s urban districts’ middle schools showed that charter schools are positively 
correlated with 6th and 8th grade Mathematics scores, yet showed no correlation with 6th 
and 8th grade Language Arts scores.  Furthering these conclusions, an examination of 
seven states by Zimmer et al. (2012) showed mixed results for students of charter schools 
and their achievement levels. 
Beyond the impact charter schools have on students who attend charter schools, 
the purpose of charter schools is also to increase achievement of students in the public 
schools.  Competition, it is argued, will push teachers in public schools to become better 
teachers and student achievement should increase.  A review of research showed, 
however, that students in a TPS either do not improve in achievement level once a charter 
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school is started in proximity to the school (Zimmer & Buddin, 2009) or improve slightly 
in Math and Language Arts because of the loss of students (Winters, 2012b).  Research 
by Zimmer & Buddin (2009) also concluded that principals did not report an increase in 
competition pressure when a charter school opened in proximity to their school.  
Imberman (2011) concluded in his research that charter schools actually had a negative 
impact on student test score growth in public schools.  
There is no clear cut evidence to charter schools improving student achievement; 
the overwhelming evidence is that charter schools do not improve student achievement of 
students of charter schools; these students perform worse or equal to their TPS 
counterparts in most of the literature.  Very little literature shows student achieve more at 
charter schools than TPSs.  Secondly, there is no evidence that competition between 
public and charter schools increases student achievement of students in public schools.   
Supporters of charter schools argue that these schools, freed from government 
regulation, will become more innovative in their practice and management.  The results 
of the literature review on innovation in charter schools show a mixed bag of results 
when comparing charter schools to a TPS.  One major area of innovation by charter 
schools is increase in cyber charter schools (Ellis, 2008. and Cavanaugh, 2009).  Both 
researchers concluded that cyber charters are growing in use and acceptance and offer 
another opportunity to increase parental power in public education and are viable options 
for students not succeeding in the TPS system or those students who are highly self-
motivated.  Ellis (2008) argued, however, that cyber charter schools were not innovative 
in regards to increasing student achievement, but were simply a way for the 
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homeschooled community to maneuver around state laws restricting government funds 
going to homeschooling as well as dilute local control of education funding.  Cavanaugh 
(2009) concluded that students in cyber charter schools have similar achievement as TPS 
counterparts, yet cyber charter students rated their experience with the charter poorly and 
reported a lack of enjoyment of the course.  Further research is needed regarding this 
topic especially regarding the strength of accountability measures (Huerta et al, 2006).   
Research regarding innovation (things done at charter schools that are not being 
done at the TPS) at brick and mortar charter schools is slim, but both Preston (2012) and  
Lubienski (2003), concluded that innovation in the classroom is not happening in charter 
schools.  Though these schools are innovative when discussing organization set up and 
management, in general, trusted practices of public schools teachers are being used in the 
charter school system.  This should be expected, however, since teachers of both charter 
and the TPS receive certification through similar pathways.  Though charters do have 
leniency on teacher certification, there is little evidence to suggest that charter schools are 
using innovate practices in the classroom.  The only area of innovation that Preston 
(2012) found in favor of charter schools was the lack of the use of tenure; 92% of charter 
schools do not offer tenure to their teachers.  
Charter schools, in general, are not more innovative in teaching practices however 
have shown more innovation in administrative practices as a result of deregulation. 
Though there are cases of charter schools bucking the accountability system and truly 
being innovative (Skilton-Sylvester, 2011 and Neuman, 2008), these are outliers.  Most 
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teachers in charter schools have shown to practice similar teaching practices as their TPS 
counterparts and innovation is not prevalently seen in the classroom (Lubienski, 2003). 
A claim by proponents of charter schools is that freed from the regulations that 
control public schools, charters schools are more efficient with the public funds they 
receive.  An examination of literature showed mixed results regarding efficiency.  Two 
studies of efficiency in Michigan and one on Texas charter schools showed that charter 
schools in these states were not as efficient as public schools.  Gronberg et al. (2012) 
concluded that though Texas charter schools can achieve similar education outcomes of 
the TPS at lower cost, charters in Texas were less efficient that public schools because of 
systemic inefficiency.  After examining charter schools in Michigan, Arsen and Yongmei 
(2012) showed that charters on average spend $774 less per pupil and $1, 141 more on 
administrative costs than their TPS counterparts.  
Further, Ni (2009) conducted a 10 year study of Michigan charter schools and 
concluded that charter schools had a negative impact on both the achievement and 
efficiency of the public schools in proximity.  Only one article, Grosskomph et al. (2009) 
concluded that elementary charter schools in Texas were more efficient than TPSs.  The 
authors of this article concluded that charters were more efficient because they did not 
have to stay with class size limitation and did not have to hire counselors, nurses, and 
other support staff as required by state regulation.  
Though research regarding efficiency in charter schools is not as robust as hoped, 
it is concluded that charter schools are not more efficient than TPSs and actually cause 
TPSs to achieve less efficiency as a decrease in funding for the TPS occurs with the 
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introduction of the charter school.  Efficiency is a paramount issue in the market-driven 
economics of charter schools; without efficiency the argument that charter schools spend 
public money more wisely than public schools cannot be made.  Furthermore, even when 
efficiency is found in charter schools, it is found from reduction of staff and disregard for 
state regulation that was created to benefit students. 
The final aspect of the charter schools that needs to be answered is to whether 
these school provide more opportunities for minorities, English Language Learners 
(ELL), Special Education (ESE), and impoverished students (FRL).  This is a major 
argument proponents use when supporting charter schools; that charters better serve these 
groups of students often thought to be underserved by the TPS system.  An examination 
of nine studies showed that charter schools do not give these groups of students more 
opportunities than public schools. 
An examination of charter schools in 40 states and the D.C. showed that groups 
with FRL and ELL status were at a proportionally lower population level in charter 
schools compared to their TPS counterparts; minorities were overrepresented in the 
charter schools. These results supports the argument that charter schools increase the 
segregation and stratification of the school system (Frankeberg et al., 2011).  Similar 
research in every article found regarding this subject showed that charter school students 
are more likely to be a minority, less likely to have ESE status, less likely to have ELL 
status, and less likely to have FRL status (Wolf, 2011., Wamba & Ascher, 2003., Garcia, 
2008., Ni, 2012., Garcy, 2011., Bancroft, 2009., Estes, 2004., and Drame, 2011.)   
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The overwhelming evidence shows that charter schools do not provide students 
with opportunities to a better education than TPSs.  Studies by Drame (2011) and Estes 
(2004) examined this question and concluded that charter school administrators and 
teachers are not adequately prepared to handle students with ELL or ESE status and are 
lacking knowledge of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and 
common teaching pedagogy regarding these groups of students.  Further, Drame (2011) 
and Bancroft (2009) concluded that charter schools use methods of weeding out students 
who fall into the previously mentioned categories.  Though charter schools are legally 
bound to accept all students, research has shown charters are finding legal loopholes such 
as difficult application process and not offering ESE support services (Drame, 2011, 
Bancroft, 2009).  Also, ethno-centric curriculums of some charter schools has caused 
resegregation in the surrounding public schools systems (Wamba, 2003). 
Charter schools do not offer students more opportunity than TPSs.  When 
examining race, ELL, ESE, and FRL status, charter schools do not support their rhetoric 
with action.  Instead, charters are resegregating schools on a racial level, and leaving 
students with disabilities, linguistic issues and in poverty for the TPS system to support. 
In regards to opportunity, research does not support the claim that charter schools provide 
a better opportunity for minority and at risk students.  
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Collective Bargaining/Unions 
Teachers unions and the right to collective bargaining was first started in New 
Jersey in the early 1900’s.  The early teacher unions were created as means for protection 
from a spoils system concreted in urban life which could result in unfair labor practices 
and dismissal (McNeal, 2012).  Currently, five states do not grant collective bargaining 
rights to teacher unions; these states are South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, 
Virginia (Winker et al. 2012).  The current education reform movement regarding 
teachers unions is meant to remove these organizations from collective bargaining table 
and strip them of their rights.  To the education reformer, unions stand in the way of 
changes that need to occur to improve student achievement and burden school districts 
and states with hefty pensions and strict salary schedules.  A literature review was 
conducted to determine to what extent these claims are true as well as to determine what 
impact, if any, unionization has on student achievement. 
The impact which unions and their collective bargaining rights has on finances of 
public education has been researched extensively.  Kerchner (1986) concluded that 
districts with unions have higher levels of due process, making termination of teachers 
more difficult and also increase salaries from 5-10% as compared to non-unionized 
districts.  Lamm-West and Mykerezi (2011) also concluded that unions and collective 
bargaining have an impact on salary schedule design and encourage teacher salary 
increases for qualification but not based on student achievement.  Cowen (2009) 
determined that collective bargaining increases expenditures on school personnel by 20-
25% and that collective bargaining increases salaries and fringe benefits for teacher but 
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drives down teacher quality.  Lovenheim (2009) examined three states and concluded that 
the presence of a union and collective bargaining did not impact teaching salary over 
time.  
Continuing with the impact that teacher unions have on school finance, Eberts 
(2007) concluded that unions raise teacher pay, improve working conditions and increase 
employment security of teachers, but also raise the cost of public education by 15%.  
Countering Eberts, Kasper (1970) came to the conclusion that unions had no statistical 
impact on increasing teacher salaries. Brunner and Squires (2011) and Frandsen (2011) 
both determined unionization to have minimal impact on teacher salary over time.   
Hoxby (1996) determined that unionization causes an increase in the financial inputs of a 
school district, but reduces the productivity of the teachers and administrators.   
The second aspect of collective bargaining and unionization researched is the 
impact that these variables have on student achievement.  Results of the literature review 
are inconclusive as to the impact that unions have on student achievement.  Four of the 
six articles pertaining to this issue showed that the existence of a teacher union increased 
the achievement of the students in the area (Eberts, 2007., Grimes and Register, 1991., 
Steelman et al. 2000., and Milkman, 1997).  Research by Kurth (1987) and Prehoda 
(2007) showed the existence of a teacher union had a small, negative impact on student 
achievement.   
Teacher unions represent 67% of America’s three million teachers (Eberts, 2007).  
Teacher’s unions are the nation’s largest public sector union block and represent 1/3 of 
all public union members (Hirsch et al., 2011).  Current education reform is focused on 
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changing the role of teacher unions in the public education field.  Results of the literature 
review showed the difficulty in determining the impact that unionization and collective 
bargaining has had on teacher salary, especially salary over time.  Depending on the level 
of analysis, research has shown various degrees of impact regarding unionization and 
teacher salary with little causal evidence.  The second aspect of the literature, the impact 
that unions have had on student achievement, is not overwhelmingly evident, but from 
the literature review it can be concluded that the presence of teacher unions have an 
overall positive impact on student achievement.  Though some research has shown 
otherwise, a majority of the evidence shows that unionization increased student 
achievement.  
Evaluation 
Another education reform increasing in support is the changing of how teacher 
evaluations are conducted.  Evaluations are important for the education system because 
research has shown that the teacher has the biggest impact on student achievement 
(Goldhaber, 2007, Kane et al, 2008b, Milanowki, 2004, and Wright et al, 1997).  
Education reformers argue that since teachers have such a large impact on student 
achievement, their evaluations should be connected to how well their students do on 
achievement tests; this would make teachers want to do better and would give them an 
impetus to become better teachers.  This reform can be seen in the federally funded Race 
to the Top program created by the President Obama administration.  It is also seen in 
public opinion; Darling-Hammond et al. (1983) concluded that the American public 
believes that by improving teacher quality, student achievement will also improve.  The 
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question remain as how to effectively evaluate teacher while also determining the 
construct of a valid evaluation instrument. 
 Before examining current education reforms regarding teacher evaluation, it is 
important to understand the practice of evaluating teachers prior to the enacting of reform 
legislation.  Exhaustive research by Weisberg et al. (2009) studied the use and impact of 
teacher evaluations; the researchers used surveyed 15,000 teacher, 1,300 administrators 
and 80 education officials of the state and local level to come to a description of the 
teacher evaluation process and the impact of the evaluation on the teaching profession.  
Weisberg et al. (2009) concluded that though evaluation systems varied across states and 
school districts, an overall pattern was evident; high performing teachers were 
unrecognized, poor performing teachers were unrecognized, new teachers were not put 
under higher scrutiny than their peers, and little professional development was offered to 
continuously improve teachers.  
The survey results by Weisberg et al (2009) help create an illustration of the 
issues that have driven the reform of teacher evaluations.  86% of administrators did not 
pursue dismissal of a teacher based upon poor evaluations and 68% of teachers believed 
that poor performance was overlooked by administrators.  Further, 90% of the final 
evaluations for teachers were concluded based upon three classroom visits over the 
school year.  In other words, teachers and administrators were taking part in an evaluation 
system that did little to improve the evaluating skills of the administrator and even less to 
improve the teaching practices of the educator.  With 94%-99% of teachers receiving 
satisfactory or higher evaluations, yet international comparisons showing U.S. students 
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lagging behind their international counterparts, the impetus for the reform of the teacher 
evaluation system was evident in the modern American educational setting. 
Research regarding the changes in teacher evaluation practices is lacking due to 
the relative newness of the reform; however, some research focused on teacher quality 
and the statistics used in modern teacher evaluation reform was available.  Goldhaber and 
Anthony (2004) concluded that though teacher quality is the major factor in determining 
student achievement, measuring teacher quality is difficult because quality is difficult to 
define.  Also quality varies considerably among teachers; as all teacher applicants must 
pass licensure tests in all 50 states, it is a bit surprising that such variance is as pervasive 
as it appears to be.  In a survey of principals, Jacob and Legren (2008) concluded that 
principals can successfully evaluate the best and worst teachers, but have a difficult time 
ranking the teachers that fall in the middle of the pack.  This research supports other 
research by Hanushek (2009) and Kimball and Milanowski (2009).  Harrison and Cohen-
Vogel (2012), in a survey of school administrators, concluded that so few poor teacher 
evaluations were given because of both evaluation design and administrator error. 
With such difficulty measuring teacher quality, education reformers have 
advocated the use of student achievement scores as measurements of teacher 
effectiveness.  Research regarding this issue is not as abundant as other issues, however 
conclusions can be made based upon the available literature.  Value added models 
(VAM) are mathematical equations used in teacher evaluations that determine the impact 
that the teacher had on their students’ achievement scores (Schochet and Chiang, 2010).  
The purpose of the value added model is to tie teacher evaluations to student 
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achievement; a practice that has been advocated in No Child Left Behind and Race to the 
Top.  Though field use of VAM scores for teacher evaluation has only recently been 
introduced, research regarding the quality of data that VAM scores create has been 
published.  Schochet and Chiang (2010) concluded that VAM scores are likely to have an 
error rate of 25% to 35%.  This error rate creates major issues when tying teacher 
evaluations to merit pay, as current education reform advocates.  Kimball and 
Milanowski (2009) determined that when comparing teacher evaluation conducted by 
principal evaluation with those done using VAM scores, inconsistent evaluations 
occurred often.  However, both Winters (2012a) and Golhaber and Hansen (2010) 
determined that using a teacher’s VAM score in their third year of teaching is predictive 
of their impact on student achievement in their fifth year of teaching.  
Changing the way teachers are evaluated is a major issue in modern education 
reform.  Research is inconclusive as to which is the most appropriate method to evaluate 
teachers.  Though current state level education policy is following the VAM-like model 
of tying teacher evaluation to student achievement, the implications that this will have to 
teacher evaluations, teaching as a profession, curriculum and student experience is not 
known.  What is clear from the literature is that teacher action and quality is the most 
important factor that determines student achievement.  It the way to connect those two 
issues effectively and equitably for evaluation and accountability that has yet to be 
discovered. 
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Testing 
 The high stakes testing movement is one of the oldest aspects of education 
reform.  The first glimpse of testing students on a standardized test can be seen in 1957 
when the United States learned that is was losing the space race to the Soviet Union with 
the launching of Sputnik.  The movement continued to grow in the 1970s with minimum 
competency tests and grew more prominent in 1983 and the publication of A Nation at 
Risk which called for more testing to compete with growing educational enemies home 
and abroad (Amrein and Berliner, 2002).  With the passing of No Child Left Behind and 
Race to the Top, high stakes testing became firmly planted in the education reform 
movement with every state currently having some form of testing for achievement  
(Baker and Johnston, 2010); however questions remain about the effectiveness of testing 
and impact that such testing has on students and teachers alike. 
 Research regarding how high stakes testing impacts the teaching profession is 
quite prevalent.  Au (2007) conducted 49 case studies and concluded that high stakes 
testing narrowed the curriculum being taught by teachers in a majority of the cases.  
Jacob (2005) examined teaching practices in a high stakes testing environment and 
concluded that teachers and schools were strategic (i.e. narrowing curriculum, increasing 
number of special education students, etc.) in their practices when testing was introduced.  
A review of teaching practices in North Carolina after high stakes testing was introduced 
showed that the assessment drove instruction, there was increase in time spent practicing 
for the test and an increased level of stress reported by teachers (Jones et al, 1999).   
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 Continuing with the issue of high stakes testing and impact on teaching, Lomax 
(1995) determined that in urban, impoverished, minority majority schools, high stakes 
testing caused an increase in poor teaching practices such as “drill and kill”.  In regards to 
self-efficacy, teachers in a study by Brown (2010) reported that with the introduction of 
the high stakes test, they began to measure their own abilities to teach on the success their 
student had on the test.  Echoing this, Cimbricz (2002) determined that it was teacher 
attitude and philosophy which determined how the high stakes test impacted their 
teaching practices.  Finally, Amrein and Berliner (2002) determined that high stakes 
testing resulted in an increase in teacher and administrator cheating on the test as well as 
an increase in teacher attrition due to increased stress and decreased job satisfaction. 
 The impact that high stakes testing has on students abounds and the conclusions 
drawn from the researchers are quite similar.  Amrein and Berliner (2002) studied the 
effects of high stakes testing in 18 states and concluded that in 17 of the 18 states, high 
stakes testing resulted in an increased student dropout rate and did not improve student 
achievement.  Albrecht and Joles (2003) concluded that high stakes testing could be in 
violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) because it 
discriminated against ESE students by not having all students take the tests.  Jones et al 
(1999) concluded that student anxiety increased alongside teacher anxiety with the 
implementation of the high stakes testing system. 
 The results of a 30 year study by Madaus and Clarke (2001) determined that high 
stakes testing did not improve teaching, did not increase student or teacher motivation, 
was not more effective in measuring student achievement and increased the dropout rate 
42 
 
of minority students.  A multitude of other research comes to similar conclusions 
regarding the lack of relationship between high stakes testing and student achievement.  
Marchant et al. (2006) determined that from 1992 to 2002, high stakes testing had little 
relationship with increasing student achievement.  Nichols et al. (2006) concluded that 
pressure from high stakes testing has no relationship with increasing student 
achievement.  Finally, Baker and Johnston (2010) concluded that students of low 
socioeconomic status were more likely to do poorly on high stakes tests than their high 
socioeconomic status twins.  
 High Stakes testing is a cornerstone of modern education reform.  By creating 
standardized tests to evaluate student achievement, teacher effectiveness and school 
quality can also be evaluated.  Though all 50 states and the D.C. currently have high 
stakes testing in place, the evidence from the literature review is overwhelming that high 
stakes testing is bad for students, teachers and has no impact on improving student 
achievement.   
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
 Public education is an evolving entity with a multitude of stakeholders having 
interests in the success of the system.  Having a variety of interests involved in the 
education system brings fourth various ideas on how to reform the public education 
system for all students.  One such reform, tax credit scholarship programs, has grown in 
support and use since first introduced in 1997 in the state of Arizona.  Though challenged 
in the state and federal courts through Kotterman v Killian and Arizona Christian School 
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Tuition Organization v. Winn et al, the Arizona law has paved the way for the growth of 
similar programs throughout the United States (Cavanagh, 2012).   
The premise behind tax credit scholarships is the idea of school choice.  Tax 
credit scholarships give students the opportunity to attend private institutions on state 
funds; however this differs from vouchers in an important manner.  Unlike vouchers, 
which place state funds directly in the hands of students to choose their k-12 school of 
enrollment, tax credit scholarships allow individuals or corporation the opportunity to 
donate funds to a scholarship organization in return for a tax break based upon their 
donation (Cavanagh, 2012). 
 Supporters of the tax credit scholarships argue that these programs give students, 
especially those of low socioeconomic status, the opportunity to leave poor performing 
public schools for private institutions; therefore giving these students an opportunity they 
might not have had without the scholarship.  Supporters also argue that tax credit 
scholarship help states spend less money on education while still giving students 
opportunities to improve their education.  Critics of this school reform legislation argue 
that tax credit scholarships are simply vouchers, hidden behind tax breaks.   As legal 
challenges have mounted against voucher programs throughout the United States, 
detractors of tax credit scholarships see these programs as underhanded actions meant to 
undermine the public education system, advance religious education through public funds 
and also claim that they are not as economically advantageous for state funds as 
previously stated (Cavanagh, 2012). 
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The thirteen states that currently have tax credit scholarships in place (Alabama, 
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Virginia) all follow basic guidelines, but 
differ in who can donate and how much can be donated (Davis, 2013).  Each state allows 
for individuals and/or corporations to donate to a scholarship organization created to give 
out these tax credit scholarships.  Each state chooses the limitations it places on the 
amount of money that can be donated, how large the scholarship fund will be and how 
much of a tax credit the contributor will receive for their donation.  The state also decides 
what types of students are able to receive the scholarship, which schools can receive the 
funds and how much each pupil will receive.  The overall premise for tax credit 
scholarship program is quite similar among all states; however they differ greatly in the 
aforementioned regards (Cavanagh, 2012). 
 The first subject to be examined regarding tax credit scholarships is the affect that 
these plans have had on student achievement.  After an extensive review of literature 
regarding student achievement, only one article was found tying a tax credit scholarship 
program and student achievement.  Figlio and Hart (2011) examined student achievement 
in Florida’s public k-12 schools after the tax credit scholarship program was started. The 
researchers concluded that the Florida tax credit scholarship program has improved the 
achievement of students at public school institutions through increased competition 
between private and public school (Figlio and Hart, 2011).  With this being the only 
research found regarding this topic, the results of this aspect of the literature review must 
be taken with caution.  
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 Proponents of tax credit scholarships claim that the creation of the programs will 
benefit students of minority and low socioeconomic status.  The argument can be made in 
some states where scholarships are limited to specific groups of students, however 10 of 
the 14 states with tax credit scholarships have lose limits as to who can receive the them  
(Davis, 2013).  Jacobs (1980) predicted the forthcoming use of tax credit scholarships 
and predicted they would benefit white families and children already in private 
institutions. Research by Belfield (2001) supported Jacob’s foresight and concluded that 
Arizona’s tax credit scholarship program benefitted those families who were already 
enrolled in private schools and the wealthy families enrolled in public schools because it 
was these families who had the means the motivation to claim tax credits. 
  Wilson (2000) reviewed Arizona’s tax credit program and determined that the 
law increased educational funding equity and predominantly benefitted wealthier 
families.  Data showed that the average tax credit scholarship was $411 and that 82% of 
the scholarships went to families making $150,000 or more per year (Wilson, 2000).  
Conversely, Keegan (2001) concluded that 70% to 80% of all scholarship money was 
going to the poorest students in Arizona. 
 The difficulty in examining tax credit scholarships is that the 14 states with them 
all have varying limits to donations, donators, and recipients.   For example, Florida 
limits tax credit scholarship to students of poverty, North Carolina limits their recipients 
to special needs students, and Minnesota has no limits on who can receive the scholarship  
(Davis, 2013).  This variety of plans and programs as well limits the extent to which 
research is available.  From the literature review, it cannot be concluded how tax credit 
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scholarships impacts student achievement and it cannot be concluded as to which groups 
of students benefit from these programs. 
 
Digital Learning 
 With the proliferation of computer usage and internet capability, digital learning 
has become an important issue in the education reform movement.  Though varying in 
funding, design, and support, the common theme to nearly all digital learning programs is 
the use of the computer to connect teacher to student (Barbour and Reeves, 2009).  
Supporters of digital learning argue that this innovative form of education allows for 
flexibility, meets the needs of the 21st century student, increases school choice and also 
motivates students.  Dissenters claim that digital learning breaks down the vital 
interactions between teacher and student, is discriminatory against those without the 
necessary technology and is harmful to student achievement (Barbour and Reeves, 2009).  
A review of literature was conducted to determine the current extent of digital learning as 
a school reform, its impact on the teaching profession and how students in digital 
learning programs compare to the TPS counterparts. 
 Currently, 30 states have state government run virtual schools while 24 states 
have full-time multi district online schools.  Overall, these schools serve less than 1% of 
the k-12 student population in the United States (Davis, 2013).  The use of the digital 
learning schools differ greatly with students using some schools as course recovery, 
while other utilizing them as full time students.  The interaction level between teacher 
and students varies among institutions ranging from video conferencing and physical 
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meet-ups to discussion board and emails chats only.  The design of these schools also 
changes from one institution to the other with control over the organization among 
between state controlled, university run, public or private and school district oversight 
(Cavanaugh et al, 2004).   
Funding for these digital institutions falls into three different categories:  central, 
public funded, or public/private funded.  Centrally funded virtual institutions are funded 
by the state legislature, state boards of education or state education agency with funds 
going to the state operated virtual school; 13 states currently use this model.  Publicly 
funded institutions are funded by the state legislature, state boards of education or state 
education agency as well, but funds can be used for both state operated virtual schools as 
well as other public virtual school organizations; nine states currently use this model.  
Finally, public/private funded digital learning institutions are similarly funded as the 
previous two models, but funds in this model can be used for both state, public and 
private virtual schools; this is the most popular model is use today with it being adopted 
by 26 states (Stedrak et al, 2012). 
Miron and Urschel (2012) examined K12 Inc., America’s largest online k-12 
education program with 65,000 students and concluded that students of the online 
institution had a lower graduation rate and performed statistically worse on state 
achievement tests.  Of the 48 K12 institutions in existence, seven (19.4%) received a 
satisfactory ranking by state education authorities and 27.7% met the AYP component of 
No Child Left Behind.  As a result of less expenditures on building and maintenance, the 
cost of running each individual K12 institution was much less that the TPS counterpart. 
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The influx of digital learning institutions has had an impact on the teaching 
profession.  Surveys by Hawkins et al (2012) and McConnell et al (2013) showed that 
teachers in the virtual school setting felt disconnected from students, faculty and the 
profession as a whole though McConnell et al (2013) also concluded that Professional 
Learning Communities via telecommunications was able help with teacher-teacher 
disconnection.  Furthermore, teachers felt unprepared for the change in teaching style that 
was needed in the virtual setting.  A review of teacher preparation programs by Compton 
et al. (2009) and Kennedy et al (2013) showed that current practices in teacher 
preparation programs were not preparing teachers for the changes brought by digital 
learning in the k-12 setting.   
The major push for digital learning as an education reform comes from the belief 
that by offering more school choice and increasing parental power, student achievement 
will increase.  Results regarding the major issue of student achievement are mixed.  
Barbour and Mulcahy (2008) examined digital learning programs in Canada and 
concluded that students of digital learning had similar achievement scores as TPS 
students.  Cavanaugh et al (2004) found a similar conclusion after conducting a meta-
analysis of 14 digital learning research articles.  An extensive meta-analysis conducted by 
Bernard et al. (2004), in which 232 studies were examined showed mixed results 
regarding student achievement and digital learning.  Rauh (2011), in research focused on 
socioeconomic status and student achievement determined that low and mid-poverty level 
students performed better in the TPS; however high poverty students received 
achievement scores in the virtual schools setting.  Overall, the results regarding student 
49 
 
achievement and use of digital learning are mixed with most studies showing digital 
learning does not decrease student achievement, but also not increasing the measurement.   
As an education reform, digital learning currently reaches less than 1% of all k-12 
students in the United States however nearly every states has some form of online 
schooling available to its public school students.  With educational achievement being a 
major rationale for the increase in online k-12 education, a review of literature was 
conducted to determine the impact this education reform has had on achievement.  
Though relatively new to the scene, research has shown that students in digital learning 
institutions did not outperform their TPS counterparts.  Further, it appears that teacher of 
virtual institutions are ill prepared for the changes needed to teach in digital format.   
 
Tenure 
Teacher tenure is a new issue in education reform.  Reforming the tenure process 
for public educators is based on the notion that by removing or making it more difficult to 
obtain tenure, teacher quality will improve and transparency for public education will 
increase.  This transparency will allow parents more control over the education their child 
is receiving.  It is also argued that tenure has allowed bad teachers to keep their positions 
while preventing good teacher from becoming great because of a lack of motivation once 
tenure is achieved (Hassel et al, 2011).  Opponents to changing tenure laws argue that 
tenure is a safeguard from the whims of subjective teacher evaluations and that tenure 
gives teachers the safety needed to be innovative in the classroom and enjoy academic 
freedom without fear of persecution.  It is also argued that tenure was put in place for the 
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teaching profession because the low pay of the profession can be offset by the security of 
employment (Hasel et al, 2011). 
Until 2011, every state in the United States had tenure laws in place for teachers.  
Florida, and 17 other states changed this with the passing of legislation focused on 
altering the teacher tenure process (Duffrin, 2011).  Before this, state laws had allowed 
for teacher tenure; the length of time before obtaining tenure status varied throughout the 
United States from one to seven years with 32 of the 50 states determining that teachers 
obtained tenure status upon three years of successful teaching (Sawchuk, 2010).  With 
other states looking into changing their tenure laws, a review of literature was conducted 
to determine how tenure impacts the teaching profession and how possible changes in the 
tenure process could impact student achievement. 
 In theory, tenure is given to those teachers of high quality and with years of 
experience.  However, the varying tenure laws and difficulty in taking away tenure from 
poor performing teachers was reported to cause difficulty in a survey of school 
administrators by Harrison and Cohen-Vogel (2012).  Survey results showed that 60% of 
school administrators did not believe that tenure laws supported fair evaluations and 91% 
of administrators believed that tenure laws blocked dismissal of teachers.   
 As discussed in the evaluation section of the literature review, current evaluation 
research and policy (including Race to the Top) has called for a connection between 
teacher evaluations and student achievement.  With most states beyond Florida looking to 
adapt their tenure process and not get rid of it altogether, a review of literature was 
conducted to determine how student achievement could be used to determine tenure 
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policy changes.  Research by Goldhaber and Hanson (2010) and Winters (2012a) 
concluded that VAM scores could be used to correctly determine a teacher’s impact on 
student achievement score.  Though these results show that tenure could be tied to 
student achievement in a mathematically true manner, both research conclusions warn of 
connecting VAM scores to teacher tenure due to the connection between education 
finance, teacher salary, and student achievement data.   
With the growing political nature of education policy and reform, teacher tenure 
is perhaps the newest of reforms.  Literature is abundant regarding the impact of teacher 
quality, years of teaching service and student achievement, but sparse when examining 
the impact of tenure on teacher motivation.  As the most modern education reform, issues 
of teacher tenure have not been thoroughly researched to conclude the impact that these 
changes will have on student achievement and the teaching profession. 
 
Voucher Programs 
A major issue in facing public education today is the advancement of voucher 
programs into the state-controlled educational philosophies.  Currently, vouchers are used 
in 11 states and D.C. (Davis, 2013).  However, the Wall Street Journal called 2011 the 
“Year of School Choice” as 41 states either passed or discussed legislation regarding 
vouchers (Wolf et al., 2013).  The entire premise of school vouchers is that failing public 
schools cannot provide an adequate education to students.  Vouchers will allow students 
who could most likely not afford private school, an option to obtain their education at the 
private institution which, theoretically, would offer the student a better education.  
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Through competition, it is argued, public schools would improve and those that did not 
would cease to exist because students would have a choice of whether they will attend a 
different public school or use a voucher to pay for tuition at a private institution.  This 
competition theory is at the heart of the voucher movement; however legal uncertainties 
as well as achievement outcomes must be addressed to determine the effectiveness and 
necessity of these vouchers.   
Before examining the current research regarding public school vouchers, it is 
necessary to look at the historical evidence of school choice and voucher-like systems to 
understand from where this “new” idea has come.  Thomas Paine in 1791 and  
John Stuart Mill in 1840 advocated for a voucher like system (Wolf et al, 2013); early 
American local communities in Maine and Vermont which did not have public secondary 
schools offered their residents vouchers to attend the local or neighboring parochial 
school.  The struggle between the parochial school and the newly founded public school 
system hit a pinnacle when, in 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant tried to get a 
constitutional amendment passed that would ban the use of public funds being given to 
religious based organizations.  The goal of this amendment was to end the discrimination 
from the nativist group the Know-Nothings and put an end to the conflict between 
parochial and public school (Sutton & King, 2011).  Perhaps the first notion of vouchers 
in modern context came from Thomas Friedman, who in 1955 made the argument that 
government should pay for schooling of citizens, but for the educating to be done in 
private institutions (Wolf et al., 2013).  The issue of vouchers was one set up in a purely 
theoretical frame for most of the United States’ public education history. 
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In the 1990’s, local school boards in a few states started to pass laws giving 
students in low performing schools a choice of leaving that school and attending a private 
school (whether religiously affiliated or not) on publicly funded vouchers.  What started 
off in Milwaukee, Wisconsin soon spread through Ohio, Colorado and Florida as more 
states saw privatizing public schools through vouchers programs as a viable remedy to 
public schools which were said to not be achieving the goal of student preparation 
(Sutton & King, 2011).  As voucher initiatives continued to sprout through the grounds of 
state legislature floors, the legality of vouchers was soon called into question. 
The foremost case regarding school vouchers is Zellmann v Simmons-Harris.  In 
this case, the Supreme Court ruled that despite the fact that most private schools were 
religiously affiliated; vouchers did not violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because the money was first given to parents, who then decided which 
private institution would receive the public funds (Eberle-Peay, 2011).  The parent is able 
to choose whether the private school their child will attend on the voucher is religious or 
secular in nature.  The Establishment Clause states that Congress will not make any laws 
that support a specific religion.  On a Federal constitutional level, precedence has been 
set; however legal challenges on the state level are finding different conclusions.  
The major difference between the results of the Supreme Court case previously 
discussed and state judicial decisions has to do with what is in state constitution that is 
not enumerated in the Federal constitution.  Within 40 of the 51 state and district 
constitutions in the United States lies what are known as No Aid Clauses.  These clauses 
state that no public funds can be used for sectarian or religious purposes.  It is this clause 
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in the 40 state constitutions that have shown to be the major stumbling block for voucher 
programs.  Affectionately known as Blaine Amendments after former Congressman and 
presidential hopeful James G. Blaine, these clauses have stopped voucher programs form 
proceeding in many states, including Ohio, Florida, and Colorado (Sutton & King, 2011).   
Beyond the No Aid Clauses, further state legal challenges have declared voucher 
programs unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the uniformity clause 
regarding public and private education.  These clauses, found in 16 state constitutions 
declare that a fair and uniform public school system must be provided by the state (Sutton 
& King, 2011).  The pinnacle case regarding the use of a uniformity clause is 2006’s Bush 
v. Holmes.  This case centered on the creation of a voucher program, Opportunity 
Scholarship Program, designed to give parents the choice of sending their child to a 
different school using publicly funded vouchers so as long as their child’s home school 
received a failing grade two consecutive years.  Every court that heard the case, including 
the Florida Supreme Court, declared that the voucher program was illegal because it 
violated the uniformity clause (Gey, 2008).  In ruling, the court stated that by taking 
money from the public school system, the state was not fulfilling its constitutionally 
required role supporting a uniform public education system (Sutton & King, 2011). 
Outside of the historical and legal context of voucher programs, research has 
focused on the impact that voucher programs have on student achievement.  An extensive 
literature review was conducted regarding this issue with conclusions able to be drawn.  
In a study of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin voucher program, Carlson et al (2013) concluded 
that students who went to private schools on vouchers and then came back to public 
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schools performed at a higher level than when they initially left the public institution.  
The researchers concluded that the simple act of experience a private institution impacted 
student achievement in a positive manner.  Rouse (1998) also examined the voucher 
program of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and concluded that vouchers had a positive impact of 
math gains but no impact on reading gains when examining students in the private school 
setting.  Winters and Green (2011) concluded that the existence of a voucher program 
decreased the likelihood that a student would be labeled ESE status and that a small, 
positive correlation existed between existence of a voucher program and public school 
achievement.  
Etscheidt (2005) examined the impact that vouchers had on student achievement 
of special education students and determined that voucher programs are not equitable 
toward ESE students as private schools do not have to offer the services for these 
students as do public schools and found no correlation between student achievement of 
ESE students and voucher status.  Howell et al (2002) examined voucher students in New 
York City, Dayton, Ohio and D.C. city schools and determined that vouchers had a small 
positive impact on student achievement, but only in the African American subgroup.  All 
other subgroups showed no student achievement gains.  Ladd (2002), in a meta-analysis 
of voucher literature concluded that vouchers may have a small positive impact on 
pockets of student achievement, but large scaled positive impacts are not found.  Ladd 
also found that vouchers increase racial and social stratification of schools causing 
resegregation to occur. 
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In 1999 the state of Florida created the McKay Scholarship program; this 
voucher, only available to special education students, is the largest voucher program in 
the United States and gives each student who receives the voucher an average of $7,206.  
To obtain the voucher, a student must be a special needs students, or have in Individual 
Education Plan (IEP) (Greene & Winters, 2008).  Weidner and Herrington (2006) 
examined the impact that the voucher program had on parental attitudes and concluded 
that parents of students who used the McKay Scholarship were happier with their 
student’s education and more satisfied with the school as a whole.  However, the 
researchers also concluded that parents of higher socioeconomic status and higher 
education level were more likely to use the vouchers than their poorer and less educated 
counterparts.   
Further research on the McKay Scholarship program by Greene and Winters 
(2008) concluded that all special education students, not simply those on the McKay 
scholarship, received a better education based upon the mere existence of the scholarship.  
The researchers also concluded that there was a positive relationship between the 
proximity of the private school accepting vouchers and student achievement at the public 
school; in other words, the closer the public school was to the private, voucher accepting 
institution the better the education students at the public schools would receive.  The 
competition that arose between public and private school because of the voucher caused 
the public schools to improve.   
A major premise of vouchers is that private schools can provide better education 
than public schools.  Levin (1998) found no statistical difference between public and 
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private school achievement; data did show that private institutions had higher graduation 
rates, college enrollment and college graduation rates but that the introduction of 
vouchers as a school choice program increased stratification on socioeconomic status and 
race, continuing the path of resegregation.  Rangazas (1997) also concluded that school 
vouchers will benefit those with motivation and ability to pay the extra costs of using 
voucher, leaving behind the lowest students.  This division of students will cause public 
school to be less efficient therefore going against the idea of competition bringing about 
efficiency.  McEwan (2004) also determined that equity was hurt with voucher programs 
increased sorting at all levels of public education.  The same author also concluded that 
there was no link between competition between public and private school and student 
achievement gains; however it was determined that African Americans showed small 
achievement gains when using vouchers. 
Wolf (2008) examined ten studies regarding voucher programs and determined 
that vouchers had a small positive impact on student achievement but with little statistical 
significance.  Wolf et al (2013) examined D.C.’s voucher school system and concluded 
that though vouchers did increase graduation rates and reading scores, the existence of a 
voucher program did not have an impact on math scores.   
Research on the impact of voucher programs on student achievement has shown 
mixed results.  Vouchers do not hurt student achievement, but have not shown to be as  
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helpful as hoped.  The existence of a voucher program increases the inequity in public 
schools; however using the voucher does increase parental satisfaction with their child’s 
education.  From the literature review it can be concluded that research does not support 
the notion that vouchers are increasing overall student achievement. 
 
Education Reform Organizations 
American Legislative Exchange Council 
 The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), is a non-profit 501(c) (3) 
status organization with a focus on creating successful state level legislation.  The 
organization, created in 1973 by group of conservative state legislatures and policy 
stakeholders, falls under the belief of limited government, federalism and individual 
freedom (History-ALEC).  The organization has nine task forces focused on various 
aspects of life from crime and civil justice to health care and education.  Each task force 
is set up to work with state legislators in order to advance the philosophies of the 
organization and consists of both a public chair (legislator) and a private chair (business 
person).   
Membership to ALEC costs between $7,000 and $25,000 depending on the level 
of interaction with legislators that corporation or private sector entity wishes to obtain; 
membership on the task forces requires an additional corporate payment between $2,000 
and $10,000 depending on the prestige and influence of the task force (Boldt, 2012).  
This influence can be seen in education with the example of Ron Packard, CEO of K12 
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Inc., America’s largest online charter school corporation, who currently sits on the ALEC 
Education Task Force (Fischer, 2013).  These corporate donations allow the corporation 
the access to influential state legislators, pay 99% of ALEC’s $7 million dollar budget 
and also goes toward a state “scholarship” that helps legislators in each state pay for their 
ALEC memberships and cost of attending the ALEC retreats; further corporate donations 
are received each year to sponsor these ALEC retreats and the annual meeting (Greeley & 
Fitzgerald, 2011).   
 For the purpose of this research, the Education task force within ALEC, and its 
annual publication Report Card on American Education was examined.  The mission of 
the Education task force is to “…promote excellence in the nation’s educational system, 
to advance reforms through parental choice, to support efficiency, accountability, and 
transparency in all educational institutions, and to ensure America’s youth are given the 
opportunity to succeed.” (Education-ALEC).  The education task force is responsible for 
creating “model legislation” to help state legislators produce successful education 
reforms which adhere to the philosophies of the organization.  Rep. Greg Foristall, 
Republican from Iowa and Johnathan Butcher of the Goldwater Institute are the current 
public and private chairs of the task force (Education-ALEC).   
 The Report Card on American Education for the year 2013 is the 18th edition of 
the publication.  It is only since the 16th edition of such publication that ALEC has given 
each state and D.C. a letter grade for education policy as well as an overall ranking.  For 
the 18th edition, ALEC used multiple measures to create the ranking and grading system 
in the publication.  The measures include academic standards, charter school laws, 
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homeschool regulation, private school choice, teacher quality policies, and digital 
learning.  These variables were quantified in a manner which aligned with the philosophy 
of the organization and an average score was created.  This score was averaged with the 
state scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) as well as 
variable including state education spending and graduation rates to create both a ranking 
of the state and an education policy letter grade (Ladner & Myslinski 2013).  For the 
purpose of this research, the numeric ranking, which averages the education policy grade 
with other variables, was used to help determine state ranking.  
 Of the three organizations used by the researcher, ALEC is the most prominent 
and longstanding; though its’ 40 year history brings name recognition it also brings about 
controversy surrounding the interactions between ALEC, political leaders and the 
business community.  ALEC’s membership consists mostly of corporations and their 
leaders and state legislators.  These two groups are the creators of the “model legislation” 
previously referenced.  With the members of corporations and legislatures working 
collaboratively on creating the state legislation, the ALEC produced bills are 
ideologically conservative and focused on the ALEC’s principals of decreased taxation 
and private sector supremacy (Boldt, 2012).   
ALEC estimates that from this “model legislation” thousands of state level bills 
are introduced on a yearly basis with a passing rate of 17% (McIntire, 2012), compared to 
the national average of 4% (Shaw, 2009).  For the legislative year 2013, The Center for 
Media and Democracy determined there were 139 ALEC model education reform bills 
introduced into state legislatures.  These bills were focused on increasing charter schools, 
parental power, vouchers, tax credit scholarships and alternative certification programs.   
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 Despite the relationship that ALEC creates between corporations and legislators, 
the organization is not considered a lobbying unit and therefore falls outside the election 
laws and tax codes created to ensure public oversight of such relationships; because the 
corporate leaders and state legislators only create “model legislation”, not actual 
legislation, ALEC retains its’ nonprofit status (Boldt, 2012).  Though an argument can be 
made that as members of the task force, corporations reach out to legislators and help 
create “model legislation” at ALEC sponsored retreats every year in a similar way 
lobbyists reach out to legislators to influence legislation, ALEC has continued to 
gracefully walk to the line between non-profit political think tank and corporate lobbyist. 
 
The Center for Education Reform 
 The Center for Education Reform (CER) is an organization with a mission to 
empower parents and reform public education in the United States.  The CER was 
founded in 1993 by its current President, Jeanne Allen and has collaborated with other 
education reform organizations such as the Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation and 
the Walton Family Foundation in order to advance the cause of education reform 
(Background-CER).  The organization focuses on both community and media outreach to 
help create a coalition of education reformers.  Though the organization does not directly 
influence policy decisions as collaboration with legislators is not as prominent as seen in 
ALEC, the CER acts as an information distributor involving issues such as education 
transparency, unions, tenure, evaluation and other education reform issues. 
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 The Parent Power Index (PPI) is a ranking of the 50 states and the D.C. in regards 
to how much power parents have over their child’s education.  Power defined by the CER 
as parents having access to quality education and information for their child’s education 
experience.  The five variables that were used to rank the states include charter schools, 
school choice, teacher quality, transparency and online learning (Parent Power Index).  
These five factors are ranked in regards to the philosophy of the organization and the 
current educational practices and policies of the states and district.   
 
Students First 
Students First is a 501(c) (4) organization created in 2010 by former D.C. 
Chancellor of schools Michelle Rhee.  The mission of the “grassroots” organization is to 
reform public education so that all students receive the best education possible from the 
best teachers possible.  This can be done through education reform policy issues focused 
on teacher tenure, accountability, parent choice, online learning and various other 
education reforms. The organization is currently active in 18 states and basis its focus on 
three pillars:  elevate the teaching profession, empower parents with data and choice, and 
spend wisely and govern well (Students First, 2013).   
Students First published its 2013 State Policy Report Card as a means to evaluate 
states based upon the three pillars of the organization.  Each state was given both a letter 
grade and a Grade Point Average (GPA) based on a scale of 0-4.  Methodologically, 
Students First examined all policies and regulations regarding public education in the 
frame of falling under the three pillars and creating an environment for reform.  Once 
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each piece of policy/regulation was categorized as either elevating the teaching 
profession, empowering parents, or spending wisely/governing well, the policies were 
then given a ranking of 0-4, based upon a reform rubric, to determine the strength by 
which the policy helped create the environment for reform (Students First 2013).  This 
method of calculation allowed the organization to create a ranking of all 50 states and the 
D.C. in regards to their current and future education reform environment.  
The publication of these state rankings was not without conflict.  As student 
achievement was not a major measurement value used to determine the state grade, 
Massachusetts, a state constantly ranked near the top of public education rankings 
received a “D” and no state received an “A”.  Overall 28 states received a “D” and 11 
states received an “F”.  Florida and Louisiana were the two highest ranking states, both 
receiving a “B” and nine states and the District of Columbia received a “C”  
(Wolfgang, 2013).   
Beyond the grading of state education reform legislation and policy, Students 
First has moved quickly to gain ground in states focused on education reform.  For the 
2011-2012 election cycle, Students First spent $533,000 on 60 local and state elections in 
Tennessee; this sum gave Students First the title of largest campaign donator in the state 
behind the committees of the major political parties.  Further, in 2013 Students First spent  
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just over $250,000 on the Los Angeles School Board elections (Guo, 2013).  With a focus 
on analyzing and influencing state and local education policy through published 
evaluation and campaign contribution, Students First is a young organization focused on 
growing its influence in the field of education reform.  
 
States 
 The ten states chosen for the research were put in rank order as measured by the 
three education reform organizations previously discussed.  The mean average of each 
organization’s ranking was used to determine the top ten states focused on education 
reform.  The states are listed in order based upon this aggregate ranking.  
 
Indiana 
The state of Indiana’s legislature is known as the General Assembly.  It consists 
of 150 total members, 50 from the Senate and 100 from the House of Representatives.  
The General Assembly meets every year but with differing lengths depending on the 
year.  During odd numbered years the Assembly meets 61 days which must be concluded 
by April 29; during even numbered years the Assembly meets for 30 days and must 
conclude by March 14.  House members serve two year terms while their Senatorial 
counterparts serve four year terms.  For a bill to become a law, it must pass each house by 
a majority vote and then be signed by the governor (Indiana General Assembly).  The 
General Assembly is considered a part-time legislature and its members receive a salary 
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of $22,616.46 per year and $152 per diem for each day of the session (Empire Center, 
2012).   
Florida 
The state of Florida’s bicameral legislature consists of 120 representatives and 40 
senators.  Each officeholder is limited to eight years in a specific office.  Representatives 
are elected for two year terms and Senators for four year terms.  The legislature meets the 
first Tuesday after the First Monday in March and for no more than 60 days of regular 
session.  For a bill to become a law, it must pass each house by a majority vote and then 
be signed by the governor (Online Sunshine).  The state legislature is considered a part-
time position and members receive a salary of $29,687 per year and $131 per day during 
session (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Ohio 
Ohio’s state legislature is known as the General Assembly and consists of a 99 
member House of Representatives and a 33 member Senate.  Each legislator is limited to 
consecutive terms of eight years total.  Members of the Senate are elected for four year 
terms and members of the House are elected for two year terms.  The full time legislature 
meets on year round biennium’s and receive $60,583 per year (Empire Center, 2012).  
Bills introduced during the biennium must be passed by the end of the second year; if 
they do not pass both houses with a majority vote they do not carry over to the next 
biennium (Ohio Legislator Guide Book).   
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Arizona 
Arizona’s bicameral legislature consists of a 60 member House of Representatives 
and a 30 member Senate.  Each member can serves two-year terms and is limited to four 
years in that position; members can run for office in the other house of the legislature 
after their term limit.  Each of Arizona’s 30 districts is represented by two members of 
the House and one member of the Senate.  The legislature meets on the second Monday 
in January each year and has a 120 day calendar.  As in other states, both houses must 
pass a bill by popular vote in order for it to go to the governor for signing (Arizona State  
Legislature FAQ).  Arizona’s legislature is considered part-time and as such its members 
receive $24,000 a year for their position with an additional $35 per day if a special 
session is called by the governor (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Louisiana 
The Louisiana state legislature is broken down into the House of Representatives 
and the Senate.  There are 105 members of the House and 39 members of the Senate and 
each are elected for four year terms with a 3 term (12 year) limit.  The legislature meets 
each year, but with varying lengths.  During even numbered years the legislature meets 
on the last Monday in March for a session no longer than 60 days within an 85 day 
timeframe.  During odd numbered years the legislature meets the last Monday in April 
for no longer than 45 days in a 60 day timeframe.  A bill must pass both houses with 
majority votes in order for the bill to move onto the governor for signature (Louisiana 
State Legislature).  The legislature of Louisiana is considered part-time and its members 
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receive an annual salary of $16,800 with an additional $6,000 for expenses; legislators 
also receive $149 per diem while in session (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Minnesota 
Minnesota has a bicameral legislature with a House of Representatives and a 
Senate.  There are 134 members of the House and 67 members of the Senate; there are no 
term limits for senators ore representatives.  Legislative sessions are held biennially and 
begin on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the odd numbered year.  
On even numbered years the legislature meets on dates agree by each governing body.  
During the biennium term there can be a maximum of 120 legislative days (Minnesota 
Legislature).  Legislators receive $31,149 per year in salary and expenses of $96 in the 
senate and $66 in the house per legislative day (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s state legislature is divided into the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  The legislature consists of 99 representatives and 33 senators.  Each district in 
the state is represented by three representatives and one senator.  Half of the senate and 
all 99 representatives are elected every two years without term limits.  Biennial 
legislative sessions begin the first week of each odd numbered year, there is a summer 
recess, and then reconvene in September to continue legislative duties.  A bill must pass 
both houses with majority votes in order for the bill to move onto the governor 
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(Wisconsin Legislature).  Legislators are receive a salary of $49,943 annually and $88 a 
day as stipend during the legislative sessions (Empire Center, 2012).    
 
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma’s bicameral legislature is made up of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate.  The legislature consists of 101 representatives and 48 senators who are 
limited to a 12 term.  Representatives are elected every two years and senator every four 
years on a staggered basis.  The legislative session begins on the first Monday in 
February of each year and must adjourn by the last Friday in May of the same year.   All 
bills majority support from both the house and senate in order for the bill to be passed 
(Oklahoma Legislature).  Oklahoma’s part-time legislators receive $38,400 per year and 
$147 per diem while in session (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Georgia 
Georgia’s bicameral General Assembly consists of a House of Representatives 
and a Senate.  The house consists of 180 members and the senate has 56; each legislator 
is elected for a two year term but without term limits.  The legislative session begins the 
second Monday of each year and lasts only 40 days.  Any legislation introduced during 
the first session can be brought up the following year’s session but if not acted upon 
during the second session, the bill dies.  Bills must pass both bodies with majority vote to 
move on in the legislative process (New Georgia Encyclopedia).  As a part-time 
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legislature, representatives and senators receive an annual salary of $17,342 and a stipend 
of $173 per diem in session (Empire Center, 2012). 
 
Michigan 
Michigan’s bicameral state legislature is made up of a House of Representatives 
and a Senate.  Each of the 110 representatives is elected for a two year term with a 
maximum of three terms and each of the 38 senators for a four year term with a 
maximum of two terms.  As pursuant to the state constitution, each legislative session 
begins on the second Wednesday of January of each year and a session last the entire year 
with short breaks throughout.  Bills are introduced in both bodies and must pass with a 
majority vote in both in order for the bill to reach the governor (Michigan Constitution, 
1963).  As a full-time legislative body, legislators receive a salary of $71,685 per year 
with a $10,800 stipend for expenses (Empire Center, 2012) 
 
Summary 
Education reform is difficult to define because it is contextually an issue of 
various and sundry facets.  From alternative certification to vouchers, the impact that 
education reform must be placed in frameworks including student achievement, impact 
on the teacher profession, politics and a multitude of others.  An exhaustive review of 
literature was conducted to determine how the nine themes of education reform, 
alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/ unions, evaluation, 
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testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure and voucher programs, impacted 
a variety of variables in K-12 setting of the United States.  Further information regarding 
prominent education reform organizations, The Center for Education Reform (CER), 
Students First, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), was also 
specified.  The literature review concluded with an explanation of the legislatures of each 
of the ten states, Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan that were researched in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3:  METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to determine the political and social forces 
supporting, the rationale behind, and the growth and impact of education reform policies 
in the K-12 public education system of the United States.  The expansiveness of this 
purpose required a multidimensional approach to conducting research; because of this, a 
mixed method research design was chosen as the most appropriate manner in which to 
meet the purpose of the study and be able to draw conclusions regarding the research 
questions.  A qualitative and quantitative analysis of ten states and hundreds of pieces of 
legislation was conducted with the goal of creating a 360 degree view of the America's k-
12 education reform movement. 
 
Selection of the Sample 
The population of the study consisted of all fifty states of the United States, the 
District of Columbia and every legislator who authored education reform legislation in 
legislative sessions from 2001-2011.  To meet the requirement of education reform 
legislation, the bills introduced had to be focused on alternative certification, charter 
schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, 
digital/learning, tenure or voucher programs. 
For the purpose of this study, ten states were selected as the sample.  The states 
used as the sample were chosen based upon rankings by three major education reform 
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organizations in the United States.  The ten states chosen were Indiana, Florida, Ohio, 
Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia and Michigan. The three 
education reform organizations used to create this sample were the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), The Center for Education Reform, and Students First.  These 
organizations were chosen because all were renowned for their focus on education reform 
and have ranked all 50 states and the District of Columbia based upon education reform 
legislation and policy.  Using a triumvirate of ALEC's 2013 publication, Report Card on 
American Education: Ranking K-12 Performance, Progress and Reform, The Center for 
Education Reform's Parent Power Index and Students First's State Policy Report Card 
2013  (TABLE 1), a quantified list of the top ten reform-minded states was created by 
taking the lowest mean scores of three rankings together (TABLE 2).  The District of 
Columbia was removed from the rankings because the legislative set up of the district as 
well as its physical proximity and political setting as the Capital of the United States. 
Once the sampling of the states was concluded, an examination of the education 
reform legislation and authoring legislator in each of the ten states from 2001-2011 was 
conducted.  All legislators who authored the enacted education reform bills within the ten 
sample states and all enacted bills falling under the parameters of alternative certification,  
charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, 
digital learning, tenure or voucher programs were used as the sample. This sampling was 
used for the research to obtain a more thorough and illustrative account of education 
reform. 
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Table 1:  State Rankings by Education Reform Organization 
Rank         ALEC Center for Education Reform Students First 
1 Indiana Indiana Louisiana 
2 Arizona Florida Florida 
3 Oklahoma Louisiana Indiana 
4 Florida Ohio District of Columbia 
5 Ohio District of Columbia Rhode Island 
6 Louisiana Arizona Michigan 
7 Michigan Georgia Hawaii 
8 Wisconsin Wisconsin Arizona 
9 Utah Minnesota Colorado 
10 Georgia Utah Ohio 
11 Pennsylvania Michigan Tennessee 
12 District of Columbia Pennsylvania Delaware 
13 Idaho Colorado Oklahoma 
14 Minnesota Oklahoma Massachusetts 
15 Texas New York Georgia 
16 Colorado South Carolina Washington 
17 California California Maryland 
18 Nevada Idaho Connecticut 
19 Tennessee Rhode Island Pennsylvania 
20 New Mexico Missouri Wisconsin 
21 North Carolina North Carolina New York 
22 Illinois Delaware Maine 
23 South Carolina Texas New Jersey 
24 New Hampshire Nevada Nevada 
25 Wyoming Tennessee Utah 
26 Missouri Maine New Mexico 
27 New Jersey New Mexico Minnesota 
28 Massachusetts Massachusetts Arkansas 
29 Arkansas Oregon Illinois 
30 Iowa New Jersey Texas 
31 Oregon Illinois South Carolina 
32 Delaware Hawaii Mississippi 
33 Maine Arkansas North Carolina 
34 Connecticut New Hampshire Missouri 
35 Mississippi Connecticut Kentucky 
36 Kansas Wyoming Kansas 
37 Virginia Maryland Oregon 
38 New York Washington Virginia 
39 Hawaii Virginia Alaska 
40 Washington Mississippi Idaho 
41 Alaska Alaska New Hampshire 
42 Alabama Kansas California 
43 Rhode Island West Virginia Alabama 
44 Vermont South Dakota South Dakota 
45 Kentucky Vermont Iowa 
46 Maryland Alabama Vermont 
47 West Virginia Kentucky Wyoming 
48 South Dakota Iowa West Virginia 
49 Montana North Dakota Nebraska 
50 North Dakota Nebraska Montana 
51 Nebraska Montana North Dakota 
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Table 2:  State Ranking Based Upon Education Reform Policy 
State Mean Ranking 
Indiana 1.67 
Florida 2.67 
Louisiana 3.33 
Arizona 5.33 
Ohio 6.33 
District of Columbia* 7 
Michigan 8 
Oklahoma 10 
Georgia 10.67 
Wisconsin 12 
Minnesota 12 
Range 10.33 
*District of Columbia not used in this research.  
 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research designs are procedures for obtaining, examining, interpreting and 
presenting data in a research study.  The research design helps guide the researcher in 
determining the logical steps by which the researching process should take place 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011).  For the purpose of this research, a mixed method research 
design was used.  Though relatively new in the research world, mixed method research 
has increased in popularity as the barriers between quantitative and qualitative research 
have slowly been broken down with more than 40 known mixed methods research 
designs being identified (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007).  Qualitative methods are usually 
more rich and deep in institutional understanding and also extensive in illustration of the 
context and environment in which the research is being done.  This methodology allows 
for an in depth look at a specific issue of study, however lacks the generalizability of 
quantitative research and can often appear less supported based on a lack of quantified 
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data to back conclusions (Lieber, 2009).  Quantitative methods offer much more 
generalizability then qualitative methods, usually require less time to complete the 
research, and are less likely to have bias in the results (Lieber, 2009). 
It is the diversity of social research that requires more than a one-or-the other 
approach to methodology when deciding between qualitative or quantitative methods.  
Simplistically, quantitative methods is about collecting numbers, while qualitative 
methods is about collecting words (Greene et al., 1989).  The goal of the mixed methods 
research design is to combine the best of both quantitative and qualitative research while 
at the same time controlling for the flaws of each research methodology.  Mixed methods 
research allows the research to be more dynamic while also having the methodology be 
grounded in quantifiable supported detail (Coller & Elman, 2008).  It is the mixed 
methods design that has the ability to limit researcher bias, increase validity of the results, 
and illustrate a more complete picture of the issue being studied through the 
accumulation of a wealth of data created by the quantifiable and qualitative  
(Greene et. al. , 1989; Bryman, 2006). 
For the purpose of this research, a triangulation type of mixed method research 
was used.  Triangulation focuses on creating a corroboration and convergence of 
information to increase validity and decrease bias (Greene et. al., 1989; Bryman, 2006; 
Cresswell & Clark, 2011).  Triangulation is a form of the convergent design of mixed 
methods research and is the most common, yet most challenging of the research designs 
(Cresswell & Clark, 2011). Convergent designs allow the researcher to value the 
quantitative and qualitative data equally, research them simultaneously, and then 
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converge the two sects of data into a congruent conclusion during the integration phase 
just after analysis of each sect of research occurs.  This convergence increases the 
validity of the data and decreases the likelihood of bias (Caracelli & Greene, 1997; 
Cresswell & Clark, 2011). 
Triangulation or convergent analysis was chosen for this research due to 
multifaceted topic of education reform.  With the topic having various meanings and with 
the purpose of the study to create a complete illustration of education reform including 
causes, themes, and impact, the researcher felt it necessary to use both quantifiable and 
qualitative data.  The qualitative data for this research focused on the examination of 
education reform legislation.  The quantified data focused on funding for education and 
legislators.  By examining these issues separately, and then converging the analysis, a 
more rich, descriptive and supported picture of America's education reform movement 
was painted. 
Collection of Data 
The first part of data collection was focused on obtaining education reform 
legislation from 2001-2011 that had been enacted in each of the ten identified states: 
Indiana, Florida, Ohio, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Georgia 
and Michigan.  Legislation was found through the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) education bill tracking system; this system held bills enacted in 
legislation sessions 2001-2011 at the time of the research.  Each bill was reviewed and 
categorized by educational reform theme and sponsor/co-sponsor.  These bills were then 
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found on each state’s legislative search apparatus and read to have a thorough 
understanding of all of the education reform legislation.  
The next step in the data collection was to obtain the political campaign donations 
for each year in which the authoring legislator was a candidate for office from  
2001-2011.  After each legislator who authored the enacted education reform legislation 
was identified, an examination into the campaign contributions for each candidate, in the 
election cycle preceding the authored and enacted legislation was conducted.  Using data 
from the National Institute on Money in State Politics, campaign contributions were 
traced to the specific political donor.  All donors were examined for the specific election 
cycle; however only education oriented donors with ties to major education organizations 
were included in data analysis.  These connections were discovered through the use of 
search engine results.  After searching for each contributor, a review of their 
accomplishments and connections was conducted to determine which organizations they 
held affiliation.  Each donor was examined to determine how much was donated to the 
candidate in the election cycle immediately preceding the year of legislation enaction.  
Finally, an examination of current vendor contracts connected to the authored legislation 
was conducted using state procurement office data and vendor contract data provided by 
each state.  Each of the ten states of the sample had government agency search engines 
available to determine the state vendor contracts awarded to each organization.   
The third step in data collection was to obtain per-pupil spending on K-12 
education within each of the ten states from 2001-2011 while also amassing the amount 
of education reform legislation introduced in those same years.  This data was retrieved 
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from the National Center for Education Statistics and specific state departments of 
education when needed.  Each state had 11 years of per-pupil education funding, 
converted to 2011 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, and the number of education 
reform bills placed into an SPSS spreadsheet for analysis. 
Research Questions 
Using the theoretical framework as a guide, the researcher developed five guiding 
research questions regarding the education reform movement in the k-12 public education 
system of the United States. 
1. What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States 
between 2001-2011? 
2. Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and 
support for education reform legislation? 
3. What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
4. Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
5. Who is financing education reform legislation? 
6. Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
7. Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits 
for their support? 
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Analysis of Data 
Question one was focused on the rationale for education reform of the K-12 
system in the United States.  To determine the rationale, an examination and review of 
literature regarding each reform was conducted.  Education reform was identified as 
literature and research focused on alternative certification, charter schools, collective 
bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or 
voucher programs. Each topic was thoroughly reviewed to determine the impact that the 
reform had on public education in terms of student achievement, achievement gap, 
efficiency, effectiveness and further implications.  An analysis of this research was able 
to conclude how these reforms impacted public education; though it did not conclusively 
answer question one, it did serve as a qualitative starting point which was later converged 
in summation. 
Question two was meant to address the issue of political party platform and 
likelihood of supporting education reform on both a meta scale and identified education 
reform level.  After collecting the data from each of the ten states regarding legislator and 
education reform bills enacted, an SPSS data spreadsheet was created; the spreadsheet 
classified each legislator by political party affiliation and authorship for each specific 
type of education reform legislation enacted into law.  An independent samples t test was 
used to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between political party 
affiliation and support for education reform legislation as a whole.  To determine if a 
statistically significant relationship existed between political platform affiliation and each 
of the identified education reforms, a cross-tabulation and Chi-square test was conducted 
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for each of the education reforms as based on legislation and political platform affiliation 
of the legislation’s author.  A comparison table was also created to show the amount of 
total education reform legislation introduced by each political party.  
Subsequently, question three focused on the themes of education reform.  To 
come to a conclusion on the themes of education reform, each bill enacted into law was 
analyzed to determine which education reform theme it identified with.  After 
categorizing each piece of education reform legislation from 2001-2011 and then coding 
the categories by education theme of alternative certification, charter schools, collective 
bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships, digital learning, tenure or 
voucher programs, descriptive statistics was used to determine the mode of the education 
reform bills.  An examination as to what types of bills occur most in education reform 
legislation allowed the researcher to determine the themes of education reform from  
2001-2011. 
Question four examined the relationship between state funding for public 
education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced.  To come to a 
conclusion in regards to this question, each piece of education reform legislation was 
entered into an SPSS spreadsheet by year and state.  The mean of this data was used to 
create a yearly average of education reform legislation enacted into law in the 
conglomerate of the ten states researched.  Further, each state’s per-pupil spending was 
entered into the spreadsheet on a yearly basis.  The mean of this funding data was used to 
determine the average per-pupil funding of all ten states.  After entering the data in SPSS, 
a correlation was conducted to determine if there was a statistically significant 
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relationship between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted each year, and 
the overall funding for K-12 education on a per-pupil level.  By using a correlation, it was 
determined if a relationship existed between the total mean amount of education reform 
legislation introduced and the total mean per-pupil spending of the ten states being 
researched.   
Questions five, six and seven were the most intricate and investigative of the 
research.  To determine who was financing, supporting and benefitting from education 
reform, data regarding political campaign contributions for each legislator who authored 
education reform legislation from 2001-2011 in each of the ten states was obtained.  
Next, the researcher followed the campaign contributions to major supporters of the 
legislator to determine how large the campaign donations were and from which education 
organization the donations were received.  Lastly, after examining the data regarding 
current state vendor contracts based upon the education reform legislated enacted into 
law, the researcher was able determine if there was link between those who financed the 
legislators, supported education reform, and received education reform oriented contracts 
following the successful enacting of education reform legislation.  This conclusion came  
full circle to question number one regarding rationale and allowed the researcher to come 
to a more thoroughly supported answer. 
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Methodology Table 
 
Table 3:  Methodology Table 
Question 
Number 
Research Question 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Analysis 
1 
Rationale Behind 
Education Reform 
N/A N/A 
Qualitative/Quantitative 
(Pearson Correlation) 
2 
Difference Between 
Political Party 
Affiliation as it 
relates to Support 
for Education 
Reform 
Political 
Party 
Affiliation 
Support for 
Education 
Reform 
Independent Samples 
T-test 
(Overall Education 
Reform) 
 
Crosstabs and  
Chi-Square (Specific 
Education Reforms)  
 
3 
Themes of Enacted 
Education Reform 
Legislation 
N/A N/A 
Descriptive Statistics 
(Mode) 
4 
Relationship 
Between Amount of 
Education Reform 
Legislation and 
State Funding for 
Education 
Amount of 
Education 
Reform 
Legislation 
Enacted 
State 
Funding 
for 
Education 
on a Per 
Pupil Basis 
Correlation 
5 
Financing Education 
Reform  
N/A N/A Qualitative 
6 
Supporting 
Education Reform 
N/A N/A Qualitative 
7 
Benefitting from 
Education Reform 
Political 
Donation 
Received 
Vendor 
Contract 
Qualitative 
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Summary 
The methodology used in this research was mixed mode triangulation; through the 
use of qualitative and quantitative data, a more thorough understanding of the education 
reform movement in the United States occurred.  Quantified data focused on political 
campaign funding, state mandated education vendor contracts, the amount of education 
reform legislation introduced, and funding for education reform on a per-pupil basis in 
each of the ten states dating from 2001-2011.  Qualitative data consisted of the legislation 
enacted, themes of education reform, and political campaign funding.  Each set of data 
was collected and analyzed in parallel factions; convergence occurred after analysis to 
help illustrate a more expressive picture of K-12 education reform in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Introduction 
The analysis section was divided into both state and national levels to create a 
clear description of the education reform movement in the United States while also 
allowing for data analysis at the state and national level.  All seven research questions 
were addressed for state and national levels with conclusions following.   
 
Indiana 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 4 and 5 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 1.  The results 
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of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, r = .775, n = 11, p = .005 between 
the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 1 clearly shows 
this increase in education reform legislation.  
  
Table 4:  Indiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 2.09 2.023 11 
 
 
Table 5:  Indiana Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .775** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .005 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .775** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005  
N 11 11 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 1:  Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011  
 
From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Indiana, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.  The next step was to read each piece of legislation to 
determine the rationale for this reform.  Table 6 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Rationales were concluded based upon the 
language used in the legislation and academic research from the literature review.  In 
Indiana, education reform legislation is focused mainly on increasing school 
accountability and increasing school choice.  Of the 23 pieces of education reform 
legislation, 18 were concluded to have one of these rationales. Beyond these rationales, 
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another common rationale in some of the legislative pieces is the decreasing power of the 
educator.   
 
Table 6:  Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale  
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2003 HB 1120 Clarifies the required data to be 
included in annual school 
corporation reports 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2005 
 
HB 1488 Creates new requirements 
regarding Reading curriculum 
and assessments 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0200 Approves the Core 40 required 
course load and testing for 
Indiana high school graduates 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0598 Gives charter school equitable 
access to public school agencies 
and funding sources 
 
Increase School Choice 
2006 
 
HB 1240 Requires the state board of 
education to review the current 
testing practices and create long 
term testing objectives 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0172 Allows public and private 
schools to hire teachers without 
teaching licenses if certain 
criteria are met 
 
Increase Teacher Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 0310 Allows student to receive 
passing scores on state exams 
and classroom assessments in an 
avenue that is not based in 
school 
 
Increase School Choice 
2007 
 
HB 1300 Encourages school 
administration to apply for 
federally funded grants to 
increase minority students 
advanced placement enrollment 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0088 Exempts administrators from 
following collective bargaining 
agreements if positions being 
filled our considered “high 
need” 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
 
2008 
 
SB 0022 Requires state board of 
education to grant individuals 
Increase Teacher Workforce 
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Table 6:  Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale  
with postgraduate degrees initial 
teacher licenses 
 
 
HB 1246 Establishes a state committee to 
examine digital learning 
 
Increase School Choice 
2009 
 
SB 0536 Empowers the state retirement 
board of trustees with oversight 
over the teacher’s retirement 
fund 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
HB 1001a Requires state board of 
education to create charter 
school grants and requires tax 
credits for individual who donate 
to scholarship organizations 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1479 Requires the development of 
programs to increase successful 
teachers areas of 
underrepresented populations 
 
Increase Teacher Workforce 
2010 
 
HB 1135 Promotes the enrollment in 
advanced placement courses by 
requiring colleges to accept 
passing AP scores for credit 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1367 Clarifies issues related to charter 
school funding, tax credits and 
reading curriculum 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2011 
 
SB 0001 Requires an evaluation system 
based in party on student growth 
assessments and requires 
categories for teacher ratings 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 0549 Creates the Indiana Public 
Retirement System to oversee 
public employee retirement and 
collective bargaining 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
 
SB 0575 Disallows teacher evaluations as 
a topic of collective bargaining 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
Decrease Educator Power 
  
HB 1002 Creates the Indiana Charter 
School Board, requirements for 
charter school sponsors and path 
to convert public school to 
charter school 
 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 6:  Indiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale  
HB 1003 Expands the tax credit 
scholarship program and creates 
a voucher program 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1260 Limit the amount school 
corporations can spend on 
employee health coverage 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1341 Requires school corporations to 
spend a proportionate amount of 
funds on special education 
students not enrolled in public 
schools 
Increase School Choice 
 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation?  
 To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Indiana state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a not a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =.64, SD = .809) and Republicans (M = 1.36, SD = 2.11) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -1.06, p = .299.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Indiana, Democrats and Republicans do not vary that much in regards to support for 
education reform legislation.  However, though there is not a statistically significant 
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difference between the two parties and support for education reform, the results do show 
educational relevance.  The mean number of the legislation introduced by each party 
shows that Republicans in Indiana are more likely to support education reform legislation 
compared to their Democratic counterparts (Table 7).  Of the 23 pieces of the education 
reform legislation enacted in Indiana from 2001-2011, 16 of these bills were authored by 
Republicans, only seven authored by Democrats.  
Table 7:  Indiana Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .64 .809 .244 
R 11 1.36 2.111 .636 
 
Table 8:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T Df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.641 .120 -1.06 20 .299 -.727 .682 -2.149 .694 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -1.06 12.877 .306 -.727 .682 -2.201 .746 
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Figure 2:  Indiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
 
 To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  The chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix A).  Though 
lacking in statistical importance, a comparison of which political party authored each 
piece of education reform legislation does show educational relevance.  Of all reforms 
introduced in Indiana, only in bills with the theme tax credit scholarships did Democrats 
(2) introduce more than Republicans (1).  Though no statistically significant difference 
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existed, Republicans in Indiana were more likely to support education reform legislation 
overall and in each education reform theme except tax credit scholarships and digital 
learning.  Democrats introduced more bills regarding tax credit scholarships and no bills 
were introduced regarding digital learning from 2001-2011.  
 Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Indiana.  Republicans were more 
likely by a two-to-one ration to support education reform legislation overall and more 
likely to support each type of education reform legislation except for tax credit 
scholarships and digital learning; Democrats are more likely to support tax credit 
scholarships.  Though no statistically significant differences were found, the results show 
educational relevance.  
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the enacted state education reform legislation? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Indiana from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes 
the enacted legislation fell under; Table 9 displays this tally and the mode of the state 
legislation for Indiana.  Overall, Indiana education reform has focused on testing, with 
seven bills or 30% of all enacted education reform legislation focused on this theme in 
the ten year time period, two more than any other education reform theme.  Collective 
bargaining and charter schools rank second and third in terms of enacted legislation with 
five and four pieces of legislation respectively.  Digital learning and tenure are the 
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lowest cited themes of enacted legislation with each theme only have one bill enacted in 
the eleven year period.  
Table 9:  Indiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
2 4 5 2 7 3 1 1 2 
 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for public 
education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the state level 
between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Indiana showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = -.571, n = 11, p = 
.067 (Table 11); the scatter (Figure 3) summarizes these results.  Overall, the resulting 
lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Indiana, the amount 
of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant 
relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
Table 10:  Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 2.09 2.023 11 
Per Pupil Expenditure 10359.27 370.102 11 
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Table 11:  Indiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 -.571 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .067 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation -.571 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .067  
N 11 11 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Indiana ed. reform legislation/per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
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Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation?  
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 12 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Indiana. 
 Of the 11 sources of campaign contributions in Indiana, only one came from a 
public education source, the Indiana State Teacher’s Association.  The other ten sources 
are either private businesses or education reform organizations/affiliates. The Indiana 
State Teacher’s Association, donated $43,500 from 2001-2011 compared to $43,000 
from all other organizations; in other words the teacher’s union was a major financier in 
education reform legislation in Indiana.  An examination of the other sources highlights 
the other financiers of such reform.   All Children Matter is a political action committee 
(PAC) is based out of Virginia and was started by Betsy and Richard Devos; the goal of 
the organization is to increase school choice in education.  K12 Inc. is a for-profit 
company that sells online courses to public and private institutions.  McGraw-Hill is a 
content software company with a focus on providing education supplies.  Christel Deehan 
opened the charter school, Christel’s House and gained notoriety for her connection with 
the downfall of Indiana and Florida’s former Secretary of Education Tony Bennett.  
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Connections Academy is a provider of online K-12 schooling.  Finally, Hoosiers for 
Economic Growth is the parent organization of School Choice Indiana and The 
Educational Choice Charitable Trust, organizations focused on increased school choice 
in public education. 
 From the research, it is concluded that both public schools organizations  
(teachers union) and outside organizations finance education reform.  Though the amount 
of outside influences in education reform legislation outnumbers the public school 
organizations, the monetary influence remains similar.  An examination of the specific 
contributors shows us is that public education reform in Indiana is more widely financed 
by advocates of school choice than those supporting traditional public schools.  
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Table 12:  Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party  
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform Category Year of Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of 
Contribution 
Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor 
Contract 
Procurement 
Porter D HB1120 Testing 2003 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$6,500 No 
Behning  R HB 1488 Testing 2005 All Children Matter 
 
$2,000 No 
Lubbers R SB 0200 
 
SB 0598 
Testing 
 
Charter Schools 
 
2005 Robert Koch II $1,000 No 
Behning R HB 1240 Testing 2006 All Children Matter 
 
$2,500 No 
K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
McGraw-Hill 
 
$500 Yes 
Lubbers R SB 0172 Alternative Certification 
 
2006 K12 Inc. $500 No 
Alting R SB 0310 Testing 2006 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$16,500 No 
Porter D HB 1300 Testing 2007 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$7,500 No 
Indiana Association 
of Private Career 
Schools 
 
$600 No 
Weatherwax R SB 0088 Collective Bargaining 
 
2007 
 
No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions 
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Table 12:  Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Lubbers R SB 0022 Alternative Certification 2008 Christel Dehaan 
 
$6,000 No 
K12 Inc. 
 
$2,000 No 
Connections 
Academy 
 
$1,000 No 
Austin D HB 1246 Digital Learning 2008 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$3,000 No 
Kruse R SB 0536 Collective Bargaining 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions 
 
Crawford D HB 1001a Charter Schools/ 
Tax Credits 
 
2009 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$5,000 No 
Porter D HB 1479 Evaluation 2009 Christel Dehaan 
 
$6,500 Yes 
McGraw-Hill 
 
$1,000 Yes 
Porter D HB 1135 
 
HB 1367 
Testing 
 
Charter Schools/ Tax 
Credits 
2010 Indiana State 
Teacher’s 
Association 
 
$5,000 No 
Christel Dehaan 
 
$3,000 No 
McGraw-Hill 
 
$900 Yes 
Kruse R SB 0001 Evaluation/Tenure 2011 Hoosiers for 
Economic Growth 
 
$3,000 No 
K12 Inc. 
 
$1,000 No 
Boots R SB 0549 
 
Collective Bargaining 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions 
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Table 12:  Indiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
 
SB 0575 
Collective Bargaining 
 
Bosma R HB 1002 Charter Schools 
 
2011 Connections 
Academy 
$500 No 
Behning R HB 1003 
 
 
HB 1341 
 
Tax Credits/ Vouchers 
 
Vouchers 
2011 Hoosiers for 
Economic Growth 
$6,000 No 
Dermody R HB 1260 Collective Bargaining 2011 Hoosiers for 
Economic Growth 
$2,000 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Indiana education reform legislation is 
supported by Republicans by more than a two to one margin.  Of the 23 education reform 
bills enacted, Republicans authored 16 of those bills.  A breakdown of the bills by 
education reform theme shows similar results (Table 13).  In all education reform themes, 
except for digital learning and charter schools, Republicans introduce more legislation.  
In the two aforementioned legislative themes, Democrats and Republicans authored equal 
number of enacted bills.  
 Table 14 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Of the seven education reform bills authored by Democrats, 
four were introduced by the same legislator. Of the 16 Republican authored legislatives 
pieces, there were a total of eight authors.   
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Indiana 
were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Also, the difference in 
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distribution of authored bills between members of their respective parties indicated that 
education reform in the Indiana was much more likely to be supported by a larger amount 
of Republican legislatures than their Democratic counterparts.  
 
Table 13:  Indiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 2 
Charter Schools 2 2 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 4 
Evaluation 1 1 
Testing 3 4 
Tax Credit Scholarships 2 1 
Digital Learning 1 0 
Tenure 0 1 
Voucher Programs 0 2 
Total 9 17 
 
Table 14:  Indiana Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003 HB 1120 Porter D Testing 
2004     
2005 HB 1488 Behning R Testing 
2005 SB 0200 Lubbers R Testing 
2005 SB 0598 Lubbers R Charter Schools 
2006 HB 1240 Behning R Testing 
2006 SB 0172 Lubbers R Alternative Certification 
2006 SB 0310 Alting R Testing 
2007 HB 1300 Porter D Testing 
2007 SB 0088 Weatherwax R Collective Bargaining 
2008 SB 0022 Lubbers R Alternative Certification 
2008 HB 1246 Austin D Digital Learning 
2009 SB 0536 Kruse R Collective Bargaining 
2009 HB 1001a Crawford D Charter Schools/Tax Credits 
2009 HB 1479 Porter D Evaluation 
2010 HB 1135 Porter D Testing 
2010 HB 1367 Porter D Charter Schools/Tax Credits 
2011 SB 0001 Kruse R Evaluation/Tenure 
2011 SB 0549 Boots R Collective Bargaining 
2011 SB 0575 Boots R Collective Bargaining 
2011 HB 1002 Bosma R Charter Schools 
2011 HB 1003 Behning R Tax Credits/Vouchers 
2011 HB 1260 Dermody R Collective Bargaining 
2011 HB 1341 Behning R Voucher Programs 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes.  
 In the state of Indiana, McGraw-Hill was the contributor to receive the most 
contracts and the contracts worth the most.  McGraw-Hill contributed a total of $1,300 to 
various state legislator campaigns from 2001-2011.  Table 14 shows the amount of each 
contribution, the amount of the contract received and the purpose of the contract.  For 
$1,300 in campaign contributions, McGraw-Hill received $146,817,459 in state vendor 
grants.  The only other campaign contributor to receive a vendor contract was the Christel 
House Academy, a school owned by Christel Deehan, a woman who contributed multiple 
times to legislative campaigns from 2001-2011.  For Ms. Deehan’s $6,500 campaign 
contribution in 2009, her company received $5,802.  Of the nine education based 
contributors, only these two contributors received any state vendor contracts.   
 For the state of Indiana it was concluded that those organizations which contribute 
to campaigns of legislators who author enacted education reform legislation do not 
benefit from such contributions.  Using the vendor contract search for Indiana, only two 
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of the nine contributors received any state vendor funding from 2001-2011, with one of 
those contributors receiving four out of the five contracts identified.   
Table 15:  Indiana Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts 
Contributor Legislation 
Theme 
Contributed  
Year of 
Contribution 
Amount 
Contributed 
Contract Received Contract 
Purpose 
McGraw-Hill 
 
Testing 2006 $500 $115,751,781.00 Testing 
McGraw-Hill 
 
Testing 2006 $500 $10,116,982.00 Testing 
McGraw-Hill 
 
Evaluation 2009 $1,000 $7,572,106.00 Online 
Testing 
Christel 
House  
Academy 
 
Evaluation 2009 $6,500 $5,802 Building 
Expansion 
McGraw-Hill Testing 2010 $900 $13,372,088.00 Testing 
Total  $9,400 $146,818,759  
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Florida 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 16 and 17 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 4.  The 
results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, r = .687, n = 11, p = .020 
between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 4 clearly 
shows this increase in education reform legislation. 
 
Table 16:  Florida Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 3.18 2.328 11 
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Table 17:  Florida Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .687* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .020 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .687* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Florida, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.  The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 18 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.   Of the 35 pieces of education reform legislation, 
31 had a rational of increasing accountability or school choice.  Much of the education 
reform legislation focuses on testing and school choice options which guides the 
researcher in determining that Florida’s legislators have tried to hold schools more 
accountable in regards to funding and student success while also giving students in 
Florida an opportunity to attend other educational institutions, private or public, using 
donation and state funds.  
 
Table 18:  Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2003 HB 0023B Provides alternative 
assessments to the FCAT for 
10th grade students  
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 0055A Creates guiding principles for 
charter schools as well as rules 
and regulations for creation and 
accountability 
   
Increase School Choice 
HB 0915 Creates an accountability 
system to meet No Child Left 
Behind requirements and 
achievement based funding 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2004 
 
HB 0769 Establishes career certification 
specifications for high school 
students within charter 
technical career centers 
 
 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 18:  Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
SB 2986 Clarifies employment status of 
public and charter school 
employees 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 3000 Loosens rules of construction 
for charter schools and funding 
based upon new construction 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0364 Creates the Reading 
Enhancement and Acceleration 
Development (READ) program 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2006 
 
HB 0135 Creates the Florida Schools of 
Excellence Commission which 
acts as the state’s charter school 
authorizing entity  
  
Increase School Choice 
 
HB 7087 Increase the requirement for 
data use through state testing 
(School Grades) and increases 
governor authority over failing 
schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 7103 Requires public school district 
to provide FDOE with unused 
classroom data and empowers 
FDOE to recommend 
chartering underused school 
property; requires creation of 
online charter school 
accountability report 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0256 Increases fiscal and academic 
accountability over the McKay 
scholarship and the Corporate 
Tax Credit Scholarship 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
 
2007 
 
SB 1226 Creates the voluntary Merit 
Award Program for teachers 
and administrators; program 
gives bonuses to 
teachers/administrators based 
upon student achievement 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0108 Creates a commission to 
increase minority students 
enrolled in advanced placement 
courses 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 2092 Extends charter school pilot 
district program and clarifies 
requirement for charter school 
renewal 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 18:  Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
 
2008 
 
SB 0526 Allows private and charter 
school students to participate in 
extracurricular activities at a 
public school 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
HB 0653 Expands the Corporate Income 
Tax Credit Scholarship 
program 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1313 Requires that students with 
disabilities have equal 
opportunity to enter charter 
schools; expands the McKay 
Scholarship program 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1906 Creates a pilot program for 
industry certification and 
correlated tests 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1908 Creates new state curriculum 
standards and requires students 
in alternative schools be 
counted on school grades 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 7067 Declares that virtual schools are 
public schools and that charter 
schools can operate as virtual 
school 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 7105 Creates and authorizes the State 
Distance Learning Consortium 
to examine digital learning in 
public education 
 
Increase School Choice 
2009 
 
SB 0278 Allows charter schools to count 
as district schools when 
applying for federally funded 
grants 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 0453 Expands the Corporate Income 
Tax Credit Scholarship 
program 
 
Increase School Choice  
HB 0991 Requires school grading and 
accountability measures by 
school districts, aka Florida's 
Equal Opportunity in Education 
Act 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1248 Requires 7th grade students to 
pass an end of course exam in 
the subject of Civics 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 18:  Florida Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
 
SB 2538 Requires reporting of student 
achievement and learning gains 
online 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2010 
 
SB 0004 Increases use of end of course 
exams  
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 0105 Requires civics education in 
language arts curriculum and 
use of assessment data in 
school grade report 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 2126 Increases tax credit scholarship 
cap 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
HB 5101 Allows for teacher off-site 
instruction (virtual) of public 
school students 
 
Increase School Choice 
2011 
 
SB 0736 Requires teacher evaluations to 
be based party on student 
achievement and disallows the 
use of tenure 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
 
HB 1255 Increases student access to 
Florida Virtual School and 
requires student achievement 
data to be used in calculation 
Opportunity Scholarship 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
 
HB 1329 Expands McKay Scholarship 
program to 504 status students 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1331 Expands the definition of 
“failing” school to expand use 
of Opportunity Scholarship 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 7197 Expands use of virtual 
education and allows private 
companies to create virtual 
schools; requires high school 
students to take one virtual 
class before graduation 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
 
 
110 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Indiana state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =.36, SD = .674) and Republicans (M = 2.81, SD = 2.386) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -3.406, p = .003.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Florida, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform 
legislation.  Beyond statistical significance, this test also shows the educational relevance 
of the results.  Democrats introduce an average of .36 education reform bills in Florida 
per legislative session, while Republicans introduce an average of 2.81 education reform 
bills (Table 19).   
 
 
Table 19:  Florida Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .36 .674 .203 
R 11 2.81 2.386 .719 
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Table 20:  Independent Samples Test for Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
12.596 .002 -3.406 20 .003 -2.545 .747 -4.105 -.986 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -3.406 11.587 .005 -2.545 .747 -4.180 -.910 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Florida education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
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 To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests, except for one, showed no statistical 
significance between party identification and support for specific education reform 
themes (Appendix B).  The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured 
party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a 
statistically significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school 
legislation X² (1, N = 36) =5.00, p = .025.  This crosstab indicate that if a Democrat 
authored enacted education reform legislation, there was a 75% chance that that it would 
be about charter schools; however the validity of this statistic must be questioned as two 
of the counts have less than the assumed five.    
 The lack of statistical significance for the eight other chi squared tests does not 
take away from the educational relevancy of the results.  Of the remaining eight 
education reform themes, Republicans in Florida supported every education reform 
theme introduced at a more prominent level than Democrats.  Of all 35 education reform 
bills enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans authored 31 of them.   
 Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Florida.  Republicans were much 
more likely overall and more likely to support each type of education reform legislation 
introduced in the state of Florida.  An independent samples T-test was conducted and 
showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for 
education reform legislation.  When breaking each reform down by theme, Republicans 
were more likely to support each reform introduced, with charter schools showing 
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statistical significance at p = .025, however questions of validity remain on the results of 
the this statistic. 
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Florida from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes 
the enacted legislation fell under; Table 21 displays this tally and the mode of the state 
legislation for Florida.  It is evident from the data that over the ten year period,  
testing (11) and charter schools (10) are the most common themes of education reform 
legislation in the state.  With 35 pieces of education reform legislation enacted into law 
during the time period, testing made up 33% of all education reform legislation, 
Collective bargaining and alternative certification are the least enacted legislation 
reforms with zero bills becoming law.   
 
Table 21:  Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain. 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
0 10 0 3 11 3 5 1 5 
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Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Florida showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = .524, n = 11, p = 
.098 (Table 23); the scatter plot (Figure 6) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Florida, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically 
significant relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
 
 
Table 22:  Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 3.18 2.328 11 
PerPupilExpend 9211.82 663.104 11 
 
 
Table 23:  Florida Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .524 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .098 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .524 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .098  
N 11 11 
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Figure 6:  Florida ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
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organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 24 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Florida. 
 With 43 different sources contributions, Florida’s legislators received one of the 
highest levels of financial support in the sampled states.  Of the 43 contributors, four 
were based in the public education field and donated a total of $6,000 from 2001-2011.  
The sources of contributions from outside of education totaled 39 different sources for a 
contribution level of $46,697.  The financial data shows that organizations outside of 
public education are financing education reform in the state of Florida.  The next step was 
to determine what kind of organizations/representatives were part of these outsiders. 
 Working in chronological order, research was conducted to determine the purpose 
and/or the affiliations of each of the financiers of Florida’s education reform legislation.  
Education First is a for profit corporation focused on language acquisition for middle and 
high school students.  Academica Corp. is a charter school management corporation that 
works with such schools to help them reach the goals of the charter school board of 
directors; this corporation’s President, Fernando Zulueta is also listed as a contributor.  
Charter Schools USA is another charter school management corporation and has 
operations in 58 charter schools in seven states.  Another outside organization is 
Community Education Partners, a for profit corporation offering alternative education 
programs to school districts throughout the United States. 
 Chancellor Beacon Academy is another charter school management corporation 
and is America’s second largest with 80 public charter schools in the United States.   As 
seen in Indiana and many other states to follow, K12 Inc., a supplier of online based 
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education components, was an active member of the financial outsiders.  Apollo Group, a 
for profit corporation focused on online education and math curriculum, contributed to 
campaigns in Florida and other states in the sample as well.  White Hat Management is 
another charter school management corporation that runs schools in Florida and other 
states in the sample.  The Paxen Group is a company which produces career pathways 
educational curriculum.  Emergent Design and Development is a consulting firm that 
focuses on education consulting to state government officials.  William Lager is the 
Owner and President of the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), a provider of 
online education and a subsidiary of Altair Learning Management.   
 With the abundance of contributions in the state of Florida, each contributor was 
either based on affiliation with traditional public education or outside of traditional public 
education sector.  In Florida, outside education contributors are responsible for the 
financing of education reform legislation.  Whether these groups are chart schools, school 
choice advocates, corporations or corporate consulting firms, outside organizations and 
their affiliates are the main source of financing of education reform legislation in the 
state.  
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of Contribution Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor Contract 
Procurement 
        
Quinones R HB 23B Testing 2003 Education First 
 
$500 No 
Baxley R HB 55A Charter 
Schools 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions  
 
 
Pickens R HB 915 Evaluation 2003 Florida Association of 
School Administ. 
 
$500 No 
Jennings D HB 769 Charter School 2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
 
Constantine R SB 2986 Charter 
Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Diaz de la 
Portilla 
R SB 3000 Charter 
Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Constantine R SB 364 Testing 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Greenstein D HB 135 Charter 
Schools 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Arza R HB 7087 Testing 2006 Academica Corp 
 
$500 No 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charter Schools USA 
 
$500 No 
Community Education 
Partners 
 
$1,000 No 
Chancellor Beacon  
Academy 
 
$500 No 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Stargel R HB 7103 Charter 
Schools 
 
2006 K12 Inc. $500 No 
King R SB 256 Vouchers 2006 Apollo Group 
 
$500 No 
     Wayne Blanton 
 
$500 No 
Charter Holdings  
Foundation 
 
$500 No 
Charter School 
Foundation of Florida 
 
$500 Yes 
Charter School of 
Excellence 
 
$500 No 
Charter Schools USA 
 
$500 No 
Connections Academy 
 
$500 No 
Florida Consortium of 
Charter Schools 
 
$500 No 
K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
White Hat Mgmt. 
 
$500 No 
Paxen Group 
 
$500 No 
Keiser College 
 
$1000 No 
Gaetz R SB 1226 Evaluation 
 
2007 Frank Fuller $500 No 
Hill D SB 108 Testing 
 
2007 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Deutch D SB 2092 Charter 
Schools 
2007 Broward Teachers  
Local 
 
$1,000 No 
     Palm Beach County 
Classroom Teacher’s 
Assoc. 
 
$1,000 No 
Wise R SB 526 Charter 
Schools 
2008 Altair Learning  
Mgmt. 
 
$500 No 
     Apollo Group 
 
$1000 No 
     Paul Bent 
 
$1000 No 
     Wayne Blanton 
 
$1000 No 
     Charter Schools USA 
 
$500 No 
     Community Education 
Partners 
 
$500 No 
     Connections Academy $500 No 
        
     Education Mgmt. Corp. 
 
$500 No 
     Educational Services of 
America 
 
$500 No 
     Education Design and 
Dvlp. 
 
$500 No 
     Donald Kidd 
 
$500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$500 No 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
     Joseph and Angela  
Lokovitch 
 
$1000 No 
     Tom Sawner 
 
$500 No 
     The Cerra Consulting 
Group 
 
$1000 No 
     Skip Villerot 
 
$500 No 
Traviesa R HB 653 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
2008 Apollo Group $500 No 
     Educational Partnership 
LLC 
 
$500 No 
Precourt R HB 1313 Charter 
Schools/ 
Vouchers 
2008 Connections Academy $500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
     Magdalena Fresen 
 
$500 No 
     Fernando Zulueta 
 
$500 No 
Gaetz R SB 1906 Testing 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Gaetz R SB 1908 Testing 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Pickens R HB 7067 Digital 
Learning 
 
2008 Apollo Group $500 No 
Pickens R HB 7105 Digital 
Learning 
2008 Wayne Blanton 
 
$250 No 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
     Community Education 
Partners 
 
$500 No 
     Florida School Services 
 
$500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
     Martha Revenaugh 
 
$500 No 
     White Hat Mgmt. 
 
$500 No 
     WIN 
 
$500 No 
     Imagine Schools 
 
$250 No 
Gaetz R SB 278 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Weatherford R HB 453 Tax Credit 
Scholar. 
 
2009 Apollo Group $500 No 
Grady R HB 991 Testing 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Wise R SB 1248 Testing 2009 Altair Learning Mgmt. 
 
$500 No 
     Fernando Zulueta 
 
$1000 No 
     Apollo Group 
 
$1,000 No 
     Heather Beaven 
  
$447 No 
     Paul Bent 
 
$1,000 No 
     Wayne Blanton 
 
$1,000 No 
     Charter Schools USA $500 No 
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     Community Education 
Partners 
 
$500 No 
     Connections Academy 
 
$500 No 
     Education Mgmt. Corp. 
 
$500 No 
     Educational Services of 
America 
 
$500 No 
     Emergent Design and 
Develop 
 
$500 No 
     Magdalena Fresen 
 
$500 No 
     Jaeger Corp 
 
$1,000 No 
     Donald Kidd 
 
$500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$500 No 
     Joseph and Angela 
Lokovitch 
 
$1,000 No 
     Tom Sawner 
 
$500 No 
     The Cerra  
Consulting Group 
 
$1000 No 
     Skip Villerot 
 
$500 No 
Detert R SB 2538 Testing 2009 Altair Learning Mgmt.  
 
$500 No 
     Apollo Group 
 
$1,000 No 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
     Wayne Blanton 
 
$250 No 
     Connections Academy 
 
$500 No 
     Florida Association of 
School Admin. 
 
$500 No 
     K12 Inc.  
 
$500 No 
Detert R SB 4 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
McBurney R HB 105 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Negron R SB 2126 Tax Credit 
Scholar. 
2010 Community Education 
Partners 
 
$500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
     White Hat Mgmt. 
 
$500 No 
Flores R HB 5101 Digital 
Learning 
2010 Fernando Zulueta 
 
$1000 No 
     Red Apple Develop. 
 
$500 No 
     Educational Services of 
America 
 
$500 No 
     Artswork in Education 
 
$500 No 
     Charter Schools USA 
 
$500 No 
     Community Education 
Partners 
 
$500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
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Table 24:  Florida Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
     Soars Educational 
Group 
 
$500 No 
Wise R SB 736 Evaluation/Te
nure 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Adkins R HB 1255 Digital 
Learning/ 
Vouchers 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Bileca R HB 1329 Vouchers 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Bileca R HB 1331 Vouchers 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Stargel R HB 7197 Digital 
Learning 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Florida education reform legislation is 
supported by Republicans by a near nine to one margin.  Of the 35 education reform bills 
enacted, Republicans authored 31 of those bills.  A breakdown of the bills by education 
reform theme shows similar results (Table 25).  In all education reform themes, except 
for alternative certification, Republicans introduce more legislation.  Only in alternative 
certification, of which zero bills were enacted, did Republicans not dominate the 
Democratic legislatures in support for education reform.  
 Table 26 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Since 2007, not one Democrat has introduced education reform 
legislation that was enacted.  This clearly shows the near total domination of Republicans 
regarding education reform in the state.   
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Florida 
were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Republicans introduced 31 
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of the 35 enacted education reforms from 2001-2011, with the major focus of nearly a 
third of the reforms being on the theme of testing.  In Florida, Republicans are the 
dominant force of education reform. 
 
Table 25:  Florida Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 0 
Charter Schools 3 7 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 0 
Evaluation 0 3 
Testing 1 10 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 3 
Digital Learning 0 5 
Tenure 0 1 
Voucher Programs 0 5 
Total 4 35 
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Table 26:  Florida Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003 HB 23B Quinones R Testing 
2003 HB 55A Baxley R Charter Schools 
2003 HB 915 Pickens R Evaluation 
2004 HB 769 Jennings D Charter Schools 
2004 SB 2986 Constantine R Charter Schools 
2004 SB 3000 Diaz de la Portilla R Charter Schools 
2004 SB 364 Constantine R Testing 
2005     
2006 HB 135 Greenstein D Charter Schools 
2006 HB 7087 Arza R Testing 
2006 HB 7103 Stargel R Charter Schools 
2006 SB 256 King R Vouchers 
2007 SB 1226 Gaetz R Evaluation 
2007 SB 108 Hill D Testing 
2007 SB 2092 Deutch D Charter Schools 
2008 SB 526 Wise R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 653 Traviesa R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2008 HB 1313 Precourt R Charter Schools/Vouchers 
2008 SB 1906 Gaetz R Testing 
2008 SB 1908 Gaetz R Testing 
2008 HB 7067 Pickens R Digital Learning 
2008 HB 7105 Pickens R Digital Learning 
2009 SB 278 Gaetz R Charter Schools 
2009 HB 453 Weatherford R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2009 HB 991 Grady R Testing 
2009 HB 1248 Wise R Testing 
2009 SB 2538 Detert R Testing 
2010 SB 4 Detert R Testing 
2010 HB 105 McBurney R Testing 
2010 SB 2126 Negron R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2010 HB 5101 Flores R Digital Learning 
2011 SB 736 Wise R Evaluation/Tenure 
2011 HB 1255 Adkins R Digital Learning/Vouchers 
2011 HB 1329 Bileca R Vouchers 
2011 HB 1331 Bileca R Vouchers 
2011 HB 7197 Stargel R Digital Learning 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 In Florida, only one of the over 50 campaign contributors received a state vendor 
contract.  Table 27 highlights that only the Charter School Foundation of Florida received 
a vendor contract, worth $20 Million while contributing $500 to Senator King’s 
campaign the same year as receiving the contract.  The purpose of the contract was to 
create 25-30 charter schools while the legislation King sponsored was focused on 
voucher programs in Florida.   
 It was concluded that in the state of Florida, campaign contributions did not 
benefit (financially) those who contributed.  With over fifty different campaign 
contributors of education reform advocates, the results show that these contributions did 
not benefit contributors when examining state vendor contracts.  
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Table 27:  Florida Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts 
Contributor Legislation 
Theme 
Contributed  
Year of 
Contribution 
Amount 
Contributed 
Contract Received Contract 
Purpose 
Charter 
School 
Foundation of 
Florida 
Vouchers 2006 $500 $20,000,000 
Create  
25-30 
Charter 
Schools 
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Louisiana 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 28 and 29 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 7.  The 
results of the analysis indicate no relationship, r = .535, n = 11, p = .090 between the 
amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 7 clearly shows this 
lack of relationship. 
 
Table 28:  Louisiana Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 3.00 4.000 11 
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Table 29:  Louisiana Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .535 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .090 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .535 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .090  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Louisiana, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.  The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 30 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.   Just as with other states, a major rationale for the 
education reform legislation in Louisiana is to increase school choices and increase 
school accountability.  Of the 33 pieces of education reform legislation, 32 had a 
rationale of increasing school accountability or choice.  This again shows that education 
reform minded states are focused on giving students more options in terms of the types of 
schools they can attend and also focused on what is being done in the classroom in 
regards to student achievement.   
 
Table 30:  Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2003 HB 1309 Prohibits a charter school from 
employing members of its board 
of directors 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 0567 Clarifies employment status of 
teachers upon promotion to 
administrative positions 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 0568 Requires alternative certification 
program students to take the 
same amount of Reading courses 
as undergraduate certification 
programs 
  
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0710 Creates a Recovery School 
District for failing schools and 
outlines the requirements of the 
schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2005 
 
SB 0214 Changes the testing requirements 
for students and allows students 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 30:  Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
with disabilities to be excluded 
from such testing 
 
SB 0239 Allows charter schools to apply 
for state funding for LA4 
Curriculum  
(early childhood) 
 
Increase School Choice 
2006 SB 0701 Requires the Board of 
Elementary and Secondary 
Education to provide assistance 
in determining financial impact 
of charter schools in districts of 
less than 5000 students 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
 
2008 
 
HB 0321 Increases the amount of charter 
schools allowed  
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0005 Creates an income tax deduction 
for enrolling students in 
nonpublic schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 0349 Changes charter school renewal 
from a 10 year period to 
minimum of 3 and no more than 
10 year period 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight  
HB 0718 Allows employees of a public 
school district to take a leave of 
absence to work in a charter 
school 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1105 Outlines funding requirements 
for charter schools;  allows 
charter schools to team up with 
districts to diminish overhead 
costs 
 
Increase School Choice  
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
HB 1347 Creates the Student Scholarships 
for Educational Excellence 
Program (Voucher) 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0388 Provides standards to pay 
teachers who help create 
standardize tests  
 
Decrease Teacher Power 
SB 0447 Allows a parent to remove their 
child from a failing school 
(Recovery School District) and 
place them in any school from 
their home district 
 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 30:  Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
SB 0475 Requires charter schools to 
reimburse school district for 
transportation costs 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
 
2009 
 
SB 0146 Requires third party evaluation 
of a charter proposal and allows 
religious institutions to provide 
services for charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 0187 Loosens restrictions for 
converting public school to 
charter school 
 
Increase School Choice  
HB 0519 Removes the cap on the amount 
of charter schools that can be 
created 
 
Increase School Choice 
2010 
 
SB 0083 Allows for the use of norm 
referenced or criterion 
referenced testing for Louisiana 
Education Assessment Program 
(LEAP) 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0344 Requires public schools supply 
reasons for denial and public 
participation when hearing 
charter school application 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0112 Prohibits the use of student 
achievement data from students 
in juvenile detention centers 
when calculation school and 
district grades 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0490 Creates end of course exams 
 
Increase School Accountability   
SB 0492 Requires governing boards of 
charter schools to fall under the 
ethics codes of the state 
 
Increase School Choice Accountably  
HB 0216 Establishes the School Choice 
Pilot Program for students with 
disabilities 
  
Increase School Choice 
HB 0388 Extends previous act which 
allows a public school employee 
to take a leave of absence to 
work at a charter school 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
HB 0420 Restricts certain public school 
funds from being used for 
charter schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 30:  Louisiana Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
HB 1487 Allows certain charter schools to 
create an enrollment preference 
for certain students 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 0925 Requires letter grades for 
schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 0962 Requires public disbursement of 
information regarding charters 
school application and automatic 
renewal of high performing 
charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice  
HB 1033 Creates new value-added 
evaluation system with 50% of 
evaluation coming from student 
growth data 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2011 
 
SB 0142 Allows charter school creators to 
remove, revise and reintroduce 
proposed charter schools before 
charter school authority rules 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
HB 0421 Relates to corporate sponsors of 
charter schools; allows children 
of employees of corporate 
sponsors preference for 
admittance to the charter school 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Louisiana state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
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and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a no statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =1.45, SD = 2.162) and Republicans (M = 1.55, SD = 2.115) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -.100, p = .922.  Beyond a lack of statistical significance, 
this test also shows that political parties in Louisiana are not too far apart when it comes 
to supporting education reform overall; Democrats introduced an average of 1.45 
education reform bills in Louisiana per legislative session, while Republicans introduced 
an average of 1.55 education reform bills (Table 31).   
 
Table 31:  Louisiana Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 1.45 2.162 .652 
R 11 1.55 2.115 .638 
 
 
Table 32:  Independent Samples Test Louisiana Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.173 .681 -.100 20 .922 -.091 .912 -1.993 1.811 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -.100 19.990 .922 -.091 .912 -1.993 1.811 
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Figure 8:  Louisiana education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
  
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix C).  
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills shows a fairly equal split between 
Democrats and Republicans.  Of the 33 pieces of education reform legislation, 16 were 
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introduced by Democrats and 17 by Republicans.  Breaking this down into education 
theme, Democrats introduced more legislation focused on charter schools and tax credit 
scholarships than their Republican counterparts.  Republicans on the other hand 
introduced more legislation focused on alternative certification, evaluation and testing.   
 Results of question two indicate that party identification does not plays a major 
role in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Louisiana.  Party 
identification did not impact support for specific education reform legislation and 
statistically significant differences were not evident.  An independent samples t-test was 
conducted and showed a no statistically significant difference between party 
identification and support for education reform legislation overall.  Chi squared tests also 
showed no statistical relevance and descriptives indicated that political party 
identification did not impact support for education reform legislation  
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Louisiana from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 33 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Louisiana.  Overwhelmingly the legislative theme for Louisiana was 
charter schools with 20 out of the 33 bills (60%) enacted into law focused on this issue; 
testing was the other major theme with seven bills total.  Zero of the 33 education reform 
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bills enacted in Louisiana were focused on the issues of digital learning, tenure or 
collective bargaining.   
 
Table 33:  Louisiana Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain. 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
1 20 0 2 7 1 0 0 2 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Louisiana showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = .533, n = 11, p = 
.091 (Table 35); the scatter plot (Figure 9) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Louisiana, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically 
significant relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 34:  Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditures Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 3.00 4.000 11 
PerPupilExpend 10348.18 1112.957 11 
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Table 35:  Louisiana Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .533 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .091 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .533 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Louisiana ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
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Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 36 shows the resulting 
data from this research for the state of Louisiana.  
 Teachers unions were responsible for a total of $4,500 of campaign contributions 
from 2001-2011; nonpublic school organizations contributed $11,250.  This stark contrast 
shows that Louisiana education reform was predominantly financed by organizations 
from outside the state with a focus on school choice.  The Apollo Group is the parent 
company of many for-profit colleges, but is also supplier of online and consumable 
mathematics curriculum.  As seen in Indiana, All Children Matter is a political action 
committee (PAC) out of Virginia and was started by Betsy and Richard Devos.  K12 Inc., 
also seen in other states, in a for profit company that provides online curriculum for 
private and public schools.  Lastly, the Louisiana Federation for Children is a subsidiary 
of American Federation for Children and Alliance for School Choice and is focused on 
increasing the use of vouchers and tax credit scholarships.  
 Louisiana education reform legislation is predominantly financed by 
organizations and businesses outside the state of Louisiana and focused on school choice.  
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Public education unions represent the in-state financiers while businesses and PAC’s 
represent the major contributors from outside the state.  The nearly 3 to 1 margin by 
which these outside organizations contribute to campaigns indicates an increased 
influence over education reform legislation.  
 
Table 36:  Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislat. Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of 
Contribution 
Amount 
of 
Contribut. 
Vendor 
Contract  
    2001    
    2002    
Carter D HB 1309 Charter 
Schools 
2003 Louisiana 
Association 
of Educators 
 
$1,000 No 
Crane R HB 0567 Evaluation 
 
2003 Apollo 
Group 
$1,000 No 
Crane R HB 0568 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2003 
Theunisse
n 
R SB 0710 Testing 2003 Louisiana 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$500 No 
    2004    
Barham R SB 0214 Testing 
 
2005 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Ullo D SB 0239 Charter 
Schools 
 
2005 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Jones D SB 0701 Charter 
Schools 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
 2007 
 
 
Trahan R HB 0321 Charter 
Schools 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Trahan R  HB 0349 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Trahan R HB 0718 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008 
Trahan R HB 1105 Charter 
Schools 
2008 
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Table 36:  Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
 
Marionne
aux 
D SB 0005 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
2008 Louisiana 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$1,000 No 
Badon D HB 1347 Vouchers 2008 All Children 
Matter 
 
$1,000 No 
Donahue R SB 0388 Testing 2008 All Children 
Matter 
 
$1,000 No 
     Louisiana 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$500 No 
Cassidy R SB 0447 Charter 
Schools 
2008 Louisiana 
Association 
of Educators 
 
$500 No 
Gray D SB 0475 Charter 
Schools 
2008 All Children 
Matter 
 
$2,500 No 
Duplessis D SB 0146 Charter 
Schools 
2009 All Children 
Matter 
 
 
$4,000 No 
Smith  D HB 0187 Charter 
Schools 
2009 Louisiana 
Association 
of Educators 
 
$1,500  
     East Baton 
Rouge 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$500 No 
     Louisiana 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$500 No 
Leger D HB 0519 Charter 
Schools 
2009 All Children 
Matter 
 
$500 No 
     Louisiana 
Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$500 No 
     United 
Teachers of 
New 
Orleans 
 
$500 No 
Appel R SB 0083 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
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Table 36:  Louisiana Campaign Contributions and State Vendor Contracts  
 
Duplessis D SB 0344 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 See Duplessis 2007 
Long R SB 0112 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Nevers D SB 0490 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 Nevers D SB 0492 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 
Foil R HB 0216 Vouchers 2010 All Children 
Matter 
 
$250 No 
Smith D HB 0388 Charter 
schools 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Leger D HB 0420 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Leger D HB 1487 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 
Badon D HB 0925 Testing 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Carter R HB 0962 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 All Children 
Matter 
 
$250 No 
Hoffmann R HB 1033 Evaluation 
 
2010 All Children 
Matter 
 
$250 No 
Quinn R SB 0142 Charter 
Schools 
 
2011  
Carter R HB 0421 Charter 
Schools 
2011 K12 Inc. 
 
$250 No 
     Louisiana 
Federation 
for Children 
 
$250 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Louisiana education reform legislation 
is supported by nearly equal number of Democrats and Republicans.  Of the 33 education 
reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 17 of those bills, Democrats 16.  A 
breakdown of the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 37).  A 
review of the tables indicates that Democrats in Louisiana introduced more legislation 
focused expanding access via charter schools, vouchers and tax credit scholarships, while 
Republicans focused on accountability issues such as testing and evaluation.  Though the 
support for education reform is fairly equal between the political parties, the types of 
education reform supported does differ. 
 Table 36 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  From the table it is evident that charter schools dominate the 
reform movement in Louisiana.  Of the 33 bills enacted, 20 were focused on charter 
schools, with Democrats authoring 12 of the bills.  14 of the 33 bills were authored and 
enacted since 2010 showing a recent push toward education reform.      
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Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that neither Democrats nor 
Republicans supported education reform legislation any more so than the other in the 
state of Louisiana.   Though the parties did differ in the themes of the education reforms 
supported, the number of the bills enacted were evenly split between the two political 
parties.  
Table 37:  Louisiana Education Reform Themes by Party ID 
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 1 
Charter Schools 12 8 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 0 
Evaluation 0 2 
Testing 2 5 
Tax Credit Scholarships 1 0 
Digital Learning 0 0 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 1 1 
Total 16 17 
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Table 38:  Louisiana Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003 HB 1309 Carter D Charter Schools 
2003 HB 0567 Crane R Evaluation 
2003 HB 0568 Crane R Alternative Certification 
2003 SB 0710 Theunissen R Testing 
2004     
2005 SB 0214 Barham R Testing 
2005 SB 0239 Ullo D Charter Schools 
2006 SB 0701 Jones D Charter Schools 
2007     
2008 HB 0321 Trahan R Charter Schools 
2008 SB 0005 Marionneaux D Tax Credit Scholarships 
2008 HB 0349 Trahan R  Charter Schools 
2008 HB 0718 Trahan R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 1105 Trahan R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 1347 Baldone D Vouchers 
2008 SB 0388 Donahue R Testing 
2008 SB 0447 Cassidy R Charter Schools 
2008 SB 0475 Gray D Charter Schools 
2009 SB 0146 Duplessis D Charter Schools 
2009 HB 0187 Smith P D Charter Schools 
2009 HB 0519 Leger D Charter Schools 
2010 SB 0083 Appel R Testing 
2010 SB 0344 Duplessis D Charter Schools 
2010 SB 0112 Long R Testing 
2010 SB 0490 Nevers D Testing 
2010 SB 0492 Nevers D Charter Schools 
2010 HB 0216 Foil R Vouchers 
2010 HB 0388 Smith D Charter schools 
2010 HB 0420 Leger D Charter Schools 
2010 HB 1487 Leger D Charter Schools 
2010 HB 0925 Badon D Testing 
2010 HB 0962 Carter R Charter Schools 
2010 HB 1033 Hoffmann R Evaluation 
2011 SB 0142 Quinn R Charter Schools 
2011 HB 0421 Carter R Charter Schools 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Louisiana’s state transparency and accountability search program showed no connection 
between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts 
from 2001-2011.  For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign 
contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by 
the candidate to which they contributed.  
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Arizona 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 39 and 40 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 10.  The 
results of the analysis indicate no relationship, r = .490, n = 11, p = .126 between the 
amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 10 clearly shows this 
lack of relationship. 
 
Table 39:  Arizona Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 4.81 4.245 11 
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Table 40:  Arizona Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .490 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .126 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .490 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .126  
N 11 11 
 
 
Figure 10:  Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011 
 
 From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Arizona, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
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Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 41 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.   Just as in the previous states, increasing school 
accountability and school choice appears to be the rationale for education reform in 
Arizona; changing the profession of teaching in regards to evaluation and licensure show 
the rationale of decreasing educator power in order to achieve academic goals laid out by 
legislation. 
 
Table 41:  Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2002 HB 2465 Requires norm-referenced Reading 
tests in elementary schools 
 
Increase School Accountability 
2003 
 
HB 2093 Creates a technology assisted 
curriculum pilot program in 7 public 
and 7 charter schools 
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 2277 Creates a classification other than 
“failing” for schools which are 
underperforming for three years in a 
row 
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 2461 Clarifies classroom site  fund use for 
the AIM (Arizona Instrument of 
Measurement)  
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 2462 Requires 40% of Classroom Site 
Fund to be used on teacher salary 
based upon student performance and 
expense 
 
Increase School Accountability 
SB 1330 Requires school district to define 
inadequacy as it relates to teacher 
performance  
 
Increase School Accountability 
2004 
 
HB 2105 Requires State Board of Education to 
create accountable and verifiable 
procurement practices for school 
districts 
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 2255 Outlines the financial relationship 
between charter schools and public 
school districts 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
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Table 41:  Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
HB 2353 Requires school accountability 
reports based upon student 
achievement growth; ties growth to 
school funding 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 2580 Adds two more members to the State 
Board for Charter Schools; a charter 
school classroom teacher and a 
charter school operator 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
2005 
 
SB 1074 Creates the Arizona Performance 
Based Compensation Task Force  to 
oversee the requires performance 
based educator evaluations  
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 2438 The sponsor of a charter school may 
not charge fees to charter school 
unless work has been done for the 
charter school 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
SB 1422 Requires a performance audit of 
schools involved in the technology 
assisted curriculum program by the 
Auditor General 
 
Increase School Accountability 
SB 1529 Increases the amount of income tax 
deductions available when donating 
to school tuition organizations 
 
Increase School Choice 
2006 
 
HB 2359 Changes the penalty to charter 
schools that underperform and fail to 
report an action plan to the state 
board (withholding of 10% of state 
funding on a monthly basis) 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability 
HB 2676 Creates the Arizona Scholarships for 
Pupil with Disabilities fund  
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1164 Creates the Displaced Pupils Choice 
Grant Program 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1184 Requires the creation of the 
Alternative Teacher Development 
Program 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 1270 Empowers the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to publish a list of 
the top 50 schools as measured by 
student growth 
 
Increase School Accountability 
SB 1380 Requires all students with disabilities 
to be included in state mandated tests 
 
Increase School Accountability 
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Table 41:  Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
SB 1404 Increases the maximum allowed tax 
credit for donation to school tuition 
organizations  
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1499 Allows corporations to claim tax 
credits on donations to school tuition 
organizations who provide 
scholarships to low income students 
 
Increase School Choice 
2007 SB 1522 Gives the Department of Education 
the power to develop school district 
and charter school district grading 
system  
 
Increase School Accountability 
2008 
 
SB 1081 Requires that schools involved in the 
e-learning program must report 
personnel salaries 
  
Increase School Choice 
Accountability 
SB 1215 Creates specific timeline for charter 
schools to renew their charter 
   
Increase School Choice 
Accountability 
HB 2008 Creates alternative graduation 
requirements if student cannot pass 
state required examination 
 
Keep the Peace 
HB 2064 Clarifies the required actions of the 
E-Learning Task Force 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
HB 2330 Exempt property owned by charter 
schools from taxation 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2563 Allows state test to take the place of 
transferred core education credit  
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 2747 Requires fair busing practices for 
sensory impaired students in public 
and charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
2009 
 
SB 1006 Reduced the funding assistance to 
charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
SB 1303 Requires charter schools to post 
public notice of board meeting dates 
with the Secretary of State 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
HB 2011 Prohibits the use of tenure as the 
basis for teacher rehiring in public 
and charter schools 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power  
SB 1386 Requires the review of financial 
records and academic achievement 
when charter schools apply for 
renewal of charter 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
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Table 41:  Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
 
HB 2099 Allows charter schools to locate in 
areas where public schools are 
prohibited from occupying by 
municipal code 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2346 Exempts charter schools building 
(rented or owned) from taxation 
 
Increase School Choice 
2010 
 
SB 1039 Establishes the Charter Arizona 
Online Instruction (AOI) Processing 
Fund for charter schools to create 
online instruction 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1040 Creates the requirement for an 
educator evaluation system with 33% 
to 50% base upon student 
achievement data 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 1119 Creates the Task Force on K-3 
Accountability and Assessments to 
examine accountability and 
assessment best practices 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 1274 Clarifies school tuition tax credit 
dates for reporting purposes 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1282 Clarifies application process for 
affiliate charter school 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1286 Requires baseline performance report 
for public and charter schools and 
guidelines for computation of 
academic achievement 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 2008 Decreases charter school funding for 
2010-2011 
 
Increase School Choice 
Accountability  
HB 2128 Establishes Joint Technical education 
district between public school 
districts and colleges  
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2129 Loosens the amount of hours 
required of digital learning to be 
considered a full time or half time 
student 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2227 Decreases teacher’s time to renew 
contract, improve teaching practices 
and appeal dismal  
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
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Table 41:  Arizona Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
HB 2298 Loosens specifications for alternative 
certification programs for teacher 
licensure 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 2514 Gives charter schools tax exemption 
in regards to food, drink or other 
consumption products 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2663 Clarifies school tuition organization 
rights, responsibilities and 
requirements 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2732 Requires a passing score on the 
Reading section of the AIM test for 
promotion to third grade 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 2733 Increases the use of the school 
achievement data to align with 
requirements of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2011 SB 1553 Creates the Arizona Empowerment 
Scholarship (vouchers for students 
with special needs) 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2706 Requires an annual achievement 
profile for school districts computed 
using student achievement data as 
50% of the measure 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Arizona state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
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and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
Results of the t-test indicate a statistically significant difference between 
Democrats (M =.09, SD = .302) and Republicans (M = 4.33, SD = 4.202) and support for 
overall education reform bills; t(20) = -3.579, p = .002.  These results suggest that in the 
state of Arizona, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform 
legislation.  Beyond this statistical significance, this test also shows the educational 
relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of .09 education reform bills 
in Arizona per legislative session, while Republicans introduce an average of 4.33 
education reform bills indicating that Republicans dominated education reform in the 
state (Table 42). 
 
Table 42:  Arizona Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .09 .302 .091 
R 11 4.33 4.202 1.267 
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Table 43:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.381 .006 -3.579 20 .002 -4.545 1.270 -7.195 -1.896 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -3.579 10.103 .005 -4.545 1.270 -7.372 -1.719 
 
 
Figure 11:  Arizona education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
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To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix D).  
Though the lack of statistical significance was surprising considering the overwhelming 
difference in legislation introduced by each party, educational relevance of the data is 
telling.  Of the 53 pieces of education reform legislation introduced from 2001-2011 in 
Arizona, 52 were introduced by Republicans, one by Democrats.  Looking at the data by 
specific education reform, Republicans overwhelmingly introduced more legislation in 
for each theme, minus collective bargaining/unions as no such legislation was 
introduced.   
 Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a major role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Arizona.  Republicans were much 
more likely overall and more likely to support each type of education reform legislation 
introduced in the state.  An independent samples T-test was conducted and showed a 
statistically significant difference between party identification and support for education 
reform legislation.  Though no statistical significance was shown from the nine chi 
squared tests focused on party identification and specific education reform theme, the 
results of descriptive analysis showed that Republicans overwhelmingly introduced more 
education reform legislation, minus collective bargaining/unions, than their Democratic 
counterparts. 
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Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Arizona from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 44 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Arizona.  Out of the 53 total enacted education reform bills in 
Arizona, charter schools was the theme for 20 (37%) pieces of legislation.  Testing was 
the theme of 13 (25%) legislative bills with collective bargaining the only theme not have 
a bill introduced.   
 
Table 44:  Arizona Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain. 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
2 20 0 5 13 5 7 1 3 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Arizona showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = .529, n = 11, p = 
.323 (Table 46); the scatter plot (Figure 12) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
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resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Arizona, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically 
significant relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 45:  Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 4.81 4.245 11 
PerPupilExpend 8181.45 425.610 11 
 
 
 
Table 46:  Arizona Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .329 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .323 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .329 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .323  
N 11 11 
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Figure 12:  Arizona ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
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organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 47 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Arizona. 
 Though 53 pieces of education reform legislation were enacted from 2001-2011, 
public subsidizing of campaigns is commonly used in Arizona legislative campaigns 
making private donations and campaign costs limited.  Knowing this, the lack of 
substantial campaign fundraising from private donors is not surprising with 24 of the 42 
legislators not having any major education oriented campaign contributions.  Of those 
legislators who did receive donations, all major education oriented donations came from 
organization outside of traditional public education and totaled $7,810.  Arizona is the 
only state in which education outsiders contributed all education based campaign 
contributions.   
As with both Florida, Louisiana and other states to follow, the Apollo Group is 
again financing education reform legislation.  William Coats, a contributor on more than 
one occasion, is the founder of the Leona Group, a charter school management 
organization with operations in Arizona, Ohio, Michigan and Florida.  Terry Bishop and 
John Sperling both have ties to the Apollo Group with Terry acting as Vice Chair of the 
Board and John Sperling the Founder of the organization.  Lucia Anderson also works for 
the Apollo Group as an Academic Advisor.  Furthering the influence of the Apollo 
Group, Charles Edelstein is CEO and Joseph Damico is President of corporation.  With 
multiple donations from the corporation and its employees, it is evident that the Apollo 
Group, headquartered out of Arizona, has played a role in financing education reform 
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legislation.  Finally, Eileen Sigmund is President of the Arizona Charter School 
Association. 
 The results of question five are not clearly indicated from the data.  Though all 
major campaign contributions to candidates of education reform legislation came from 
organizations/affiliates outside the traditional public school setting, 57% of all Arizona 
education reform legislation was financed by public subsidy.  This use of the public funds 
for legislative campaigns pushes the researcher to two conclusions.  First, in Arizona, 
public subsidies play a major role in state politics.  Second, the financing of the education 
reform legislation is unclear due to the use of public subsidy; however if focusing only on 
legislators with substantial outside funding, it can be concluded that organizations from 
outside the tradition public school sector are financing education reform legislation in the 
state. 
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Table 47:  Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of 
Contribution 
Amount 
of 
Contributi
on 
Vendor 
Contrac
t 
Procure
ment 
    2001    
Gullett R HB 2465 Testing 2002 Apollo 
Group 
 
$150 No 
Gray R HB 2093 Digital 
Learning/ 
Charter 
Schools 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Gray R HB 2277 Testing 
 
2003    
Boone R HB 2461 Testing 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 Boone R HB 2462 Evaluation 
 
2003 
Martin R SB 1330 Evaluation 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Boone R HB 2105 Charter 
Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Boone R HB 2255 Charter 
Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Huppenth
al 
R HB 2353 Testing 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Allen R HB 2583 Charter 
Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Hellon R SB 1074 Evaluation 
 
2005 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Anderson R HB 2438 Charter 
Schools 
2005 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Waring R SB 1422 Digital 
Learning/ 
Charter 
Schools 
 
2005 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Martin R SB 1529 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
 
2005 William 
Coats 
$250 No 
Anderson R HB 2359 Charter 
Schools 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
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Table 47:  Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Knaperek R HB 2676 Vouchers 2006 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Verschoor R SB 1164 Vouchers 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1184 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2006            No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions 
 
  SB 1270 Testing 
 
2006 
Hellon R SB 1380 Testing 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Bee R SB 1404 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
 
2006 Apollo 
Group 
$200 No 
     Terri Bishop 
 
$200 No 
     John 
Sperling 
 
$100 No 
Martin R SB 1499 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
 
2006 William 
Coats 
$250 No 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1522 Testing 
 
2007 See Huppenthal 2006 
Gray R SB 1081 Digital 
Learning 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Johnson R SB 1215 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008 Apollo 
Group 
 
$200 No 
Schapira D HB 2008 Testing 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Anderson R HB 2064 Digital 
Learning 
 
2008 Lucia 
Anderson 
$1,200 No 
Anderson R HB 2563 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008 William 
Coats 
$1,000 No 
Anderson R HB 2747 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008    
Mason R HB 2330 Charter 
Schools 
 
2008 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Burns R SB 1006 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 Apollo 
Group 
 
$200 No 
Adams R HB 2011 Tenure 2009 Apollo 
Group 
$200 No 
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Table 47:  Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
 
     Eileen 
Sigmund 
 
$350 No 
Tibshraen
y 
R SB 1303 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 Apollo 
Group 
 
$200 No 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1386 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Crandall R HB 2099 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Mason R HB 2346 Charter 
Schools 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1039 Digital 
Learning/ 
Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 Beverly 
Coats 
$140 No 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1030 Evaluation 
 
2010 William 
Coats 
$140 No 
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1119 Testing 
 
2010    
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1282 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010    
Huppenth
al 
R SB 1286 Testing 
 
2010    
Melvin R SB 1275 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Adams R HB 2008 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 William 
Coats 
 
$640 No 
     Beverly 
Coats 
 
$380 No 
     Apollo 
Group 
 
$200 No 
Crandall R HB 2128 Digital 
Learning 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
Crandall R HB 2129 Digital 
Learning 
 
2010 
Crandall R HB 2732 Testing 
 
2010 
Crandall R HB 2733 Testing 
 
2010 
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Table 47:  Arizona Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Hendrix R HB 2227 Evaluation 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign 
Contributions  
 
McComis
h 
R HB 2298 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2010 William 
Coats 
$410 No 
     Beverly 
Coats 
 
$250 No 
     Eileen 
Sigmund 
 
$75 No 
Murphy R HB 2514 Charter 
Schools 
 
2010 Apollo 
Group 
$600 No 
 
Murphy 
 
R 
 
HB 2663 
 
Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
 
 
2010 
 
Charles 
Edelstein 
 
$200 
No 
Murphy R SB 1553 Vouchers 
 
2011 
 
Joseph 
Damico 
 
$200 No 
Lesko R HB 2706 Testing 
 
2011 Eileen 
Sigmund 
$75 No 
 
Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that education reform legislation was 
supported by Republicans much more so than their Democratic counterparts.  Of the 53 
education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 52 of those bills.  A breakdown of 
the bills by education reform theme shows similar results (Table 48).  In all education 
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reform themes, except for alternative certification, Republicans introduced more 
legislation.  This theme was not Republican dominated because no such legislation was 
enacted.  
 Table 47 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Of the 52 education reform bills authored by Republicans, a 
total of 20 authors created each bill.  The only legislation enacted which was authored by 
a Democrat was in 2008 and was focused on testing. 
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in 
Arizona were by far the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Democrats 
introduced one of the 53 total bills; 2010 was the year with the most bills introduced with 
15.  Out of the 10 states used for this sample, Arizona was the most Republican 
dominated of them all.  
 
Table 48:  Arizona Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 2 
Charter Schools 0 20 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 0 
Evaluation 0 5 
Testing 1 12 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 5 
Digital Learning 0 7 
Tenure 0 1 
Voucher Programs 0 3 
Total 1 55 
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Table 49:  Arizona Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party 
ID 
  Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002 HB 2465 Gullett R Testing 
2003 HB 2093 Gray R Digital Learning/ 
Charter Schools 
2003 HB 2277 Gray R Testing 
2003 HB 2461 Boone R Testing 
2003 HB 2462 Boone R Evaluation 
2003 SB 1330 Martin R Evaluation 
2004 HB 2105 Boone R Charter Schools 
2004 HB 2255 Boone R Charter Schools 
2004 HB 2353 Huppenthal R Testing 
2004 HB 2583 Allen R Charter Schools 
2005 SB 1074 Hellon R Evaluation 
2005 HB 2438 Anderson R Charter Schools 
2005 SB 1422 Waring R Digital Learning/ 
Charter Schools 
2005 SB 1529 Martin R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2006 HB 2359 Anderson R Charter Schools 
2006 HB 2676 Knapernek R Vouchers 
2006 SB 1164 Verschoor R Vouchers 
2006 SB 1184 Huppenthal R Alternative Certification 
2006 SB 1270 Huppenthal R Testing 
2006 SB 1380 Hellon R Testing 
2006 SB 1404 Bee R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2006 SB 1499 Martin R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2007 SB 1522 Huppenthal R Testing 
2008 SB 1081 Gray R Digital Learning 
2008 SB 1215 Johnson R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 2008 Schapira D Testing 
2008 HB 2064 Anderson R Digital Learning 
2008 HB 2330 Mason R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 2563 Anderson R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 2747 Anderson R Charter Schools 
2009 SB 1006 Burns R Charter Schools 
2009 SB 1303 Tibshraeny R Charter Schools 
2009 HB 2011 Adama R Tenure 
2009 SB 1386 Huppenthal R Charter Schools 
2009 HB 2099 Crandall R Charter Schools 
2009 HB 2346 Mason R Charter Schools 
2010 SB 1039 Huppenthal R Digital Learning/ 
Charter Schools 
2010 SB 1030 Huppenthal R Evaluation 
2010 SB 1119 Huppenthal R Testing 
2010 SB 1275 Melvin R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2010 SB 1282 Huppenthal R Charter Schools 
2010 SB 1286 Huppenthal R Testing 
2010 HB 2008 Adams R Charter Schools 
2010 HB 2128 Crandall R Digital Learning 
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Table 49:  Arizona Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
2010 HB 2129 Crandall R Digital Learning 
2010 HB 2227 Hendrix R Evaluation 
2010 HB 2298 McComish R Alternative Certification 
2010 HB 2514 Murphy R Charter Schools 
2010 HB 2663 Murphy R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2010 HB 2732 Crandall R Testing 
2010 HB 2733 Crandall R Testing 
2011 SB 1553 Murphy R Vouchers 
2011 HB 2706 Lesko R Testing 
 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Arizona’s government accountability office and state procurement office search programs 
showed no connection between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of 
any vendor contracts from 2001-2011.  For the purpose of this research it was concluded 
that campaign contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was 
sponsored by the candidate to which they contributed. 
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Ohio 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 50 and 51 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 13.  The 
results of the analysis indicate no relationship, r = .148, n = 11, p = .664 between the 
amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 13 clearly shows this 
lack of relationship. 
 
Table 50:  Ohio Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.09 1.221 11 
 
173 
 
 
Table 51:  Ohio Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .148 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .664 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .148 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .664  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in Ohio, 
the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has increased from 
2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  Rationales 
were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic research 
from the literature review.  Table 52 explains the rationale for each piece of identified 
education reform legislation.  As in the other states, Ohio’s rationale for education reform 
is choice and accountability; however unlike some of the states in the sample, Ohio also 
focuses on decreasing the power of educators.  The legislation geared to collective 
bargaining and alternative certification highlight this rationale; by attempting to remove 
educator authority over collective bargaining and professionalism in the workplace, 
reformers in Ohio decided that the current crop of teachers was simply not good enough 
to help the student of Ohio achieve academic success measured by the legislated tests.  
 
 
Table 52:  Ohio Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2002 HB 364 Allow localities to create 
“community schools” 
 
Increase School Choice 
2004 HB 3 Creates required testing for specific 
grade levels and achievement data 
analysis 
 
Increase School 
Accountability  
SB 2 Creates and empowers the Education 
Standards Board to create alternative 
teaching certification standards 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
2005 HB 107 Requires State Board of Education to 
create guidelines including value-
added evaluation for traditional and 
alternative certification programs  
 
Increase School 
Accountability 
 
Decrease Teacher Power  
HB 66 Expands the coverage and increases 
the amount of Cleveland Scholarship 
program 
 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 52:  Ohio Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
2006 
 
HB 276 Allows more charter schools than the 
current cap limit if the charter school 
is operated by an organization 
outside of the state 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 530 Allows students in poor performing 
schools (3 years in a row) the 
opportunity to access the Educational 
Choice Scholarship Pilot Program 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 79 Allows students in poor performing 
schools (2 out of 3 years) the 
opportunity to access Educational 
Choice Scholarship Pilot Program 
 
Increase School Choice 
2007 HB 190 Requires the use of elementary 
school state testing during a two 
week period  
 
Increase School 
Accountability  
2011 
 
SB 5* Prohibits striking and restricts the 
collective bargaining of public 
unions 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 21 Requires the state board of education 
to give teacher licenses to Teach for 
America employees/graduates  
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 153 Requires the creation of educator 
evaluation based at least 50% on 
student achievement 
 
Increase School 
Accountability  
 
 
*Vetoed by public referendum 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Ohio state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
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parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =..09, SD = .302) and Republicans (M = 1.00, SD = 1.095) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -2.654, p = .015.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Ohio, Democrats are less likely than Republicans to support education reform legislation 
to a statistically significant degree.  Beyond statistical significance, this test also shows 
the educational relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of .09 
education reform bills in Ohio per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an 
average of 1.00 education reform bill (Table 53).   
 
Table 53:  Ohio Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .09 .302 .091 
R 11 1.00 1.095 .330 
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Table 54:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
17.300 .000 -2.654 20 .015 -.909 .343 -1.624 -.194 
 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -2.654 11.507 .022 -.909 .343 -1.659 -.159 
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Figure 14:  Ohio education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests, except for one, showed no statistical 
significance between party identification and support for specific education reform 
themes (Appendix E).  The one chi squared test which was statistically significant 
measured party identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a 
statistically significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school 
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legislation X² (1, N = 12) = 5.455, p = .020; however the validity of this statistic should 
be questioned as three of four cells fall under the expected count of five. 
 This question of validity comes about because of the lack of education reform 
bills passed from 2001-2011 in Ohio; a total of 12 bills were enacted in this time period.  
Examining the descriptive data gives us a better illustration of which types of education 
reforms Ohio is enacting and the difference between the two political parties’ support for 
such legislation.  Of all 12 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans 
in Ohio authored 11; Republicans also authored more bills in each of the education 
reform theme except for bills focused on charter schools, which Democrats and 
Republicans both introduced one bill and tenure, under which no bills were enacted. 
 Results of question two indicate that party identification plays a role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Ohio.  An independent samples t-
test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party 
identification and support for education reform legislation p = .015.  Republicans were 
more likely to support education reform legislation overall and were also responsible for 
the introduction of all enacted education reform legislation, minus one bill focused on 
charter schools.   
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Ohio from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which themes 
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the enacted legislation fell under; Table 55 displays this tally and the mode of the state 
legislation for Ohio.  With twelve education reform bills enacted into law during the time 
period, Ohio has shown the least legislative action toward state reform of the k-12 
education system.  With this being said, the major themes of this legislation are still 
present; both testing and alternative certification were both the themes of three (25%) of 
all education reform legislation.  With 50% of the bills focused on these two themes both 
tenure and tax credit scholarships received no education reform bills.   
 
Table 55:  Ohio Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain. 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
3 2 1 2 3 0 1 0 3 
 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Ohio showed no statistically significant relationship 
between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil expenditure. 
There was no correlation between the two variables r = .045, n = 11, p = .894 (Table 57); 
the scatter plot (Figure 15) summarizes these results.  Overall, the resulting lack of a 
statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Ohio, the amount of 
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education reform legislation enacted into law had no statistically significant relationship 
with per pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 56:  Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.09 1.221 11 
PerPupilExpend 11531.73 385.994 11 
 
 
 
Table 57:  Ohio Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .045 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .894 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .045 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .894  
N 11 11 
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Figure 15:  Ohio ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
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organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 58 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Ohio. 
 Financing of Ohio’s education reform legislation can be broken down into two 
groups; teachers unions and school choice advocates.  In total, teachers unions donated 
$22,650, school choice advocates contributed $84,000.  With nearly a four to one ratio, 
school choice advocates from outside the state are the major financiers of education 
reform legislation.  Susan Dudas, a contributor of only $2,500, worked from the Charter 
Development Foundation at the time of her contribution.  William Lager, a contributor of 
$46,500, is the Owner and President of the Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), 
Ohio’s largest provider of online education.  Ann Amer and David Brennan, contributors 
of $39,500, are the Founders and Owner of White Hat Management, an Ohio based 
charter school corporation which runs 33 schools in three states (Arizona, Ohio and 
Colorado).   
 Ohio education reform legislation is primarily financed by school choice 
advocates, or those who will benefit from an increased amount of legislation supporting 
school choice.  An examination of the campaign contributions as well as the theme of the 
legislation indicate that these outside organization are playing a role in the legislative 
process.  The amount of money used in campaign contributions by such organizations 
indicate that school choice proponents are the dominant financier of education reform 
legislation in Ohio.  
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Table 58:  Ohio Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of Contribution Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor Contract  
Husted R HB 364 Charter 
Schools 
2002 Susan Dudas 
 
$2,500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$2,500 No 
Schlichter R HB 3 Testing 2004 Ann Amer Brennan 
 
$2,500 No 
     David Brennan 
 
$2,500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$1,000 No 
Gardner R SB 2 Testing/ 
Alternative 
Certification 
2004 Ohio Education Association $5,500 No 
     Ohio Federation of Teachers 
 
$2,500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$2,500 No 
Setzer R HB 107 Alternative 
Certification 
2005 Ohio Education Association 
 
$5,000 No 
     Ann Amer Brennan 
 
$2,500 No 
     David Brennan 
 
$2,500 No 
     William Lager 
 
$3,500 No 
     Ohio School Boards Association 
 
$650 No 
Calvert R HB 66 Vouchers 2005 William Lager 
 
$3,500 No 
Stewart D HB 276 Charter 
Schools 
2006 Ohio Education Association 
 
$5,500 No 
     Ohio Federation of Teachers 
 
$2,500 No 
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Table 58:  Ohio Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
     Columbus Education Association 
 
$1,000 No 
Calvert R HB 530 Vouchers 2006 William Lager 
 
$3,500 No 
Raga R HB 79 Vouchers 2006 William Lager 
 
$5,000 No 
Hite R HB 190 Testing 2007 David Brennan 
 
$2,500 No 
     All Children Matter 
 
$1,000 No 
Jones R SB 5 Collective 
Bargaining 
2011 David Brennan 
 
$5,000 No 
     William Lager 
 
$4,000 No 
Combs R HB 21 Evaluation/ 
Alternative 
Certification/ 
Digital 
Learning 
 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Amstutz R HB 153 Evaluation/ 
Digital 
Learning 
2011 David Brennan 
 
$11,000 No 
     Ann Amer Brennan 
 
$11,000 No 
     William Lager 
 
$10,000 No 
     David Brennan $5,500 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Ohio education reform legislation is 
supported by Republicans by a 11 to 1 margin; table 59 highlights this disparity between 
the two parties with charter schools being the only enacted legislation in which 
Republicans did not author and enact more bills.  Table 60 shows the extent to which 
Republicans have dominated education reform legislation in Ohio with the only 
Democratic authored legislation to be enacted focusing on the theme of charter schools 
and occurring in 2006.   
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in Ohio 
were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Though the state did not 
pass many education reforms from 2001-2011, the fact that Republicans authored 91% of 
the enacted legislation clearly indicates their dominance in the state in regards to 
education reform. 
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Table 59:  Ohio Education Reform Theme by Party ID 
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 3 
Charter Schools 1 1 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 1 
Evaluation 0 2 
Testing 0 3 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 0 
Digital Learning 0 1 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 0 3 
Total 1 14 
 
 
Table 60:  Ohio Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002 HB 364 Husted R Charter Schools 
2003     
2004 HB 3 Schlichter R Testing 
2004 SB 2 Gardner R Testing/Alternative Certification 
2005 HB 107 Setzer R Alternative Certification 
2005 HB 66 Calvert R Vouchers 
2006 HB 276 Stewart D Charter Schools 
2006 HB 530 Calvert R Vouchers 
2006 HB 79 Raga R Vouchers 
2007 HB 190 Hite R Testing 
2008     
2009     
2010     
2011 SB 5 Jones R Collective Bargaining 
2011 HB 21 Combs R Evaluation/Alternative 
Certification/Digital Learning 
2011 HB 153 Amstutz R Evaluation 
 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
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contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  Ohio’s 
state procurement search program showed no connection between financing education 
reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011.  For the 
purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit from 
the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they 
contributed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Michigan 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 61 and 62 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 16.  The 
results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, r = .647, n = 11, p = .032 
between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 16 clearly 
shows this increase in education reform legislation.  
 
Table 61: Michigan Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.90 2.145 11 
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Table 62: Michigan Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation 
 
Pearson Correlation 1 .647* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .032 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .647* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .032  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 16:  Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011 
 
 From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Michigan, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
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research from the literature review.  Table 63 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Just as in the previous states, increasing 
accountability and increase school choice are the rationales for education reform 
legislation.  It appears that in regards to education reform, the rationale is that by 
increasing choice and accountability, student achievement will rise. 
 
Table 63:  Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2002 SB 0562 Clarifies reporting procedures for 
irregularities on the Michigan 
educational assessment program 
(MEAP) test 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2003 SB 0393 Allows for the development of 
Urban High School Academies 
(Charter School) 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
2004 HB 6230 Specifies time period for which 
MEAP test can be given 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2005 HB 4142 Allows for more MEAP testing to 
comply with No Child Left Behind 
and clarifies testing reporting for 
students 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 4991 Creates the Tenure Commission and 
clarifies tenure in regards to teacher 
evaluation and retirement 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2006 SB 1427 Allows for the creation of “personal 
curriculum” for students with the 
collaboration of parents and school 
counselors 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 5606 Alters required coursework and 
testing of high school student 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 1124 Requires the passing of subject area 
exams or Michigan Merit 
Examination 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2007 HB 4591 Creates guidelines for creation and 
review of teacher preparation 
programs 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2008 SB 1096 Allows ½ of teacher internship to be 
done as substitute teaching with 
Decrease Educator Power 
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Table 63:  Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
comparative analysis of traditional 
and alternative teaching certification 
programs 
 
2010 SB 0925 Creates the title of “School of 
Excellence” for high performing 
charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0926 Ties funding to Schools of 
Excellence and virtual Schools of 
Excellence 
 
Increase School Choice  
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0981 Requires a new performance 
evaluation system tied to student 
performance 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 4787 Clarifies the process and 
requirements for “turnaround 
schools” specifically with 
curriculum and assessment 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 4788 Changes collective bargaining for 
“turnaround schools” to allow state 
chief executive officer to act as 
school representative in bargaining 
agreement 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 5596 Creates “interim teacher 
certificates”  
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
2011 SB 0158 Empowers the emergency manager 
of a school district (fiscal 
accountability), to reject, modify or 
terminate collective bargaining 
agreement 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 4625 Extends probationary period for 
new teachers and termination 
requirements 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 4626 Changes the language used for 
terminating a tenured teacher from 
“reasonable and just cause” to “for a 
reason that is not arbitrary and 
capricious”. 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 4627 Requires educator evaluations to 
based, at least 50%, on student 
performance 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
HB 4628 Adds curriculum standards, 
evaluation system, and personnel 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 63:  Michigan Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
decisions to subjects not allowed in 
collective bargaining 
 
Increase School Oversight 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Michigan state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =.45, SD = 1.214) and Republicans (M = 1.45, SD = 1.753) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -1.697, p = .105.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Michigan, party identification has little impact on support for education reform 
legislation.  Beyond a lack of statistical significance, this test also shows the educational 
relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of .45 education reform bills 
in Michigan per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 1.45 
education reform bills (Table 64).  Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows 
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that Republicans authored an average of three times more education reform bills than 
their Democratic counterparts.   
Table 64:  Michigan Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .45 1.214 .366 
R 11 1.45 1.753 .529 
 
 
Table 65:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.204 .286 -1.697 20 .105 -1.091 .643 -2.432 .250 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -1.697 17.795 .107 -1.091 .643 -2.443 .261 
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Figure 17:  Michigan education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix F).   
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills showed Republicans responsible or 16 of 
the 21 pieces of education reform legislation in Michigan.  Breaking this down into 
education theme, Democrats introduced more legislation focused on charter schools than 
their Republican counterparts.  Republicans on the other hand introduced more legislation 
196 
 
in the categories of alternative certification, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, 
testing and tenure. 
 Results of question two indicate that party identification played a minor role in 
the support of education reform legislation in the state of Michigan.  Party identification 
did not impact support for specific education reform legislation however not statistically 
significant differences were evident.  An independent samples t-test was conducted and 
showed a statistically significant difference between party identification and support for 
education reform legislation overall.  Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical 
significance between party identification and specific education reform theme.  Though 
lacking statistical significance, educational relevance was found as the Democrats were 
more likely to support charter school legislation and Republicans more likely to support 
alternative certification, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, testing and tenure 
legislation as well as overall education reform legislation at a ratio of 5:1.  
 
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Michigan from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 66 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Michigan.  Of the 21 pieces of education reform legislation to be 
enacted in the state, seven (33%) of all reform legislation had a theme of testing.  
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Evaluation was the focus of five (23%) of the legislation with tax credit scholarships, 
digital learning and vouchers having no education reform legislation.   
 
Table 66:  Michigan Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargain. 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
3 3 4 5 7 0 0 4 0 
 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Michigan showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = -.314, n = 11, p = 
.347 (Table 68); the scatter plot (Figure 18) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Michigan, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law no statistically significant 
relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 67:  Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.90 2.145 11 
PerPupilExpend 11399.91 98.835 11 
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Table 68:  Michigan Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 -.314 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .347 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation -.314 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .347  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
Figure 18:  Michigan ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
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Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 69 shows the resulting 
data from this research for the state of Michigan. 
 Michigan’s education reform legislation, similarly to Minnesota, Wisconsin and 
Indiana, is financed primarily by organizations affiliated with traditional public schools.  
These organizations, principally unions, contributed $26,310 from 2001-2011 compared 
to $7,250 from organizations/affiliates outside the traditional public school realm.  One 
aspect of this financing that sets Michigan apart from every other state is the fact that an 
organization, which is not a union, financially supported a candidate from 2001-2011.  
Friends of Kent County Schools is an organization of parents and community members of 
Kent County (Grand Rapids), with a focus on equity and success for their public school 
system.  This group is the only such organization discovered in this research.   
 Beyond public school affiliated contributions, some interesting campaign 
donators came to light during the research.  JC Huizenga, founder of the National 
Heritage Academies, a charter school management organization which focuses on 
making schools more accountable and results driven.  Daniel Quiesenbeery is the 
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President of Michigan Association of Public School Academies, an organization 
representing and leading charter schools in the state.  Finally, the Great Lakes Education 
Project is a nonprofit organization with the intent to increase school choice in the state of 
Michigan.   
 Michigan’s long history with unions is highlighted by the data regarding 
contributions to campaigns.  Education reform legislation is primarily financed by public 
education unions and not by school choice proponents as seen in other states.  On a 
nearly four to one ratio, public education affiliates have outspent nonpublic education 
affiliates in regards to financially supporting education reform legislation.  This is the 
case despite the overwhelming Republican support for such legislation.   
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Table 69:  Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party ID Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of Contribution Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor 
Contract 
Procurement 
    2001 
 
   
Garcia R SB 0562 Testing 2002 
 
JC Huizenga $1,000 No 
Kuipers* R SB 0393 Charter Schools 
 
2003 JC Huizenga $1,000 No 
Palmer R HB 6230 Testing 2004 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$450 No 
Palmer R HB 4142 Testing 2005 Michigan Association of 
Secondary School 
Principals 
  
$300 No 
Emmons R HB 4991 Evaluation 2005 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$900 No 
Kuipers* R SB 1427 Testing 2006 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$2,500 No 
  
Kuipers 
 
 
R 
 
SB 1124 
 
Testing 
 
2006 
 
Palmer R HB 5606 Testing 2006 Michigan Association of 
Secondary School 
Principals 
 
$300 No 
Hopgood D HB 4591 Alternative 
Certification 
2007 Michigan Education 
Association 
 
$2,010 No 
     Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$500 No 
     David Hecker 
 
$500 No 
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Table 69:  Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Jelinek R SB 1096 Alternative 
Certification 
2008 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$700 No 
    2009  
 
  
Thomas D SB 0925 Charter Schools 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Thomas D SB 0926 Charter Schools 
 
2010 
 
Kuipers R SB 0981 Evaluation 
 
2010 See Kuipers 2006 
Melton D HB 4787 Testing 2010 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$5,000 No 
     Michigan Education 
Association 
 
$4,975 No 
     Daniel Quisenberry 
 
$400 No 
Johnson D HB 4788 Collective 
Bargaining 
2010 Michigan Education 
Association 
 
$1,000 No 
     Daniel Quisenberry 
 
$250 No 
Pavlov  R HB 5596 Alternative 
Certification 
2010 Great Lakes Education 
Project 
 
 
$5,000 
 
No 
Pavlov R SB 0158 Collective 
Bargaining  
2011 Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$1,000 No 
Rogers  R HB 4625 Evaluation/Tenure 2011 Michigan Education 
Association 
 
$625 No 
Scott R HB 4626 Evaluation/Tenure 2011 Michigan Education 
Association 
$3,000 No 
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Table 69:  Michigan Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
 
     Michigan Association of 
School Administrators 
 
$2,000 No 
O’Brien R HB 4627 Evaluation/Tenure 2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Yonker  R HB 4628 Collective 
Bargaining 
2011 Friends of Kent County 
Schools 
$550 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Michigan education reform legislation 
is supported by Republicans much more than their Democratic legislative counterparts.  
Of the 21 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 16 of those bills.  In all 
education reform themes enacted, except for charter schools, Republicans introduced 
more legislation (Table 70).  The themes with greatest Republican support were testing 
and evaluation; Democrats most authored legislation was charter schools, with two bills 
authored and enacted. 
 Table 71 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Of the five education reform bills authored by Democrats, two 
were introduced by the same legislator. Of the 16 Republican authored legislatives 
pieces, three legislators were responsible for the creation of 8 of the enacted reforms.   
11 of the 21 total bills have been passed since 2010 showing the recent jump into 
education reform by the state. 
205 
 
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in 
Michigan were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Republican 
legislators were responsible for the majority of the legislation with much of the 
legislation occurring during the 2010, an important election year for Republicans at the 
national level.   
 
Table 70:  Michigan Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  1 2 
Charter Schools 2 1 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 1 2 
Evaluation 0 5 
Testing 1 6 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 0 
Digital Learning 0 0 
Tenure 0 4 
Voucher Programs 0 0 
Total 5 20 
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Table 71:  Michigan Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002 SB 0562 Garcia R Testing 
2003 SB 0393 Kuipers R Charter Schools 
2004 HB 6230 Palmer R Testing 
2005 HB 4142 Palmer R Testing 
2005 HB 4991 Emmons R Evaluation/Tenure 
2006 SB 1427 Kuipers R Testing 
2006 HB 5606 Palmer R Testing 
2006 SB 1124 Kuipers R Testing 
2007 HB 4591 Hopgood D Alternative Certification 
2008 SB 1096 Jelinek R Alternative Certification 
2009     
2010 SB 0925 Thomas D Charter Schools 
2010 SB 0926 Thomas D Charter Schools 
2010 SB 0981 Kuipers R Evaluation 
2010 HB 4787 Melton D Testing 
2010 HB 4788 Johnson D Collective Bargaining 
2010 HB 5596 Pavlov  R Alternative Certification 
2011 SB 0158 Pavlov R Collective Bargaining  
2011 HB 4625 Rogers  R Evaluation/Tenure 
2011 HB 4626 Scott R Evaluation/Tenure 
2011 HB 4627 O’Brien R Evaluation/Tenure 
2011 HB 4628 Yonker  R Collective Bargaining 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
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contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Michigan’s state transparency and accountability search program showed no connection 
between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts 
from 2001-2011.  For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign 
contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by 
the candidate to which they contributed. 
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Oklahoma 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 72 and 73 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 19.  The 
results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, r = .775, n = 11, p = .005 
between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 19 clearly 
shows this increase in education reform legislation.  
 
 
Table 72:  Oklahoma Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 5.09 4.940 11 
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Table 73:  Oklahoma Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .775** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .005 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .775** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005  
N 11 11 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 19:  Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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 From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Oklahoma, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.  The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 74 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Similar to the other states of the sample, school 
choice and accountability appear to be the rational for enacting education reform 
legislation.  Oklahoma follows other states in the sample by creating charter schools, 
increasing testing and the applications of the results, digital learning, alternative 
certification programs and like Florida, Georgia, Arizona, Wisconsin, Indiana and 
Louisiana, Oklahoma also added a voucher program to their laws.  
 
Table 74:  Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2002 
 
HB 2341 
 
Alters the requirements in 
school improvement plans 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 1408 Requires districts create 
policies on online education  
 
Increase School Choice  
SB 1010 Requires the use of outcome 
based performance measures 
for teachers and administrators 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2003 
 
HB 1414 Requires the use of criterion-
based tests to meet the demands 
of NCLB 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1438 Creates alternative certification 
for educational leaders 
 
Increase Educator Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
HB 1767 Requires the Virtual Internet 
School Pilot Program 
Coordinating Committee to 
make cooperative partnerships 
 
Increase School Choice 
2004 SB 0713 Allocates funds for the State 
Charter School Facilities 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 74:  Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Incentive Grants Program (Part 
of NCLB) 
 
2005 
 
HB 1028 Creates the Oklahoma 
Commission for Teacher 
Preparation  
 
Increase Educator Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 1390 Amends alternative 
certification time limit to three 
years 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
 
HB 1992 Creates Academic 
Achievement Award to provide 
monetary bonuses to teachers 
of students of high performance 
  
Increase School Accountability  
SB 982 Provides student scholarships 
based upon student 
achievement data 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2006 
 
HB 2756 Amends the list of offenses 
leading to termination of 
tenured educator 
  
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 1493 Increases funding for charter 
schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 1792 Creates a state committee to 
direct actions regarding testing 
via the Achieving Classroom 
Excellence Act 
 
Increase School Testing 
2007 
 
HB 1593 Increases the Academic 
Achievement Awards available 
to schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1589 Increases the types of 
organizations which can start 
charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
2008 
 
SB 2100 Creates a pilot program to 
allow up to 10 districts to be 
charter districts 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 3124 Requires state board of 
education to give Teach for 
America employees teaching 
certificates 
 
Increase Educator Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power  
 
2009 
 
SB 1111 Creates the Educational 
Accountability Reform Act to 
examine teacher evaluation 
practices and testing data 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 74:  Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
 
SB 0268 Requires that failing schools be 
put in a turnaround program by 
the district 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
Increase School Choice 
 
SB 0394 Pushes back date for renewal of 
teacher contracts 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 
SB 0473 Allows the office of 
accountability to evaluate 
effectiveness of school 
spending 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
SB 0497 Provides that industry 
endorsement and the affiliate 
testing show up on student 
transcripts 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0582 Requires the state board of 
education to grant alternative 
teaching certificates to any 
graduate of such program 
 
Increase Educator Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 0604 Creates the Task Force on 
Internet-Based Instruction to 
review the topic for future use 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
SB 0867 Allows for student remediation 
via alternative methods in 
subjects where students fail end 
of course exam 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1333 Increases GPA requirement for 
alternatively certified teachers 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1461 Provides state support for 
failing schools and their 
teachers  
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1837 Creates the Inner City Schools 
Rescue program to recruit 
teachers to these blighted areas 
 
Increase School Accountability  
2010 
 
SB 0509 Empowers state government to 
take over failing schools and 
remove certain teacher contract 
stipulations 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 1799 Gives testing schedule freedom 
to districts  
 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 74:  Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
SB 1862 Clarifies who can sponsor 
charter schools and removes the 
limit of the number of charter 
schools allowed each year 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 2033 Aligns Oklahoma testing and 
teacher evaluation practices 
with Race to the Top 
requirements (quantitative 
evaluations) 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 2109 Modifies the school accounting 
formula to increase online 
educations 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 2129 Creates a state taskforce to 
examine the feasibility of a 
statewide virtual education 
program 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 2212 Gives charter schools 
sponsored by boards of 
education the same funding 
status as public schools in 
regards to federal funding 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2302 Clarifies funding model for 
Academic Achievement Award 
(State Testing) 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 2318 Requires testing of students in 
online courses or alternative 
schools 
 
Increase School Accountability  
 
SB 2319 Prohibits schools from denying 
students the enrollment in 
online courses 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 2330 Allows districts to create 
deregulated empowerment 
schools or zones  
 
Increase School Choice 
 
Increase Local Authority 
HB 2747 Removes the requirement of 
public input regarding  
alternative certification 
programs 
Decrease Educator Power 
HB 2753 Increases the groups which can 
authorize charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 2928 Requires evidence based rubric 
and quantitative student growth 
required in teacher evaluations 
 
Increase School Accountability  
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Table 74:  Oklahoma Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
HB 3259 Decreases the amount of the 
experience required to receive 
alternative certification 
 
Increase Educator Workforce 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 HB 3393 Creates a school voucher 
program 
 
Increase School Choice 
2011 
 
SB 0141 Increases funding for online 
schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0256 Allows charter schools to 
receive government lease rates 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0278 Increases the types of charter 
school authorities 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0280 Decreases regulation of online 
schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0346 Requires that students who do 
not pass the appropriate grade 
Reading test cannot be 
promoted to the next grade 
 
Increase School Accountability  
SB 0445 Removes the transfer 
requirement for students who 
wish to enroll in a charter 
school within their current 
district 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0969 Creates a tax credit scholarship 
program 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1267 Creates the Oklahoma Teacher 
and Leader Effectiveness 
Evaluation System 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1456 Requires the publication of 
school testing results and ties 
performance funding to the 
results  
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1680 Requires the results of state 
tests and end of course 
assessments to be published on 
high school transcripts 
 
Increase School Accountability  
HB 1744 Allows students the opportunity 
to receive a school vouchers 
without having to have an IEP 
the previous year 
Increase School Choice 
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Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Oklahoma state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =1.18, SD = 1.079) and Republicans (M = 3.90, SD = 5.016) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -1.704, p = .104.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Oklahoma, party identification has little impact on support for education reform 
legislation.  Despite a lack of statistical significance, this test shows the educational 
relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of 1.18 education reform bills 
in Oklahoma per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 3.90 
education reform bills (Table 75).  Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows 
that Republicans authored an average of three times more education reform bills than 
their Democratic counterparts.  Also, of the 56 education reform bills enacted from 2001-
2011, Democrats authored only 13.   
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Table 75:  Oklahoma Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 1.18 1.079 .325 
R 11 3.90 5.016 1.512 
 
 
 
Table 76:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
16.053 .001 -1.704 20 .104 -2.636 1.547 -5.863 .591 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -1.704 10.923 .117 -2.636 1.547 -6.044 .772 
 
217 
 
 
 
Figure 20:  Oklahoma education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix G).   
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible or 13 of the 
56 pieces of education reform legislation in Oklahoma.  Breaking this down into 
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education theme, Republicans authored more enacted legislation for each of the nine 
education reform themes, except for tenure in which no legislation was introduced.  
 Results of question two indicate that party identification played a major role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Oklahoma.  Party identification did 
impact support for specific education reform legislation however no statistically 
significant differences were evident.  An independent samples t-test was conducted and 
showed no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for 
education reform legislation overall despite the data showing Republicans 
overwhelmingly authored the enacted legislation.  Chi square tests conducted showed no 
statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme 
despite Republicans authoring more bills enacted into legislation.  Though there was not 
a statistically significance difference between political party identification and support for 
education reform legislation, results showed Republicans responsible for 77% of all 
education reform legislation in Oklahoma from 2001-2011. 
 
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Oklahoma from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 77 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Oklahoma.  With 56 enacted education reform bills, Oklahoma is the 
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most education reform minded state if using number bills as the measurement tool.  Of 
these bills, testing is the most common theme with 18 (33%) of the bills focused on this 
issue.  Charter schools 11 (20%) and digital learning 9 (16%) round out the top three 
reform themes for the state.  Tenure received zero reform bills with tax credit 
scholarships, collective bargaining and vouchers only receiving one bill apiece in the ten 
year time period. 
 
Table 77:  Oklahoma Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
8 11 1 10 18 1 9 0 2 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Louisiana showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = .084, n = 11, p = 
.807 (Table 79); the scatter plot (Figure 21) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Oklahoma, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law no statistically significant 
relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
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Table 78:  Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 5.09 4.940 11 
PerPupilExpend 8289.00 317.543 11 
 
 
 
Table 79:  Oklahoma Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .084 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .807 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .084 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .807  
N 11 11 
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Figure 21:  Oklahoma ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
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organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 80 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Oklahoma. 
 Education reform legislation in Oklahoma is plentiful to say the least; at 56 pieces 
of education reform legislation, Oklahoma is the most active state in regards to enacting 
legislation.  Despite the numerous legislation, only six different education related sources 
contributed to campaigns from 2001-2011.  Of these six contributors, four were 
organizations based outside of the traditional public school system.   Legislative 
Interaction for Education is the PAC for Oklahoma’s school administrator’s union.  Jim 
Walton is of the Walton Family Foundation, an organization focused on education reform 
and school choice.  Jim Dunlap is a former Oklahoma legislator and 2002 National 
Chairman of the ALEC, an organization intent on increasing accountability, choice and 
reform in public education.  Koch Industries is a national corporation with investments in 
science, technology minerals.  Though the company itself is not affiliated with education 
reform, Charles and David Koch both serve on the board of directors for the company 
and are connected to multiple education reform initiates throughout the United States.  
Empower Oklahoma is a business focused on providing career training to Oklahoma 
students.   
These four organizations/affiliates donated $13,957 compared to $20,700 from 
only two organizations affiliated with traditional public schools.  This differences 
indicates that though outside organizations outnumber traditional education 
organizations, organizations traditionally affiliate with public schools are more 
responsible for financing the education reform legislation in the state of Oklahoma. 
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform Category Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of Contribution Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor 
Contract 
Procurement 
    2001    
Wilt  R HB 2341 Testing 
 
2002 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Easley D SB 1408 Digital Learning 
 
2002 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Haney D SB 1010 Evaluation 
 
2002 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Staggs D HB 1414 Testing 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Brannon D HB 1438 Alternative 
Certification 
2003 Legislative Interaction for 
Education/Life 
 
$500 No 
Adair D HB 1767 Digital Learning 2003 Legislative Interaction for 
Education/Life 
 
$500 No 
Williams D SB 0713 Charter Schools 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Benge R HB 1028 Evaluation 2005 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$250 No 
Brannon D HB 1390 Alternative 
Certification 
2005 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$600 No  
Jones R HB 1992 Testing 
 
2005 Jim Walton $1,000 No 
Morgan D SB 0982 Testing 2005 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$1,000 No 
Blackwell R HB 2756 Evaluation 2006 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
 
Paddack D SB 1493 Charter Schools 2006 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$500 No 
Paddack D SB 1792 Testing 
 
2006    
Jones R HB 1593 Testing 2007 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$1,500 No 
Jones R HB 1589 Charter Schools 
 
2007    
Ford R SB 2100 Charter Schools 2008 Koch Industries 
 
$1,000 No 
     Jim & Pam Dunlap 
 
$957 No 
Jones R HB 3124 Alternative 
Certification 
2008 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$650 No 
Jolley R SB 1111 Evaluation/Testing 2009 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$1,250 No 
Ford R SB 0268 Charter Schools 
 
2009 
See Ford 2008 
Ford R SB 0473 Evaluation 
 
2009 
Stanislawski R SB 0394 Evaluation 
 
2009 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$1,000 No 
Stanislawski 
 
R SB 0604 Digital Learning 
 
2009    
Jolley  R SB 0582 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2009 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$1,250 No 
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
 
Paddack D SB 0497 Testing 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Anderson  R SB 0687 Testing 
 
2009 Koch Industries 
 
$1,000 No 
Denney R HB 1333 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2009 Oklahoma Education  
 
Association 
$1,800 No 
     Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$650 No 
Sears R HB 1461 Testing 
 
2009 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$250 No 
Hamilton  D HB 1837 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2009 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
$300 No 
Ford R SB 0509 Evaluation 
 
2010 See Ford 2008 
Ford R SB 2212 Charter Schools 
 
2010 
Ford R SB 2330 Collective 
Bargaining/ 
Testing 
 
2010 
Paddack D SB 1799 Testing 
 
2010 
No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Coffee R SB 1862 Charter Schools 
 
2010 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$250 No 
Coffee R SB 2033 Evaluation/ 
Testing 
2010    
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
 
Stanislawski R SB 2109 Digital Learning 
 
2010 See Sanislawski 2009 
Stanislawski R SB 2129 Digital Learning 
 
2010 
Stanislawski R SB 2319 Digital Learning 
 
2010 
Banz R HB 2302 Testing 2010 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
$1,000 No 
      
Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
 
$400 
 
No 
Jolley R SB 2318 Testing/ 
Digital Learning 
 
2010 See Jolley 2009 
Denney R HB 2747 Alternative 
Certification 
2010 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
 
$1,000 
 
 
 
 
No 
Denney R HB 2753 Charter Schools 2010 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School  
Administration 
$400 No 
Coody R HB 2928 Evaluation 2010 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
$2,000 No 
     Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$1,000 No 
Blackwell R HB 3259 Alternative 
Certification 
2010 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
$1,300 No 
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
     Oklahoma Retired Educators 
Association 
 
$1,000 No 
     Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma  
School Administration 
 
$800 No 
Nelson R HB 3393 Vouchers 2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Jolley R SB 0141 Digital Learning 
 
2011 See Jolley 2009 
Jolley 
 
R SB 0346 Testing 2011 
Stanislawski R SB 0278 Charter Schools 2011 See Stanislawski 2009 
Stanislawski R SB 0280 Digital Learning 
 
2011 
Ford R SB 0256 Charter Schools 
 
2011 See Ford 2008 
Ford R SB 0445 Charter Schools 
 
2011 
Newberry R SB 0969 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
2011 Koch Industries 
 
$5,000 No 
     Empower Oklahoma 
 
$5,000 No 
Sears R HB 1267 Evaluation 2011 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
$1,000 No 
Denney R HB 1456 Testing 2011 Oklahoma Education 
Association 
 
$1,000 No 
     Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$400 No 
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Table 80:  Oklahoma Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Quinn R HB 1680 Testing 2011 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
 
$400 No 
Nelson R HB 1744 Vouchers 2011 Cooperative Council for 
Oklahoma School 
Administration 
$800 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
 The results of the data collection show that Oklahoma education reform 
legislation is supported by Republicans more so than Democrats.  Of the 56 education 
reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 43 of those bills.  In all education reform 
themes, except for tenure, where no legislation has been enacted, Republicans introduced 
far more legislation.  Table 80 shows this Republican dominance especially in the themes 
of charter schools, testing, evaluation and vouchers.  Testing was a favorite theme for 
both parties with Democrats authoring five and Republican thirteen of the enacted 
legislative pieces.  
 Table 82 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  This table highlights a theme that is showing itself in a few 
states; Democrats author some legislation, but not many bills in recent years.  In 
Oklahoma, the majority of Democratic authored education reform legislation was enacted 
in 2006 or before.   
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Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in 
Oklahoma were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Though 
Democrats did have legislative control of education reform until 2006, Republicans have 
increased the amount of the education reform dramatically since 2009 with 39 of the 56 
pieces of legislation passing from 2009 to 2011.  Similar to many states in the sample, 
Republicans are supporting education reform at a much higher level than their 
Democratic counterparts. 
Table 81:  Oklahoma Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  3 5 
Charter Schools 2 9 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 1 
Evaluation 1 9 
Testing 5 13 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 1 
Digital Learning 2 7 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 0 2 
Total 13 47 
 
 
Table 82:  Oklahoma Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002 HB 2341 Wilt  R Testing 
2002 SB 1408 Easley D Digital Learning 
2002 SB 1010 Haney D Evaluation 
2003 HB 1414 Staggs D Testing 
2003 HB 1438 Brannon D Alternative Certification 
2003 HB 1767 Adair D Digital Learning 
2004 SB 0713 Williams D Charter Schools 
2005 HB 1028 Benge R Evaluation 
2005 HB 1390 Brannon D Alternative Certification 
2005 HB 1992 Jones R Testing 
2005 SB 982 Morgan D Testing 
2006 HB 2756 Blackwell R Evaluation 
2006 SB 1493 Paddack D Charter Schools 
2006 SB 1792 Paddack D Testing 
2007 HB 1593 Jones R Testing 
2007 HB 1589 Jones R Charter Schools 
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Table 82:  Oklahoma Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
2008 SB 2100 Ford R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 3124 Jones R Alternative Certification 
2009 SB 1111 Jolley R Evaluation/Testing 
2009 SB 0268 Ford R Charter Schools 
2009 SB 0394 Stanislawski R Evaluation 
2009 SB 0473 Ford R Evaluation 
2009 SB 0497 Paddack D Testing 
2009 SB 0582 Jolley  R Alternative Certification 
2009 SB 0604 Stanislawski R Digital Learning 
2009 SB 0687 Anderson  R Testing 
2009 HB 1333 Denney R Alternative Certification 
2009 HB 1461 Sears R Testing 
2009 HB 1837 Hamilton  D Alternative Certification 
2010 SB 0509 Ford R Evaluation 
2010 SB 1799 Paddack D Testing 
2010 SB 1862 Coffee R Charter Schools 
2010 SB 2033 Coffee R Evaluation/Testing 
2010 SB 2109 Stanislawski R Digital Learning 
2010 SB 2129 Stanislawski R Digital Learning 
2010 SB 2212 Ford R Charter Schools 
2010 HB 2302 Banz R Testing 
2010 SB 2318 Jolley R Testing/Digital Learning 
2010 SB 2319 Stanislawski R Digital Learning 
2010 SB 2330 Ford R Collective Bargaining/Testing 
2010 HB 2747 Denney R Alternative Certification 
2010 HB 2753 Denney R Charter Schools 
2010 HB 2928 Coody R Evaluation 
2010 HB 3259 Blackwell R Alternative Certification 
2010 HB 3393 Nelson R Vouchers 
2011 SB 0141 Jolley R Digital Learning 
2011 SB 0256 Ford R Charter Schools 
2011 SB 0278 Stanislawski R Charter Schools 
2011 SB 0280 Stanislawski R Digital Learning 
2011 SB 0346 Jolley R Testing 
2011 SB 0445 Ford R Charter Schools 
2011 SB 0969 Newberry R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2011 HB 1267 Sears R Evaluation 
2011 HB 1456 Denney R Testing 
2011 HB 1680 Quinn R Testing 
2011 HB 1744 Nelson R Vouchers 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
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 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Oklahoma’s capital assessment and transparency programs showed no connection 
between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts 
from 2001-2011.  For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign 
contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by 
the candidate to which they contributed. 
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Georgia 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 83 and 84 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 22.  The 
results of the analysis indicate no relationship, r = .409, n = 11, p = .211 between the 
amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 22 clearly shows this 
lack of relationship. 
 
Table 83: Georgia Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.45 1.695 11 
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Table 84: Georgia Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .409 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .211 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .409 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .211  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22:  Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011 
 
From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Georgia, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
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Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 85 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Similar to the other states discussed, the rationale 
for Georgia’s education reform legislation appears to be increasing school choice and 
increasing school accountability to have an overall impact of increasing student 
achievement.  Unlike the state mentioned previously, Georgia also used the rationale of 
increasing local authority, especially when determining spending and school choice.  This 
rationale of local authority differs from all other states and begs the question why?  As 
accountability through federal funding and grants has caused most states to increase state 
authority, Georgia has done the opposite.  Examining the campaign contributions to these 
legislators does not show any clear indication that local authority would benefit a 
contributor so this movement toward decentralization is one of the outliers in regards to 
rationale.  
Table 85:  Georgia Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2003 
 
HB 0456 Allows the use of Universal 
Service Fund to support distance 
learning programs  
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0193 Creates teacher salary increase 
based upon criterion referenced 
testing 
 
Increase Educator Accountability 
2004 HB 1190 Requires uniform statewide 
performance based  accountability 
system 
 
Increase Educator Accountability 
2006 SB 0610 Prohibits the preclusion the 
technology in charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice 
2007 
 
SB 0010 Creates the “Georgia Special 
Needs Scholarship Act” voucher 
system 
 
Increase School Choice 
SB 0039 Increases school system 
flexibility to establish charter 
Increase School Choice 
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Table 85:  Georgia Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
schools and creates the state 
appointed Charter Advisory 
Committee 
 
2008 
 
HB 0637 Amends the Quality Basic 
Education Act so as each school 
system may elect to use norm-
referenced tests paid for by the 
state 
 
Increase Local Authority 
 
Increase School Accountability 
HB 0831 State will match donations to 
charter school capital outlay 
projects 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 0881 Establishes the Charter School 
Commission 
 
Increase School Choice Oversight 
HB 1065 Allows local authority to use sales 
tax for charter school capital 
outlay 
 
Increase School Choice 
 
Increase Local Authority 
HB 1133 Creates the Georgia GOAL (Tax 
Credit Scholarship) program 
 
Increase School Choice 
HB 1209 Allows local authority to increase 
flexibility in exchange for 
increased state accountability  
Increase School Accountability 
2009 HB 0555 Charter schools must be allowed 
use of unused school board 
facilities at no cost 
  
Increase School Choice 
2010 SB 0457 Sets up guidelines and 
requirements to convert public 
schools to charter schools 
 
Increase School Choice  
 
Increase Local Authority 
2011 
 
HB 0192 Creates the State Education 
Finance Study Commission to 
reexamine funding needs of k-12 
schools, including charter and 
digital learning environment 
 
Increase School Accountability 
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Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Georgia state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =.18, SD = .405) and Republicans (M = 1.27, SD = 1.421) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = -2.449, p = .024.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Georgia, party identification has an impact on support for education reform legislation 
with Republicans more likely to support such legislation.  Alongside statistical 
significance, this test also shows the educational relevance of the results.  Democrats 
introduced an average of .18 education reform bills in Georgia per legislative session, 
while Republicans introduced an average of 1.27 education reform bills (Table 86).  Also, 
of the 16 education reform bills enacted from 2001-2011, Democrats authored only two. 
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Table 86:  Georgia Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .18 .405 .122 
R 11 1.27 1.421 .428 
 
 
 
Table 87:  Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.125 .056 -2.449 20 .024 -1.091 .445 -2.020 -.162 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -2.449 11.611 .031 -1.091 .445 -2.065 -.117 
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Figure 23:  Georgia education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix H).   
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for two of 
the 16 pieces of education reform legislation in Georgia.  Breaking this down into 
education theme, Republicans authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on 
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charter schools, evaluation, testing, tax credit scholarships and voucher programs.  
Democrats and Republicans in Georgia sponsored equal amounts of bills (1 apiece) 
focused on digital learning; all other education reform themes were not addressed via the 
legislation. 
 Results of question two indicate that party identification played a major role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Georgia.  An independent samples 
t-test was conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party 
identification and support for education reform legislation overall with Republicans more 
likely to support such legislation.  Chi square tests conducted showed no statistical 
significance between party identification and specific education reform theme despite 
Republicans authoring more bills enacted into legislation.  Though there was not a 
statistically significance difference between political party identification and support for 
specific education reform legislation, results showed Republicans responsible for 87.5% 
of all education reform legislation in Georgia from 2001-2011. 
 
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Georgia from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 88 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Georgia.  With 16 education reform bills enacted into law, seven 
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(44%) of the bills were focused on charter schools.  Testing received four bills while 
tenure, collective bargaining and alternative certification did not have any bills fall under 
their respective themes.  
 
Table 88:  Georgia Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
0 7 0 1 4 2 2 0 1 
 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Georgia showed no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was no correlation between the two variables r = .271, n = 11, p = 
.421 (Table 90); the scatter plot (Figure 24) summarizes these results.  Overall, the 
resulting lack of a statistically significant correlation shows that in the state of Georgia, 
the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has no statistically significant 
relationship with per pupil expenditures. 
Table 89:  Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.45 1.695 11 
PerPupilExpend 10163.00 391.793 11 
242 
 
 
Table 90:  Georgia Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .271 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .421 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .271 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .421  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24:  Georgia ed. reform legislation and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
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Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 91 shows the resulting 
data from this research for Georgia.  
 Of the six campaign contributors, four were school choice organizations.  K12 
Inc. is an online, for profit, Education Corporation which sells online curriculum to both 
public and private schools.  The company donated a total of $4,500 to legislators with 
legislation focused on charter schools or tax credit scholarships.  One major outside 
organization that entered Georgia politics is All Children Matter, with a donation total of 
$8,600.  This political action committee (PAC) is based out of Virginia, was started by 
Betsy and Richard Devos and was fined 5.2 million dollars in 2008 for illegal funneling 
of campaign funds in Ohio.  The PAC focuses on school choice and supporting 
candidates who support such legislation.  Another outside organization involved in 
Georgia politics is Community Education Partners.  This for-profit company provides 
academic and behavior programs for school districts; though only one donation of $500 
was given, the organization was the focus of a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties 
Union regarding its management and academic success of an Atlanta based alternative 
244 
 
school for which it received a $7 Million contract.  The final outside influence comes 
from the American Federation for Children, which is a PAC focused on school choice; 
their websites states that they trace their history to leadership of John Walton (Walton 
Family Foundation) and Betsy Devos.  
 Research on the campaign contributions in Georgia showed that money from 
outside the state of Georgia and from organizations/people not affiliated with traditional 
public education is quite prevalent. Outside contributions totaled $14,500 from 2001-
2011 compared to $4,100 from public school related organizations.  Major education 
reform organizations and people such as the Walton and Devos Families and their 
affiliated organizations had a contributable voice in Georgia’s education reform.  In the 
state of Georgia, outside influences, especially those focused on school choice, were the 
major financiers of education reform legislation.  
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Table 91:  Georgia Campaign Contributions/State Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of 
Contribution 
Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor Contract 
Procurement 
    2001    
    2002    
Buck D HB 0456 Digital Learning 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Moody R SB 0193 Evaluation/ 
Testing 
 
2003 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
O’Neil R HB 1190 Testing 2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
    2005    
Moody R SB 0610 Charter Schools 2006 Community  
Education Partners 
 
$500 No 
Johnson, E. R SB 0010 Vouchers 
 
2007 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Weber R SB 0039 Charter Schools 
 
2007 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Coleman R HB 0637 Testing 2008 All Children 
Matter 
$2,300 No 
Coleman R HB 1209 Testing 2008 
 
   
Setzler R HB 0831 Charter Schools 2008 K12 Inc. 
 
 
$1,000 No 
Jones R HB 0881 Charter Schools 2008 All Children 
Matter 
 
$3,300 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$2,000 No 
Royal D HB 1065 Charter Schools 2008 Georgia 
Association of 
Educators 
 
$1,300 No 
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Table 91:  Georgia Campaign Contributions/State Vendor Contracts  
Casas R HB 1133 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
2008 All Children 
Matter 
 
$1,500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$500 No 
Casas R HB 0555 Charter Schools 
 
2009 See Casas 2008 
Weber  R SB 0457 Charter Schools 2010 All Children 
Matter 
 
$2,500 No 
     K12 Inc. 
 
$1,000 No 
Coleman R HB 0192 Digital Learning 2011 Gwinnett County 
Association of 
Educators 
 
$1,000 No 
     Georgia 
Association of 
Educators 
 
$500 No 
Ehrhart R HB 0325 Tax Credit 
Scholarships 
2011 American 
Federation for 
Children 
 
$2,400 No 
Butterworth R SB 0161 Charter Schools 2011 Georgia 
Association of 
Educators 
$1,300 No 
247 
 
Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
The results of the data collection show that Georgia education reform legislation 
is supported by Republicans more so than Democrats.  Of the 16 education reform bills 
enacted, Republicans authored 14 of those bills.  In all education reform themes in which 
legislation was enacted, except for tenure, Republicans authored more legislation.   
Table 92 shows this Republican power especially in the themes of charter schools and 
testing. Table 92 also shows Republicans as the party behind the move toward a voucher 
system and tax credit scholarships for Georgia students.  Table 93 lists who the author of 
each piece of enacted education reform legislation, their political party identification, the 
year of the legislation as well as the theme of the legislation.  This table shows that the 
most recent Democratic supported legislation came in 2008 and before that, 2003. 
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in 
Georgia were the dominant force behind education reform in the state.  Republicans are 
not only supporting education reform overall in the state of Georgia, but also supporting 
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each theme, minus digital learning, more so than their Democratic counterparts.  As in 
other states of the sample, Republicans are ruling the roost in Georgia. 
 
Table 92:  Georgia Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 0 
Charter Schools 1 6 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 0 0 
Evaluation 0 1 
Testing 0 4 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 2 
Digital Learning 1 1 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 0 1 
Total 2 15 
 
 
Table 93:  Georgia Ed. Reform Legislation by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003 HB 0456 Buck D Digital Learning 
2003 SB 0193 Moody R Evaluation/Testing 
2004 HB 1190 O’Neil R Testing 
2005     
2006 SB 0610 Moody R Charter Schools 
2007 SB 0010 Johnson, E. R Vouchers 
2007 SB 0039 Weber R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 0637 Coleman R Testing 
2008 HB 0831 Setzler R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 0881 Jones R Charter Schools 
2008 HB 1065 Royal D Charter Schools 
2008 HB 1133 Casas R Tax Credit Scholarships 
2008 HB 1209 Coleman R Testing 
2009 HB 0555 Casas R Charter Schools 
2010 SB 0457 Weber  R Charter Schools 
2011 HB 0192 Coleman R Digital Learning 
2011 HB 0325 Ehrhart R Tax Credit Scholarships 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
 The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Georgia’s procurement registry program showed no connection between financing 
education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011.  For 
the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit 
from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they 
contributed. 
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Wisconsin 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 94 and 95 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 25.  The 
results of the analysis indicate no relationship, r = .409, n = 11, p = .212 between the 
amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 25 clearly shows this 
lack of relationship. 
 
Table 94:  Wisconsin Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.18 1.401 11 
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Table 95:  Wisconsin Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .409 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .212 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .409 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .212  
N 11 11 
 
 
 
Figure 25:  Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Wisconsin, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 96 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Wisconsin in similar to other states to the extent 
that accountability and choice appear to be the major rationales for education reform.  
Unlike other states however, Wisconsin also has school choice oversight as a rationale.  
As choice has increase in the state for legislation, so too has the state oversight of those 
choice schools.  Similar to other states in the sample, it appears that the rationale for 
some of the legislation is to decrease educator power by removing the right to 
collectively bargaining and requiring/limiting certain issues to collective bargaining. 
 
Table 96:  Wisconsin Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2004 
 
AB 0747 Installs residency requirement for 
charter school attendance. 
 
Increase School Choice 
Oversight 
AB 0847 Creates strict reporting requirement of 
private schools that enter the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
 
Increase School Choice 
Oversight 
2005 AB 0425 Every school must publicly report 
(via internet or newsletter) a school 
performance report 
 
Increase School Accountability 
2006 
 
AB 0698 Establishes the Wisconsin-Parkside 
Charter School 
 
Increase School Choice 
AB 0829 Provides charter school and voucher 
program school students access to 
volunteer healthcare providers 
  
Increase School Choice 
SB 0618 Testing requirement for private 
schools participating in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
 
Increase School Choice 
Oversight 
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Table 96:  Wisconsin Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
2008 SB 0396 Virtual charter school clarifications 
and state created virtual school 
accessibility  
 
Increase School Choice 
2009 AB 0095 Creates mandatory subjects to be 
collectively bargained 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 0311 Adds “teaching assistant” to the 
collective bargaining unit for the 
Teaching Assistants Association, 
American Federation of Teachers and 
the AFL-CIO 
 
Keep the Peace 
SB 372 Allows the use of standardized test 
results in evaluating teachers and adds 
“teacher evaluation plan” to the 
required list of collective bargaining 
terms 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 
  
SB 373 Requires the application for a charter 
school to be judged based upon the 
standards of the National Association 
of Charter School Authorizers 
 
Increase School Choice 
Oversight 
2011 
 
AB 0011 Diminishes the power of collective 
bargaining 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
SB 0020 Gives the right to sell school 
properties to the Milwaukee City 
Council if the Council can show the 
properties are underused.  
Increase School Choice 
 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Wisconsin state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
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parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a not a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M =..82, SD = .1.250) and Republicans (M = .36, SD = .674) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = 1.061, p = .301.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Wisconsin, party identification does not have an impact on support for education reform 
legislation.  Despite this lack of statistical significance, this test and descriptive data 
shows the educational relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of .82 
education reform bills in Wisconsin per legislative session, while Republicans introduced 
an average of .36 education reform bills (Table 97).  Of the 13 education reform bills 
enacted from 2001-2011, Republicans authored five of the bills; this makes Wisconsin 
one of the two states in the sample to have more Democrats than Republicans author 
education reform legislation. 
 
Table 97:  Wisconsin Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .82 1.250 .377 
R 11 .36 .674 .203 
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Table 98: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
S
ig
. 
(2
-t
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le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
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o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.744 .202 1.061 20 .301 .455 .428 -.439 1.348 
 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  1.061 15.361 .305 .455 .428 -.457 1.366 
 
 
Figure 26:  Wisconsin education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
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To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix I).   
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for eight of 
the 13 pieces of education reform legislation in Wisconsin.  Breaking this down into 
education theme, Democrats authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on 
charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, digital learning and evaluation.  
Republicans authored more legislation focused on testing; all other legislative themes 
were either not addressed or equally supported.  
 Results of question two indicate that party identification did not play a major role 
in the support of education reform legislation in the state of Wisconsin.  An independent 
samples t-test was conducted and showed no statistically significant difference between 
party identification and support for education reform legislation and descriptives showed 
Democrats were responsible for 61% of all education reform legislation. Chi square tests 
conducted showed no statistical significance between party identification and specific 
education reform theme despite Democrats authoring more bills enacted into legislation.  
Though there was not a statistically significance difference between political party 
identification and support for specific education reform legislation.  Unlike most of the 
states in the research though, Wisconsin’s education reform movement was more likely 
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supported by Democrats than Republicans, but not with a statistically significant 
difference.  
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Wisconsin from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 99 displays this tally and the mode of the 
state legislation for Wisconsin.  With only 13 education reforms enacted in the ten year 
period, Wisconsin is one of the least education reform minded states when it comes to 
state legislation.  Of the 13 bills, 7 (54%) were focused on the theme of charter schools.  
Collective bargaining had four (31%) and vouchers had two (15%) to round out the top 
three education reforms in the state.  Alternative certification, tax credit scholarships, and 
tenure did not have any reform bills fall into their categories.  
Table 99:  Wisconsin Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
0 7 4 1 1 0 1 0 2 
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Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Wisconsin showed a statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables r = .620,  
n = 11, p = .042 (Table 101); the scatter plot (Figure 27) summarizes these results.  
Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the state of 
Wisconsin, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has a strong 
positive relationship with per-pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 100:  Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.18 1.401 11 
PerPupilExpend 11998.18 299.035 11 
 
 
 
Table 101:  Wisconsin Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .620* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .042 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .620* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 27:  Wisconsin ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
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determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 102 shows the resulting 
data from this research regarding the state of Wisconsin. 
 With a minimum donation of $100 and a maximum of $1,000, no campaign 
donation with origin from an education based donator contributed more than 5% of the 
total campaign funds for that year.  Though the amount of contributions were not 
sizeable, the source of contributions shed light on who is financing education reform 
legislation.  Of the 23 contributions examined for this research, 13 were from education 
unions.  The other 10 contributions came from a variety of sources focusing on the 
themes of education reform.  Starting in 2006, an increase in the financial support of 
legislator by educational reformers occurred.  Jim Blew, $250 contributor in 2006, is a 
consultant with the Walton Family Foundation in the area of K-12 education reform. 
Deborah McGriff, a contributor of both $375 and $750 is on the Board of Directors for 
the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools.  She is married to Howard Fuller, a 
contributor of $375 and the Founder of Black Alliance for Educational Opportunities and 
Institute for the Transformation of Learning out of Marquette University.   
Susan Mitchell is founder of Alliance for Choices in Education (American Education 
Reform Council), affiliated with School Choice Wisconsin and donated $1,200 to two 
legislators.  Greg Jobin-Leeds, contributor of $1,000 is founder of the Schott Foundation 
for Public Education, an organization focused on educational equity and access.   
 From the research it can be concluded that Wisconsin legislation is financed by 
both teachers unions and outside sources of contributions.  In total, public education 
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related organizations contributed $6,550 while nonpublic school affiliated contributors 
donated a total of $5,700.  From the other pieces of legislation and the contributors to the 
legislators, no pattern shows itself regarding the financing of education reform in 
Wisconsin.    What sets Wisconsin apart from all of the other sample states is the amount 
of legislation which was introduced by committee and not an individual legislator.  Four 
of the most important and recent education reforms in Wisconsin were introduced by 
committee, making it difficult to determine which legislator was responsible for the bill 
and therefore who financed such legislation.  Some charter school legislation brings 
about great support from charter school/choice advocates, while other times similar 
pieces of legislation were introduced without any financial support from charter school 
advocates.  What is clear is that in Wisconsin, both school choice advocates and teachers 
unions finance education reform legislation.   
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Table 102:  Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform 
Category 
Year of Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of Contribution Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor Contract 
Procurement 
    2001 
 
   
    2002 
 
   
    2003 
 
   
Sinicki D AB 0747 Charter Schools 2004 Wisconsin Education 
Association Council 
 
$500 No 
Sinicki D AB 0847 Charter Schools 2004 School Administrator 
Alliance 
 
$100 No 
     School Administrators 
Association 
 
$100 No 
Petrowski R AB 0425 Testing 2005 School Administrators 
Alliance 
 
$100 No 
Vos R AB 0698 Charter Schools 
 
2006 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
Richards D AB 0829 Charter Schools/ 
Vouchers 
2006 Wisconsin Education 
Association Council 
 
$500 No 
     North Shore United 
Educators Council  
 
$500 No 
     Association of 
Wisconsin School 
Administrators 
 
$250 No 
Darling R SB 0618 Vouchers 2006 Jim Blew 
 
$250 No 
     Deborah McGriff 
 
$375 No 
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Table 102:  Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
     Howard Fuller 
 
$375 No 
     Susan Mitchell 
 
$200 No 
    2007 
 
   
Lehman D SB 0396 Charter Schools/ 
Digital Learning 
2008 Wisconsin Federation 
of Teachers 
 
$1,000 No 
     Madison Teachers 
 
$1,000 No 
     Greg Jobin-Leeds 
 
$1,000 No 
     Association of 
Wisconsin School 
Administrators 
 
$500 No  
Sinicki D AB 0095 Collective 
Bargaining 
2009 Federation of Teachers 
Local 212 
 
$500 No 
     Wisconsin Education 
Association Council 
 
$500 No 
     Madison Teachers 
 
$500 No 
     Milwaukee Teachers 
Education Association 
 
$500 No 
Joint 
Committee 
on 
Employee 
Relations 
 
D* SB 0311 Collective 
Bargaining 
2009    
Education 
Committee 
D* SB 0372 Evaluation/ 
Collective  
2009    
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Table 102:  Wisconsin Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Bargaining 
 
Education 
Committee 
D* SB 0373 Charter Schools 2009    
     
2010 
 
   
Assembly 
Organization 
Committee 
R* AB 0011 Collective 
Bargaining 
2011    
Darling R SB 0020 Charter Schools 2011 Ann Amer Brennan 
 
$1,000 No 
     Susan Mitchell 
 
$1,000 No 
     Henry Herzing 
 
$750 No 
     Deborah McGriff $750 No 
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Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
  The results of the data collection show that Wisconsin education reform 
legislation is supported by Democrats more so than Republicans.  This differs from the 
previous eight states examined but fall in line with the rest of the research regarding 
Wisconsin.  Of the 13 education reform bills enacted, Democrats, or democratically 
controlled committees, authored eight of those bills.  In the reform themes of charter 
schools, collective bargaining/unions, evaluation, digital learning Democrats introduced 
a majority of the legislation.  The only theme in which Republicans introduced more 
legislation than their Democratic counterparts was in testing, but even that is only one 
piece of legislation.  Table 103 shows this Democratic control despite the little reform 
that occurred from 2001-2011. 
 Table 104 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Wisconsin is different from any other state because some of 
their education reform legislation, four out of 13 total, was created by joint committees at 
the proposition of the governor.  These pieces of legislation were focused on collective 
bargaining; overall the major reform in Wisconsin was charter schools.      
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Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Democrats in 
Wisconsin were the force behind education reform in the state.  Democrats authored more 
legislation overall and more legislation on almost all education reform themes.  Unlike 
the previous eight states from the sample, Wisconsin’s education reform is primarily 
Democratically created with a third of the reform bills originating in committees.  
Table 103:  Wisconsin Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  0 0 
Charter Schools 5 2 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 3 1 
Evaluation 1 0 
Testing 0 1 
Tax Credit Scholarships 0 0 
Digital Learning 1 0 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 1 1 
Total 11 5 
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Table 104:  Wisconsin Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID and Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003     
2004 AB 0747 Sinicki D Charter Schools 
2004 AB 0847 Sinicki D Charter Schools 
2005 AB 0425 Petrowski R Testing 
2006 AB 0698 Vos R Charter Schools 
2006 AB 0829 Richards D Charter Schools/Vouchers 
2006 SB 0618 Darling R Vouchers 
2007     
2008 SB 0396 Lehman D Charter Schools/Digital Learning 
2009 AB 0095 Sinicki D Collective Bargaining 
2009 SB 0311 Joint Committee 
on Employee 
Relations 
D* Collective Bargaining 
2009 SB 372 Education 
Committee 
D* Evaluation/Collective Bargaining 
 SB 373 Education 
Committee 
D* Charter Schools 
2010     
2011 AB 0011 Assembly 
Organization 
Committee 
R* Collective Bargaining 
2011 SB 0020 Darling R Charter Schools 
 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
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The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Wisconsin’s vendor and contract systems showed no connection between financing 
education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts from 2001-2011.  For 
the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign contributors did not benefit 
from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by the candidate to which they 
contributed. 
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Minnesota 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform in each state.  Each state’s education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 Before examining each piece of education reform legislation, it was important to 
determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform legislation 
and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the results are 
seen in Tables 105 and 106 and a visual representation of these results in Figure 28.  The 
results of the analysis indicate a strong positive relationship, r = .690, n = 11, p = .019 
between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted over time; Figure 28 clearly 
shows this increase in education reform legislation.  
 
Table 105:  Minnesota Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.18 .874 11 
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Table 106:  Minnesota Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .690* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .019 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .690* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .019  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28:  Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011 
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 From the first step in analysis to answer questions one, it is obvious that in 
Minnesota, the average amount of education reform legislation enacted each year has 
increased from 2001-2011.    The next step was to determine the rationale for this reform.  
Rationales were concluded based upon the language used in the legislation and academic 
research from the literature review.  Table 107 explains the rationale for each piece of 
identified education reform legislation.  Increasing accountatb1ility is the major rationale 
for the legislation in Minnesota; also decreasing the power of the teaching profession 
appears to be a major rationale for legislators.  By increasing accountability through 
testing and increase the number of teachers through alternative certification programs, 
Minnesota’s legislator hope to create a high achieving public education system when 
using standardized tests as the measures of achievement.  
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Table 107:  Minnesota Education Reform Legislation Rationale 
Year Legislation Summary Rationale 
2003 HF 0302 Creates state wide academic standards 
and tests  
 
Increase School Accountability 
2004 SF 1793 Creates the high objective uniform 
state standard of evaluation (HOUSSE) 
program for alternative certification 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
2005 HF 0141 Allocate funds using student 
performance via standardized tests 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 SF 0106 Removes the $2,000 per family cap on 
the education tax credit 
 
Increase School Choice 
2007 HF 2245 Creates the Graduation Required 
Assessment for Diploma (GRAD) 
exam 
 
Increase School Accountability 
 SF 1073 Ratifies collective bargaining 
agreement between state and Teacher’s 
Retirement Association 
 
Keep the Peace 
2008 HF 1812 Initial teacher licensure via portfolio  
(temporary certificate) 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
 SF 2796 Removes the term “qualified” and 
specific licensure required for early 
childhood education programs 
 
Decrease Educator Power 
2009 HF 0002 Creates a committee to advise the 
governor on methods to improve 
school choice, testing results/methods 
and teacher accountability and quality. 
 
Increase School Choice and 
Accountability 
2010 SF 2505 Creates a task force to improve early 
childhood education through increased 
federally funded charter schools and 
state wide school evaluation system 
 
Increase School Choice and 
Accountability 
 HF 3329 Fast tracks funding for Charter Schools 
serving high level of ESE population 
 
Increase School Choice 
2011 HF 0026 Creates a teacher and administrator 
evaluation system with the goal of 
increasing student success 
 
Increase School  
Accountability 
 SF 0040 Creates new alternative teacher 
certification programs which must 
have curriculum focused on outcome 
based assessment  
Decrease Educator Power 
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Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in the Minnesota state 
legislature from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a not statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M = .64, SD = .809) and Republicans (M = .36, SD = .674) and support for overall 
education reform bills; t(20) = .859, p = .401.  These results suggest that in the state of 
Minnesota, party identification has little impact on support for education reform 
legislation.  Despite a lack of statistical significance, this test and descriptive data shows 
the educational relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of .64 
education reform bills in Oklahoma per legislative session, while Republicans introduced 
an average of .36 education reform bills (Table 108).  Also, of the 13 education reform 
bills enacted from 2001-2011, Democrats authored nine, making Minnesota one of the 
two states in which Democrats authored more enacted education reform legislation than 
their Republican counterparts.  Though lacking statistical significance, the data shows 
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that Democrats authored roughly three times more education reform bills than their 
Republican counterparts.   
 
 
Table 108:  Minnesota Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 .64 .809 .244 
R 11 .36 .674 .203 
 
 
 
 
Table 109: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
1.108 .305 .859 20 .401 .273 .318 -.390 .935 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  .859 19.370 .401 .273 .318 -.391 .936 
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Figure 29:  Minnesota education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes.  All of the chi squared tests showed no statistical significance between 
party identification and support for specific education reform themes (Appendix J).   
Though lacking statistical significance, an examination as to which political party 
introduced the specific education reform bills showed Democrats responsible for nine of 
the 13 pieces of education reform legislation in Minnesota.  Breaking this down into 
education theme, Democrats authored more enacted legislation for bills focused on 
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alternative certification, charter schools, collective bargaining/unions, testing and tax 
credit scholarships.  Republicans only authored four total enacted bills in the ten year 
time period.    
 Results of question two indicate that party identification played a role in the 
support of education reform legislation in the state of Minnesota though not to a 
statistically significant level.  An independent samples t-test was conducted and showed 
no statistically significant difference between party identification and support for 
education reform legislation, however descriptives showed Democrats were responsible 
for 70% of all education reform legislation. Chi square tests conducted showed no 
statistical significance between party identification and specific education reform theme 
despite Democrats authoring more bills enacted into legislation.  Similar only to 
Wisconsin, Minnesota’s education reform movement was more likely supported by 
Democrats than Republicans, but not with a statistically significant difference.  
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
Minnesota from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine which 
themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 110 displays this tally and the mode of 
the state legislation for Minnesota.  With 13 education reform bills enacted, Minnesota 
falls into the same category as Wisconsin as one of the states which has taken the least 
action to legislation education reform.  Of the 13 bills, five (38%) are focused on testing, 
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four (30%) are geared toward alternative certification and three (23%) fall under the 
theme of charter schools.  Zero education reform bills were focused on digital learning, 
tenure or vouchers.   
 
Table 110:  Minnesota Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
4 3 1 2 5 1 0 0 0 
 
Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the state of Minnesota showed a statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables  
r = .639, n = 11, p = .034 (Table 112); the scatter plot (Figure 30) summarizes these 
results.  Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the state 
of Minnesota, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into law has a strong 
positive relationship with per-pupil expenditure. 
 
Table 111:  Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 1.18 .874 11 
PerPupilExpend 11059.82 502.379 11 
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Table 112:  Minnesota Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation 
 Legislation PerPupilExpend 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .639* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .034 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExpend Pearson Correlation .639* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .034  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 30:  Minnesota ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
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Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 After determining the authors of each piece of education reform legislation, an 
examination of the campaign contributions for each of the candidates was conducted.  
Campaign contributions was limited to only those contributions which occurred the year 
before or during the enacted legislation with each contribution being analyzed to 
determine if the source of the contribution originated from an educational based 
organization or person affiliated with such organizations.  Table 113 shows the resulting 
data from this research for the state of Minnesota. 
 Overall there were six different sources of campaign contributions to education 
reform candidates in Minnesota from 2001-2011.  Of these six contributors, all but one 
were affiliated with public schools.  The Leisa Irwin, the outlier of the group, was the 
Executive Director or Paladin Academy, a charter schools for high school level students.  
Minneapolis Teacher’s Retirement Fund Committee of Thirteen is a political action 
committee focused on protecting retirement benefits.  Education Minnesota is an affiliate 
union of the National Education Association (NEA).   
 With only 13 articles of enacted legislation and six total contributors to all 
education reform campaigns, Minnesota is not the most active state in regards to enacting 
education reform, hence its rank of tenth.  However, what is evident in Minnesota is the 
importance unions play in the state compared to others.  Minnesota is one of the two 
Democratically controlled states as it pertains to education reform and the contributions 
to legislators’ campaign follow the traditional political philosophy of union support for 
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Democratic candidates.  One thing that separates Minnesota from the other states in the 
sample except for Arizona is the common and dominant use of public subsidies for 
campaigns.  Every candidate who introduced enacted legislation received a majority of 
their funds for public subsidies, a fact that may hinder the growth of outside 
organizations entering the education reform ring in Minnesota.  
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Table 113:  Minnesota Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
Legislator Party 
ID 
Legislation Ed. Reform Category Year of 
Introduced 
Legislation 
Source of 
Contribution 
Amount of 
Contribution 
Vendor Contract 
Procurement 
Sykora R HF 0302 Testing 2003 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Kelley D SF 1793 Alternative 
Certification 
 
2004 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Sykora R HF 0141 Testing 2005 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Pogemiller D SF 0106 Tax Credit Scholarship 2005 Minneapolis 
Federation of 
Teachers Local 59 
 
$500 No 
    2005 Minneapolis 
Teachers 
Retirement Fund 
Committee of 
Thirteen 
 
$500 No 
     Education 
Minnesota 
 
$400 No 
Greiling D HF 2245 Testing 2007 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Scheid D SF 1073 Collective Bargaining 2007 Education 
Minnesota 
 
$650 No 
     St. Paul Teachers 
Retirement Fund 
Association 
 
$500 No 
Carlson D HF 1812 Alternative 
Certification 
2008 St. Paul Teachers 
Retirement Fund 
Association 
 
$500 No 
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Table 113:  Minnesota Campaign Contributions/Vendor Contracts  
     Robbinsdale 
Federation of 
Teachers 
 
$500 No 
     Education 
Minnesota 
 
$400 No 
Saxhaug  D SF 2796 Alternative 
Certification 
2008 Education 
Minnesota 
 
$400 No 
Greiling D HF 0002 Testing/ Evaluation/ 
Charter Schools 
 
2009 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Bonoff D SF 2505 Testing/Charter Schools 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Greiling D HF 3329 Charter Schools 
 
2010 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
Garofalo R HF 0026 Evaluation 2011 Leisa Irwin 
 
$250  
Olson R SF 0040 Alternative 
Certification 
2011 No Meaningful Campaign Contributions 
 
283 
 
Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state. 
  The results of the data collection show that Minnesota education reform 
legislation is supported by Democrats more so than Republicans.  This is similar only to 
Wisconsin in the top ten reform minded states, but is falling in line with other data 
regarding the state.  Of the 13 education reform bills enacted, Democrats authored nine of 
the bills.  In the reform themes of alternative certification, charter schools, collective 
bargaining/unions, testing and tax credit scholarships, Democrats introduced a majority 
of the legislation.  Republican and Democrats tied one a piece on evaluation legislation.    
Table 114 shows this Democratic control despite the little reform that occurred from 
2001-2011. 
 Table 115 lists who the author of each piece of enacted education reform 
legislation, their political party identification, the year of the legislation as well as the 
theme of the legislation.  Though Democrats have dominated education reform in 
Minnesota, the 2011 legislative session only had two education reforms enacted, both 
from Republican legislators.  Despite this, Democrats dominate the authorship of 
legislation from 2001-2011. 
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Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Democrats in 
Minnesota were the force behind education reform in the state.  Democrats authored more 
legislation overall and more legislation on almost all education reform themes.  Unlike 
most of the states from the sample, Minnesota’s education reform is primarily 
democratically created. 
 
Table 114:  Minnesota Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  3 1 
Charter Schools 3 0 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 1 0 
Evaluation 1 1 
Testing 3 2 
Tax Credit Scholarships 1 0 
Digital Learning 0 0 
Tenure 0 0 
Voucher Programs 0 0 
Total 12 4 
 
 
Table 115:  Minnesota Ed. Reform Leg. by Year, Author, Party ID, Theme  
Year Legislation Author(s) Party ID Ed. Reform Theme 
2001     
2002     
2003 HF 0302 Sykora R Testing 
2004 SF 1793 Kelley D Alternative Certification 
2005 HF 0141 Sykora R Testing 
2005 SF 0106 Pogemiller D Tax Credit Scholarship 
2006     
2007 HF 2245 Greiling D Testing 
2007 SF 1073 Scheid D Collective Bargaining 
2008 HF 1812 Carlson D Alternative Certification 
2008 SF 2796 Saxhaug  D Alternative Certification 
2009 HF 0002 Greiling D Testing/Evaluation/Charter 
Schools 
2010 SF 2505 Bonoff D Testing/Charter Schools 
2010 HF 3329 Greiling D Charter Schools 
2011 HF 0026 Garofalo R Evaluation 
2011 SF 0040 Olson R Alternative Certification 
 
 
285 
 
Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 After identifying the campaign contributors for each legislator who sponsored the 
enacted legislation, a thorough search of state vendor contracts using each state’s vendor 
contract system, accountability office or open government system was conducted.  The 
rationale of this question was to determine if those who financially supported education 
reform legislation received any benefits from their support in terms of state vendor 
contracts for education purposes. 
The results of the vendor contract search showed that not one campaign 
contributor received a state vendor contract during the year of their contribution.  
Minnesota’s office of management and budget search system showed no connection 
between financing education reform legislation and the receipt of any vendor contracts 
from 2001-2011.  For the purpose of this research it was concluded that campaign 
contributors did not benefit from the education reform legislation that was sponsored by 
the candidate to which they contributed. 
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National 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 Research question one was created to help frame the issue of education reform in 
the United States; to better create a rationale regarding the theoretical origins of 
education reform at an aggregate level.  All ten states’ education reform legislation was 
qualitatively analyzed to determine the intent of the legislation and add to mixed 
methodology of the research.  Using the results of question one and other six research 
questions, a thoroughly illustrative picture of education reform in the United States was 
created.   
 To determine if education reform was even a policy issue of importance, it was 
necessary to determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and the time period 2001-2011.  A Pearson correlation was conducted and the 
results are seen in Tables 116 and 117 and a visual representation of these results in 
Figure 31.  The results of the analysis indicate a very strong positive relationship,  
r = .881, n = 11, p = .000 between the amounts of education reform legislation enacted 
over time; Figure 31 clearly shows this increase in education reform legislation.  
 
Table 116: Ten State Legislation Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 25.00 16.631 11 
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Table 117: Ten State Legislation/Year Correlation 
 Legislation Year 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .881** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 11 11 
Year Pearson Correlation .881** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 11 11 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 31:  Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011 
 
 From Figure 31 it is evident that the amount of education reform legislation has 
dramatically increased from 2001-2011.  The next step was to determine the rationale for 
these reforms at a ten state total to draw a conclusion regarding education reform in the 
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United States.  From the rationale tables in each state, it is concluded that increasing 
school choice and increasing school accountability are the major rationales for education 
reform legislation in the United States.  These two goals indicate that the country is 
focused on increasing student test scores by holding teachers and public education 
facilities accountable for student learning gains while also introducing competition into 
the public school sector to act as an impetus to increase scores.  A secondary rational 
from the research was decreasing educator power.  Seen in every state in the sample, 
testing legislation was soon followed with requirements of teacher evaluations based 
somewhat on the testing results and increasing alternative certification opportunities for 
people to become teachers without going through the traditional channels of education 
certification.  These factors draw the conclusion that the rationale for education reform 
legislation is to fundamentally alter the power structure of public education; to remove 
the authority of educating students from the teacher just as industrialization has removed 
the power of labor from the skilled worker at the turn of the 20th century.   Replacing 
professional teacher authority with testing authority; replacing local authority  
(for all but one state) with state and national authority; turning public education from a 
supposed equitable existence to one of capitalistic competition in hopes that through 
testing and reduced autonomy, the next generation of workers will be created.  
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Research Question Two 
Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and support 
for education reform legislation? 
To answer question two, two different comparison tests were conducted.  First, an 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare support for overall enacted 
education reform legislation between Democrats and Republicans in all ten of the states’ 
legislatures from 2001-2011.  After determining if a difference existed between political 
parties for overall legislation, chi squared tests were conducted for party identification 
and each education reform theme to determine if a difference existed between party 
identification and support for specific education reform themes.  
 There was a statistically significant difference between Democrats  
(M = 6.00, SD = 5.921) and Republicans (M = 19.00, SD = 13.109) and support for 
overall education reform bills; t(20) = -2.830, p = .010.  These results suggest that in the 
most educated reform minded states, party identification has an impact on support for 
education reform legislation with Republicans more likely to support such legislation.  
Alongside statistical significance, this test and descriptive data also shows the educational 
relevance of the results.  Democrats introduced an average of 6.00 enacted education 
reform bills per legislative session, while Republicans introduced an average of 19.00 
enacted education reform bills (Table 118); Republicans are introducing and enacting 
education reform legislation on a nearly three to one ratio.  Of the 275 pieces of enacted 
legislation, Republicans authored 209. 
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Table 118: Ten State Group Statistics 
 
PartyID N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Legislation D 11 6.00 5.921 1.785 
R 11 19.00 13.109 3.953 
 
 
 
Table 119: Independent Samples Test Party ID and Legislation 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df S
ig
. 
(2
-t
ai
le
d
) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
L
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la
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o
n
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.906 .016 -2.830 20 .010 -12.273 4.337 -21.320 -3.226 
 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -2.830 13.917 .013 -12.273 4.337 -21.580 -2.965 
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Figure 32:  Ten state total education reform legislation 2001-2011 by party ID 
 
To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes. The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured party 
identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically 
significant relationship between party ID and support for charter school legislation  
X² (1, N = 275) = 9.440, p = .002.  This result showed that a relationship existed between 
party identification and support for charter school legislation.  An examination of 
crosstabs clarified that if a Democrat introduced any type of education reform legislation, 
there was a 47% chance that the legislation would be about charter schools.  Despite only 
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one relationship existing at a statistical level, further educational relevance was 
discovered when examining the descriptive data.   
 Results of question two indicate that party identification played a role in the 
support of education reform legislation on a national level when using the ten most 
education reform minded states as the sample. An independent samples t-test was 
conducted and showed a statistically significant difference between party identification 
and support for education reform legislation at p = .020. Crosstabs showed that 
Republicans sponsored more education reform legislation at a 3 to 1 ratio.  Chi square 
tests conducted showed statistical significance between party identification and support 
for charter school legislation only with Democrats authoring only 31 of 87 charter school 
bills but these 31 bills making up 47% of all Democratically authored legislation.  
Despite a lack of other significant relationships between specific reforms and party 
affiliation, crosstabs show that Republicans authored a majority of the legislation for each 
one of the nine education reform themes; with this and the significance of the t-test, it is 
clear that on a national level, education reform legislation is predominantly authored and 
supported by the Republican Party.    
 
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After identifying each piece of education reform legislation that was enacted in 
each of the ten states from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were conducted to determine 
which themes the enacted legislation fell under; Table 120 displays this tally and the 
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mode of the state legislation for ten most education reform minded states.  Of the 275 
pieces of education reform legislation that was enacted from 2001-2011, 87 (32%) fell 
under the theme of charter schools.  Close behind with 76 (28%), testing showed to be a 
major theme of the education reform bills.  In third place, yet with much less legislation 
was theme of evaluation which received 33 (12%) of the education reform bills enacted.  
The least used education reform theme was tenure will only seven (3%) of the bills 
focused on this reform. 
 To determine if a relationship existed between party identification and support for 
specific education reform themes, chi squared tests were conducted for each of the nine 
reform themes. The one chi squared test was statistically significant measured party 
identification and support for charter school legislation; this test showed a statistically 
significant relationship between Party ID and support for charter school legislation  
X² (1, N = 280) = 9.440, p = .002.  This result showed that a relationship existed between 
party identification and support for charter school legislation.  An examination of 
descriptives clarified that Republicans authored 56 of the 89 pieces of legislation focused 
on this theme (Appendix K).   Despite only one relationship existing at a statistical level, 
educational relevance was discovered when examining the descriptives of the data. 
 
Table 120:  Ten State Enacted Education Reform Bills by Theme 
Alt. 
Cert. 
Charter 
Schools 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Eval. Testing 
Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
Digital 
Learning 
Tenure Vouchers 
23 87 16 33 76 16 26 7 20 
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Research Question Four 
Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation introduced at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
 To determine if a relationship existed between the amount of education reform 
legislation and per-pupil expenditure, a Pearson’s r correlation was conducted.  The 
results of this analysis for the sampled ten states showed a statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of education reform legislation enacted and per-pupil 
expenditure. There was a strong positive correlation between the two variables r = .621,  
n = 11, p = .041 (Table 122); the scatter plot (Figure 33) summarizes these results.  
Overall, the statistically significant correlation coefficient shows that in the ten most 
education reform minded states, the amount of education reform legislation enacted into 
law has a strong positive relationship with per-pupil expenditures. 
 
Table 121:  Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expenditure Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Legislation 25.00 16.682 11 
PerPupilExp 10254.1545 345.20217 11 
 
 
 
Table 122:  Ten State Legislation/Per Pupil Expend Correlation  
 Legislation PerPupilExp 
Legislation Pearson Correlation 1 .621* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .041 
N 11 11 
PerPupilExp Pearson Correlation .621* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .041  
N 11 11 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 33:  Ten state ed. reform leg. and per pupil expenditures 2001-2011 
 
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 An analysis of all ten states in the sample indicate that to a large extent, 
organizations and affiliates outside the traditional public school system are the main 
financiers of education reform legislation.  These outside sources differ from state to 
state, with private companies being a major contributor as well as policy advocates, non-
profits, PACs and individuals working for each entity.  In total, these organizations 
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donated $234,414 to education reform legislators compared to $138,410 given by 
contributors affiliated with traditional public schools.   This clearly indicates that private 
organizations, specifically those offering new education alternatives and philosophical 
agendas, are financing education reform legislation.   
 Public schools unions were responsible for most of the financing that came from 
public school affiliated organizations.  These organizations proved financially influential 
in Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota.  Education reform legislators from the 
other six states in the sample, Florida, Arizona, Oklahoma, Georgia, Ohio and Louisiana 
were financed by the aforementioned outside organizations more so than public school 
affiliated organizations.  For questions five, the research indicates that organizations from 
outside the traditional public schools, specifically organizations focused on increasing 
school choice, are the main sources of financing for education reform legislation.  
 
Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 To answer question six, extensive research was conducted to determine how many 
education reform bills were enacted in each state from 2001-2011, the education reform 
theme in which each bill would fit and who the politician was who authored the enacted 
legislation.  From this data, the researcher was able to come to a conclusion regarding 
who was supporting education reform in each state.  
 The results of the data collection show that at the national level, using the ten state 
totals, education reform legislation is supported by Republicans far more so than 
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Democrats.  Of the 275 education reform bills enacted, Republicans authored 209 of 
those bills.  Furthermore, in all education reform themes, Republicans authored and 
enacted more legislation than their Democratic counterparts.  Table 123 clearly shows the 
amount of the control that Republicans have had on the education reform movement.   
Using the data on the education reform bills, their authors and theme of 
legislation, as well as research question two, it was concluded that Republicans in United 
States were the dominant force behind education reform.  The total amount of legislation 
as well as support for each legislative theme clearly favors the Republicans in the state 
legislative sample.  The only education reform theme in which Democrats rise close to 
the level of Republican support is charter schools, but even then a 25 pieces of legislation 
separate the two parties.  Overall, in the United States from 2001-2011, Republicans were 
the party to support not only support education reform as a movement, but also every 
single theme of education reform.  
 
Table 123:  Total Education Reform Themes by Party ID  
Ed. Reform Theme Democrat Republican 
Alternative Certification  7 16 
Charter Schools 31 56 
Collective Bargaining/Unions 5 11 
Evaluation 4 29 
Testing 16 60 
Tax Credit Scholarships 4 12 
Digital Learning 5 21 
Tenure 0 7 
Voucher Programs 2 18 
Total 74 229 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 The purpose of this question was to determine if donating to a legislator’s 
campaign would lead to financial benefits for the contributor.  The results of the data 
analysis showed that to a large extent contributions were not connected to benefits.  Only 
three out of over 300 campaign contributors received state vendor contracts from 2001-
2011.  This great divide between contributing and benefiting indicates that at donating to 
campaigns at the state level does not lead to financial benefits for the contributor as 
measured by state vendor contracts.  
 
Summary 
Education reform legislation in the ten most education reform minded states grew 
dramatically from 2001-2011.  The legislation enacted was meant to increase student 
achievement through increasing accountatb1ility and school choice.  With Republican 
domination of education reform legislation, introducing 209 of the 275 enacted legislative 
pieces, themes of testing and charter schools highlight the relationship with the rationale.   
This increased legislation correlated with an increase in per-pupil funding in most states 
and at the aggregate level.  The financing for this legislation predominantly came from 
sources outside of public education, specifically corporations and PAC’s.   However, the 
financing of such legislation did not lead to financials benefits for contributing 
organizations when examining state vendor contracts. 
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CHAPTER 5:  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to determine a few key issues regarding 
education reform in the United States.  First, the researcher wanted to show exactly what 
education reform looked like in the country.  Another purpose was to show who, 
politically, supported education reform legislation.  A third issue that the researcher 
examined was the rationale for education reform.  Finally, a focus on the stakeholders in 
education reform would be able to bring clarity to issues regarding financial support and 
benefits of enacted education reform legislation.  
To create a sample for the research, purposive sampling was used to determine 
which states were the most education reform oriented; enacted education reform 
legislation from 2001-2011 was then used to explain what were the rationale, themes and 
purposes of education reform.  Political campaign contributions were used to determine 
who was financing education reform and state vendor contracts researched to conclude if 
financing reform led to financing benefits.  Results of the research indicated a clear 
characterization as to what education reform is in the United States as well as the 
relationship between this reform and legislative funding and the politics/policies of the 
top ten education reform minded states.   
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Summary and Discussion of Findings 
Research Question One 
What is the rationale behind the education reform movement in the United States between 
2001-2011? 
 After conducting an extensive literature review and then examining 275 pieces of 
education reform legislation, a supported conclusion is evident.  The literature review 
conducted showed that education reform, no matter the theme, is focused on improving 
student achievement and making American students more competitive in the world 
marketplace.  Though the methods for increasing student achievement varies, the end 
goal is all the same whether its testing, accountability, collective bargaining, or any other 
education reform theme identified.  The rationale is that through reformation, a 
renaissance for public education can be created. 
 However, the literature review is only half the process in answering question one.  
Examining each of the 275 education reform legislative pieces while also researching the 
supporters and financiers of education reform legislation highlight other rationales 
alongside the general increasing of student achievement.  A vast majority of the 
legislation had the rationales of increasing accountabt1ility and school choice.  
Acocuntatb1ilty as a rationale was focused on increasing testing of students and tying 
teacher evaluations to a student’s achievement or growth on said assessment.  This form 
of accountatb1ility is supposed to assure that good teachers in the classroom and that 
poor teachers are removed.  By decreasing the power of collective bargaining and 
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changing tenure laws, as many of the states in the sample legislate, accountatb1ility 
moves from the school district level to the state and national level.   
 The rationale of increasing school choice (vouchers, charters, virtual and tax 
credit scholarships) is meant to increase competition between traditional public schools 
and the new alternatives.  In theory in competition will spur on student achievement and 
teacher effectiveness as fear of losing students to school choices options will drive 
instruction.  School choice works hand-in-hand with accountability as fear of choice 
options holds public schools accountatb1le for what students are learning.  
 A final rationale, decreasing educator power, is seen in many of the sampled 
states.  When tying evaluations to student achievement through state testing, the teacher 
loses the authority over a student’s success.  No longer is the teacher’s evaluative 
techniques the measurement of student success, but instead the standardized tests 
determine how students, parents and society measures student success and teacher 
effectiveness.  The results of decreasing educator power could very well have a negative 
impact on the teaching profession and the students they teach.  Instead of making 
teaching a more attractive profession through incentivization, education reforms as 
currently used will turn teachers into replaceable widgets.  This widgetization of 
professional educators will have a broad impact on the future of public education. 
 The two major rationales determined from this research, increasing school choice 
and accountability, follows a growing practice on the international level.  Research by 
Wobmann et al, (2008) showed students performed better in countries with higher levels 
of school choice and school accountability when examining the results of the 2003 PISA 
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test.  Furthermore, a focus on the human input of education (teachers) has grown in use 
on an international level (Verger et al., 2013).  The rationales discovered from this 
research highlight a clear connection between globalization and neoliberal ideals of 
education.  This neoliberalism, as Hursh (2005) describes, has taken root on a global 
scale as education reforms focus on competition, accountability and privatization of 
education.  The rationales of America’ education reform movement show that the United 
States is following incredibly similar paths as other countries in regards to the types of 
reforms being enacted and the rationales for such reforms.  
  
Research Question Two 
 Is there a statistically significant difference in political party identification and 
support for education reform legislation? 
 Question two was created to show the difference between Democrats and 
Republicans in regards to support for the overall education reform movement and each 
identified education reform theme.  Support was defined as authoring the enacted 
education reform legislation.  The results showed that in six of the ten states sampled, 
there was no statistically significant difference between the two parties.  The other four 
states, Florida, Arizona, Ohio and Georgia, showed a statistically significant difference 
with Florida and Arizona showing a statistically significant difference at p = .01.  As a 
national data set, the ten states combined clearly indicated a statistically significant 
difference also at the p = .01 level.  In all statically significant differences, Republicans 
were more likely to support education reform legislation as a topic of legislation.   
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 Further chi-square and cross tabs were conducted to determine if party 
identification was related to support for each type of education reform legislation.  
Though the crosstabs and chi square tests were conducted at state and national levels, 
only those tests at the national level proved valid because the states did not have enough 
data (5) in each value of the 2 X 2 crosstab.  At the national level the only relationship 
which existed was between party identification and charter schools at strength of p = .01.  
Though the crosstab showed 56 of the 87 charter schools bills were authored by 
Republicans, any bill authored by Democrats had a 47% chance of being focused on 
charter schools.   Beyond this relationship, no such statistical relationship occurred. 
A lack of statistical significance turned the researcher to look at crosstab 
descriptives to get a better view of education reform as it related to party identification.  
The results of this analysis showed that on a national level, with 275 pieces of education 
reform legislation, Republicans sponsored more bills in each theme than their Democratic 
counterparts.  This added together to show Republicans authored 209 or the 275 total 
legislative bills enacted into law.  At the national (10 state) level, Republicans by far 
support education reform legislation overall and in each theme of legislation.   
 Breaking that down into each state, Florida, Arizona and Oklahoma were 
dominated by Republicans in both overall legislation and in each theme.  Democrats did 
not produce any piece of the legislation more than their Republican counterparts.  Beyond 
these three states however, Democrats did introduce some themes in some states more 
than their Republican brethren.  In Indiana, Democrats authored more tax credit 
scholarship and digital learning legislation, while both parties created equal amounts of 
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charter school and evaluation theme legislation.  Democrats in Louisiana authored more 
legislation regarding charter schools and digital learning while produced equal amounts 
legislation focused on vouchers. 
 Ohio Democrats did not author any legislative theme more than Republicans 
however did author equal amounts of legislation focusing on charter schools.  Michigan 
Democrats only produced more legislation focused on charter schools.  Georgia followed 
similar suit with digital learning being the only education reform theme in which 
Democrats created more legislation than Republicans.  Wisconsin Democrats showed 
more control over charter schools, collective bargaining, evaluation and digital learning 
and produced equal amount of legislation focused on vouchers.  Finally, Democrats in 
Minnesota created more legislation non alternative certification, charter schools, 
collective bargaining, testing, and tax credit scholarships while authoring equal amounts 
of legislation on evaluation.   
 The differences among each state’s results clearly indicate that party identification 
is not enough to clearly indicate one’s support for specific education reform legislation.  
Though statistically a difference exists between the parties and support for legislation 
overall; relationships between the parties and support for specific education reform 
legislation are not so clear.  The data indicates that if a Democrats authors education 
reform legislation it is more likely to be focused on charter schools than any other theme; 
this does not tell us a lot about major differences between the parties.  It appears from the 
data that other issues beyond party identification drive education reform authorship when 
it comes to specific themes.  Though Republicans dominate education reform as a policy 
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and in each education theme when using all state data combined, how each party relates 
to each identified education reform theme at the state level remains unclear. 
 Though the data at the aggregate level indicate that Republicans are clearly 
authoring and enacting the education reform legislation at the state level, this does not 
draw the most vivid picture of which political party supports specific types of education 
reform.  An examination of the official Democratic and Republican party platforms show 
both parties support increasing opportunities for student to receive a top public education.  
Both platforms also clearly state that the United States must improve its education 
systems in order to meet global demands for an educated workforce (this follows the 
conclusions discussed in Question One regarding globalization).  What differentiates the 
party platforms from each other however is that Republicans bluntly state their support 
for market driven education reforms (charter schools, scholarships, vouchers) whereas the 
Democratic platform calls for improving education without giving clear indications as to 
the means to such improvement.   
 Though an examination of state level education reforms showed that Republicans 
clearly are responsible for a vast majority of the enacted legislation, this does not tell the 
entire story.  It must be remembered that much of this state level legislation which has 
been passed since 2001 was done so in order to meet the guidelines of a Republican 
presidential education plan (NCLB) and a Democratic presidential education plan 
(RTTP).  The fact that both parties are responsible for this legislation due to the power of 
the purse shows that education reform is being used as a national security issue today, 
just as it was in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik.  By focusing on economic globalization, 
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political leaders have been able to generate market driven, neoliberal education reforms 
which create an education system focused on pushing out widgets capable working for 
corporations in the new global economy.  With a vast, educated workforce, America’s 
place as the global hegemon in the political, economic and militaristic theatre can be 
concreted.  Though the data shows state level Republicans responsible for such neoliberal 
reforms, the well is truly deeper.   
Furthermore, the sampling used for this research may have contributed to a 
Republican dominated sample.  The publications from Center for Education Reform, 
Students First and ALEC, the latter two being known as more conservative entities, were 
used as the basis for the ranking of the states; this may have contributed to Republic 
controlled legislatures dominating the research and therefore the showing up as the party 
behind education reform.    
  
Research Question Three 
What are the themes of the education reform legislation being introduced? 
 After reading each of the 275 pieces of education reform legislation in each of the 
ten states enacted from 2001-2011, descriptive statistics were run to determine which 
education reform theme state legislation was focused on reforming.  In all states the most 
often used themes of the education reform legislation was either testing or charter 
schools.  In six of the states (Indiana, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma and 
Minnesota), testing was the most common theme.  In four of the states (Louisiana, 
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Arizona, Georgia and Wisconsin), charter schools was the most common theme.  The 
least common theme of education reform was tenure where only four of the states 
(Louisiana, Florida, Arizona and Michigan) enacted education reform legislation focused 
on this issue.   
 These results indicate that from 2001-2011, education reform legislation in the 
United States had a competition driven and results oriented focus.  The top three 
education reform themes were charter schools, testing and evaluation.  With these three 
themes making up 72% of all education reform in the ten states, clear conclusions 
regarding the themes of education reform were made. First, competition was a major 
focus of education reformers from 2001-2011.  This is evident in the fact that 32% of all 
education reform legislation during this time period fell under the theme of charter 
schools.  With a goal of creating competition to increase student achievement, the charter 
school movement dominated the first decade of new millennium.   
Secondly, education became results oriented during the decade.  In order to show 
who wins this competition between schools, both traditional public as well as charter 
schools, some form of data must be used as evidence.  This was accomplished by state 
legislatures as 28% of all education reform legislation was focused on the theme of 
testing.  Testing forced schools to show their successes and failures and become more 
accountable for the actions of their teachers and administration. 
 Finally, the use of the test results as evaluative measures and decision making 
apparatuses is evident as 12% of all education reform legislation had the theme of 
evaluation.  Once competition was initiated via charter schools and comparison of 
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schools was done through testing, evaluation of school success based upon the testing 
policies forced public schools to change how both school and personnel would be 
evaluated.  This basic process, competition-testing-evaluation, is evident when examining 
each states legislative themes as all ten states have some combination of two out the three 
major themes in their top three education reform themes.  
Not surprisingly, the results of the types of reforms being enacted follows suit 
with the rationales for education reform.  These reform themes continue with the 
everclearer picture of education reform as a response to globalization and international 
competition.  As Windle (2014) concluded, market driven reforms, including choice 
choice and competition, are the driving forces behind education reform in the United 
States and on a global scale.  Using capitalistic philosophy, education reformers have 
pushed to create a simple process of transferal from teacher to student, therefore creating 
scapegoats, easy to blame and weak in voice, when the fear of falling behind our 
competitive counterparts on the global level is bellowed.  With little regard for the 
altruistic nature of education, political and business leaders of the United States have 
reformed education into a production line system of gilded results based upon 
competition and capitalism.  
 
Research Question Four 
 Is there a statistically significant relationship between per-pupil state funding for 
public education and the amount of education reform legislation enacted at the 
state level between 2001-2011? 
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 After analyzing the data from the sample, it was concluded that there was a 
statistically significant relationship between per-pupil funding and the amount of the 
education reform legislation enacted from 2001-2011 when amassing the ten state totals.  
This was surprising due to the fact that in eight of the ten states used as the sample, there 
was no statistically significant relationship; in Minnesota and Wisconsin there were 
statistically significant relationships.   
 The first question that arises from the data is why there is a difference between 
the ten state average and eight of the ten states individually.  This disparity could lie with 
amount of legislation introduced in each state; though a state like Oklahoma had 56 
pieces of education reform legislation, Ohio only produced 12.  This difference in the 
amount of legislation may have played a part in the lack of coherence of results. 
A major factor that jumps out from this data is that Minnesota and Wisconsin 
were the only two states in which Democrats authored more enacted legislation than their 
Republican counterparts.  This finding leads to a major conclusion, the data shows that 
Democrats are more fiscally responsible when it comes to funding educational reform 
initiatives than their Republican counterparts.  In the two Democratic states, as education 
reforms increased or decreased each year, so followed per pupil expenditures on 
education. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the research is the use of the incorrect term 
“unfunded mandate” in regards to education reform.  On an aggregate level, as the 
amount of education reform legislation increased, the per-pupil funding also increased.  
Though the researcher has shown a positive correlation between education reforms and 
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funding, Duncombe et al (2008) concluded that when examining Federal funding only, 
education reforms were underfunded by Federal dollars when purposing for high 
achievement students.  The idea that the Federal government places mandates on states 
and school districts and then does not supply the funds necessary for such changes needs 
to be examined further.  However, as the movement toward market driven education 
reforms has grown, the focus on funding models for public education will come under 
spotlight.  With neoliberal notion of competition for finite resources moving into public 
education, the issue of funding, and perhaps “underfunded mandates” will become a 
major issue in education policy.  
  The results of the data analysis of question four show that at a national level, 
there is a statistically significant relationship between state funding for education at a per 
pupil level and a the amount of education reform legislation enacted from 2001-2011.  Of 
the ten state, only Minnesota and Wisconsin showed similar results; eight of the ten states 
showed no statistical significance.   
 
Research Question Five 
Who is financing education reform legislation? 
 Financing education reform candidates and their enacted legislation was meant to 
determine the sources of money that were influencing state legislators who enacted 
education reform legislation.  It was concluded that sources from outside the traditional 
public school system, specifically those organizations focused on school choice, were the 
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main financiers of these candidates; money from nontraditional education organizations 
are playing major role in the development and growth of educational reform organization.  
 A few issues from the data stuck out as interesting when examining the sources of 
financing.  First, education reform organizations and school choice advocates are not 
restricted by state boundaries.  Many organizations focused on education reform were 
identified as contributors in multiple states indicating a large scale lobbying effort for 
education reform.  Secondly, traditional public schools have very little 
advocacy/lobbying beyond the public school union.  In every state, except Michigan, the 
educators unions were not only the major financier within the traditional public school 
contributors, they were the only financiers!  This indicates that public schools are ill 
prepared to represent themselves and their stakeholders when it comes to issues of policy 
change.  Compared to the numerous and diverse nontraditional public schools financiers, 
public school unions are monolithic. 
 Finally, in the narrative of public school reform in the United States, public 
school unions have often been vilified for protecting poor teachers at the expense of 
student success.  Education reformers have focused great efforts on demonizing the 
public school unions and the results of this research shows exactly why they have taken 
this course of attack.  Because educators unions are basically the only form of lobbying 
and financing of education reform legislation, the attacks against them by education 
reform advocates will always hit their target.  Without multiple agencies and 
organizations representing the interests of traditional public schools, educators unions 
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will continue to by lambasted by education reformers in the public realm and out spent in 
regards to education reform financing on an aggregate level.  
 The findings from question five is supported by previous research regarding the 
source of education reform on an international level.  Research by Ball (1998), concluded 
that the globalization of industrialized economies acted as the impetus for education 
reform in modern society as increased competition for limited commodities has required 
business and government to work together to create a labor force able to compete in this 
globalized economy.  Brown and Lauder (1996), originated this idea of globalization as a 
major causes of education reform and further research has come to similar conclusions 
regarding the connection between globalized economies and reformed education systems 
based upon free market principles.  Again, the issue of globalization and neoliberal 
philosophies drive the education reform movement in the United States, as they are on a 
global scale.  
As the United States has increased its’ amount education reform legislation, the 
interests of organization outside of the traditional public education has grown similarly in 
voice.  This view of globalization and the economization of public schools through 
education reform is also seen in the increasing use of testing to measure (compare) one 
country’s students to another’s and therefore a country’s future economic strength 
(Lingard et al., 2013).  The increased use of standardized and high-stakes testing on a 
state, national (Common Core) and international level (PISA) which currently takes a 
paramount role in education reform, fully supports the theory of globalization of business 
as a major impetus for the education reform legislation.  Results of research questions 
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five, funding for education reform legislation, clearly indicates that outside organizations 
are playing a major role such reform.  
 
Research Question Six 
Who is supporting education reform legislation? 
 Supporting education reform in the United States appears to a clear cut issue; 
Republicans, by an overwhelming majority, support education reform legislation 
compared to their Democratic counterparts overall and for each education reform theme.  
When taken at the aggregate level, Republicans appear to dominate the education reform 
movement; breaking down the legislation to state level status highlights an interesting 
finding. 
 Though overall legislation and legislative themes of education reform are 
supported more so by Republicans than Democrats at the collective level, the state of 
Minnesota and Wisconsin buck this trend.  In these two North Midwestern states, 
Democrats have controlled the education reform in their states.  The amount of the 
education reform legislation in these states is much lower than other states in the sample 
and outside financing is also less bountiful.  Though these two states rank 9th and 10th in 
education reform mindedness, they still outrank 40 other states, some of which will be 
Republican controlled states.  This leads to the question:  Why are these two states 
different from the rest? 
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Research Question Seven 
Are those who finance education reform legislation receiving financial benefits for their 
support? 
 One of major intents of this research was to determine if those who financially 
supported candidates who in turn authored enacted education reform legislation received 
any financial benefits in return for their support.  Using state vendor contracts as the 
descriptor for “benefits”, an examination of each state’s vendor contract system was 
conducted.  The results of the research indicated that the affiliates of educational 
organizations and the organizations themselves who financially supported these 
campaigns did not receive financial benefits for their political and financial support. 
 Though the question is sufficiently answered for the purpose of this research, 
variables remain that pose further questions.  The researcher chose to use state vendor 
contracts as the avenue by which financiers of education reform legislation could receive 
benefits.  By focusing only on state vendor contracts, other paths by which financial 
benefits might possible be received are not unlikely.  Though the organizations and 
people who donated to campaigns did not receive financial benefits for their contributions 
via state contracts, does not mean they did not receive financial benefits in other avenues.   
 Also, one must take into the account that financial remunerations are not the only 
benefits that an organization or person may receive for their campaign contribution; 
influence, for example, can be difficult to quantitatively measure.  Though the conclusion 
of this research is was no financial benefits were received for campaign contributions, a 
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broader term of benefits and examining different methods by which public funds are 
distributed may result in different findings. 
 
Conclusions 
 Education reform legislation in the ten most education reform minded states grew 
dramatically from 2001-2011.  The legislation enacted was meant to increase student 
achievement through increasing accountatb1ility and school choice.  With Republican 
domination of education reform legislation, introducing 209 of the 275 enacted legislative 
pieces, themes of testing and charter schools highlight the relationship with the rationale.   
This increased legislation correlated with an increase in per-pupil funding in most states 
and at the aggregate level.  The financing for this legislation predominantly came from 
sources outside of public education, specifically corporations and PAC’s.   However, the 
financing of such legislation did not lead to financials benefits for contributing 
organizations when examining state vendor contracts.   
 Though the purpose of this research was to determine how education reform in 
the United States could be characterized, the results of the research highlight a global 
issue in education.  A focus on privatization, competition and other neoliberal ideals have 
taken a foothold in education reform worldwide.  Though there are various degrees of 
reform being instituted on a global scale, the general premise of neoliberalism has been 
decided upon as the method to create the best education systems.  The paramount finding 
from this research, perhaps the most vital question not asked, is now that we know the 
reforms…what is the renaissance? 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 Education reform is a broad topic, one in which a researcher can get lost in and 
never finish discovering new information; because of this, further research regarding the 
top can be quite extensive.  From this dissertation, a few specific research 
recommendation can be made.  First, research needs to be conducted specifically on 
education reform in all fifty states.  This could show answers as to what major differences 
and similarities are between the most and least education reform minded states.  Second, 
research regarding education reform funding needs to focus not only on legislator who 
introduce enacted legislation, but also on the governors of the states as these individuals 
carry great power and influence over legislative policy.  Another area of further research 
is focused on benefits of funding education reform legislation.  This research used state 
vendor contracts as the method to determine in those who funded campaigns received 
financial benefits; further research should focus on district level finances to determine if 
benefits exist.  This would require extensive research in each individual state. Though the 
focus of this dissertation reached acceptable conclusions regarding education reform, 
rationales and support for such legislation, further research is necessary to clarify the 
relationship between outside organizations and financial benefits of supporting education 
reform legislation.   
 Perhaps the greatest need for future research lies in an examination of the root of 
neoliberal ideals which have taken a foothold in education reform.  Where these ideals 
get their support on an international level would help greatly in determining how these 
reforms have grown and what the ultimate goal is for such reforms.  Education reform is 
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a global issue, one in which most educational systems on an international level are 
following the same steps.  Who created these steps and why they have become the road 
more travelled needs to be answered.  
 
Summary 
 America’s infatuation with education reform may have started in 1983 with the 
publication of A Nation at Risk, but not until the new century did the United States begin 
to fundamentally change public education in the country.  With an increase in education 
reforms, legislators, predominantly Republican, across the country tried to enact a 
reformation to create an educational renaissance.  With a focus on accountability, 
achievement, and choice, reformers, proliferated in profiles of corporations, PACs and 
other organizations outside the realm of traditional public education.  Though these 
various stakeholders did not benefit financially from their political and financial support, 
education reform in the United States, and the world, was an issue of growing legislation 
and increasing importance as globalization and neoliberal philosophies propagated 
education reform. 
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APPENDIX A:  INDIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Indiana Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
23 100.0% 0 0.0% 23 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Indiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 0 7 
R 14 2 16 
Total 21 2 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .958a 1 .328   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .204 .328 
Cramer's V .204 .328 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Indiana Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 5 2 7 
R 14 2 16 
Total 19 4 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .875a 1 .349   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.195 .349 
Cramer's V .195 .349 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Indiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 0 7 
R 11 5 16 
Total 18 5 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.795a 1 .095   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.52. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .349 .095 
Cramer's V .349 .095 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Indiana Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 6 1 7 
R 15 1 16 
Total 21 2 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .396a 1 .529   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .61. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.131 .529 
Cramer's V .131 .529 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Indiana Party ID and Testing Crosstab  
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 3 7 
R 12 4 16 
Total 16 7 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .733a 1 .392   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.179 .392 
Cramer's V .179 .392 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Tax Credit Scholarships 
 
Indiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 5 2 7 
R 15 1 16 
Total 20 3 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.139a 1 .144   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.305 .144 
Cramer's V .305 .144 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Indiana Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 6 1 7 
R 16 0 16 
Total 22 1 23 
 
 
 
 
Indian Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.390a 1 .122   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.322 .122 
Cramer's V .322 .122 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Indiana Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 0 7 
R 15 1 16 
Total 22 1 23 
 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .457a 1 .499   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .141 .499 
Cramer's V .141 .499 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Indiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 Voucher Programs  
 No Yes Total 
Party ID D 7 0 7 
R 15 1 16 
Total 22 1 23 
 
 
 
Indiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .457a 1 .499   
N of Valid Cases 23     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .141 .499 
Cramer's V .141 .499 
N of Valid Cases 23  
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APPENDIX B:  FLORIDA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Table : Florida Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
35 100.0% 0 0.0% 35 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Florida Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No 
Party ID D 4 4 
R 31 31 
Total 35 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Test 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 35 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 35 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 3 4 
R 24 7 31 
Total 25 10 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.002a 1 .025   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.11. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.373 .025 
Cramer's V .373 .025 
N of Valid Cases 35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 
 
Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Florida Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No 
Party ID D 4 4 
R 31 31 
Total 35 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 35 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 35 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Florida Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 0 4 
R 28 3 31 
Total 32 3 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .409a 1 .522   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .107 .522 
Cramer's V .107 .522 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Florida Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 3 1 4 
R 21 10 31 
Total 24 11 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .141a 1 .708   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.33. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .063 .708 
Cramer's V .063 .708 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Florida Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 0 4 
R 28 3 31 
Total 32 3 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .409a 1 .522   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .33. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .107 .522 
Cramer's V .107 .522 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Florida Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
 Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 0 4 
R 26 5 31 
Total 30 5 35 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .726a 1 .394   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56. 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .142 .394 
Cramer's V .142 .394 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Florida Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 0 4 
R 30 1 31 
Total 34 1 35 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .129a 1 .720   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .11. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .060 .720 
Cramer's V .060 .720 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Florida Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 0 4 
R 26 5 31 
Total 30 5 35 
 
 
 
 
Florida Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .726a 1 .394   
N of Valid Cases 35     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .56. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .142 .394 
Cramer's V .142 .394 
N of Valid Cases 35  
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APPENDIX C:  LOUISIANA CHI SQUARE TESTS  
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Crosstabs 
 
Louisiana Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
33 100.0% 0 0.0% 33 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 16 0 16 
R 16 1 17 
Total 32 1 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .971a 1 .325   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.356 1 .244   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .515 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .171 .325 
Cramer's V .171 .325 
N of Valid Cases 33  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 12 16 
R 9 8 17 
Total 13 20 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.695a 1 .101   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
1.652 1 .199   
Likelihood Ratio 2.749 1 .097   
Fisher's Exact Test    .157 .099 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.30. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.286 .101 
Cramer's V .286 .101 
N of Valid Cases 33  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No 
Party ID D 16 16 
R 17 17 
Total 33 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 16 0 16 
R 15 2 17 
Total 31 2 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.004a 1 .157   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.470 1 .493   
Likelihood Ratio 2.775 1 .096   
Fisher's Exact Test    .485 .258 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .97. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .246 .157 
Cramer's V .246 .157 
N of Valid Cases 33  
 
 
 
 
346 
 
Party ID * Testing 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 14 2 16 
R 12 5 17 
Total 26 7 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.411a 1 .235   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.580 1 .446   
Likelihood Ratio 1.452 1 .228   
Fisher's Exact Test    .398 .225 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.39. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .207 .235 
Cramer's V .207 .235 
N of Valid Cases 33  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 15 1 16 
R 17 0 17 
Total 32 1 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.096a 1 .295   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.001 1 .975   
Likelihood Ratio 1.481 1 .224   
Fisher's Exact Test    .485 .485 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.182 .295 
Cramer's V .182 .295 
N of Valid Cases 33  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No 
Party ID D 16 16 
R 17 17 
Total 33 33 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 16 16 
R 17 17 
Total 33 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 33 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 15 1 16 
R 16 1 17 
Total 31 2 33 
 
 
 
 
Louisiana Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .002a 1 .965   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .002 1 .965   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .742 
N of Valid Cases 33     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .97. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.008 .965 
Cramer's V .008 .965 
N of Valid Cases 33  
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APPENDIX D:  ARIZONA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Table :  Arizona Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
53 100.0% 0 0.0% 53 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Arizona Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 50 2 52 
Total 51 2 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .040a 1 .842   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .027 .842 
Cramer's V .027 .842 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Arizona Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 32 20 52 
Total 33 20 53 
 
 
 
 
Table : Arizona Party ID and Chart School Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .618a 1 .432   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .108 .432 
Cramer's V .108 .432 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Arizona Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No 
Party ID D 1 1 
R 52 52 
Total 53 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 53 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 53 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Arizona Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 47 5 52 
Total 48 5 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .106a 1 .745   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .045 .745 
Cramer's V .045 .745 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Arizona Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 0 1 1 
R 40 12 52 
Total 40 13 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.136a 1 .077   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.243 .077 
Cramer's V .243 .077 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Arizona Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarship Crosstab 
 
Tax Credits Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 47 5 52 
Total 48 5 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .106a 1 .745   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .045 .745 
Cramer's V .045 .745 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Arizona Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 45 7 52 
Total 46 7 53 
 
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .155a 1 .694   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .054 .694 
Cramer's V .054 .694 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Arizona Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 51 1 52 
Total 52 1 53 
 
 
 
 
Table :  Arizona Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .020a 1 .889   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .019 .889 
Cramer's V .019 .889 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Arizona Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 49 3 52 
Total 50 3 53 
  
 
 
 
Arizona Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Test 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .061a 1 .805   
N of Valid Cases 53     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .034 .805 
Cramer's V .034 .805 
N of Valid Cases 53  
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APPENDIX E:  OHIO CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Ohio Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
12 100.0% 0 0.0% 12 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Ohio Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 8 3 11 
Total 9 3 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .364a 1 .546   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .605 1 .437   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .750 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .174 .546 
Cramer's V .174 .546 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Ohio Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 0 1 1 
R 10 1 11 
Total 10 2 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.455a 1 .020   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.873 1 .350   
Likelihood Ratio 4.111 1 .043   
Fisher's Exact Test    .167 .167 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.674 .020 
Cramer's V .674 .020 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Ohio Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 10 1 11 
Total 11 1 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .099a 1 .753   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .182 1 .670   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .917 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .091 .753 
Cramer's V .091 .753 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Ohio Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 9 2 11 
Total 10 2 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .218a 1 .640   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .382 1 .536   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .833 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .135 .640 
Cramer's V .135 .640 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Ohio Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 8 3 11 
Total 9 3 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .364a 1 .546   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .605 1 .437   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .750 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .174 .546 
Cramer's V .174 .546 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Ohio Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No 
Party ID D 1 1 
R 11 11 
Total 12 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 12 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 12 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Ohio Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 10 1 11 
Total 11 1 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .099a 1 .753   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .182 1 .670   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .917 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .091 .753 
Cramer's V .091 .753 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Ohio Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 1 1 
R 11 11 
Total 12 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 12 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 12 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Ohio Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 0 1 
R 8 3 11 
Total 9 3 12 
 
 
 
 
Ohio Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .364a 1 .546   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .605 1 .437   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .750 
N of Valid Cases 12     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .174 .546 
Cramer's V .174 .546 
N of Valid Cases 12  
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APPENDIX F:  MICHIGAN CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Table : Michigan Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
21 100.0% 0 0.0% 21 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Michigan Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 1 5 
R 14 2 16 
Total 18 3 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .222a 1 .637   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .206 1 .650   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .558 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .68. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.101 .637 
Cramer's V .101 .637 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Michigan Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 3 2 5 
R 15 1 16 
Total 18 3 21 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.819a 1 .051   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
1.471 1 .225   
Likelihood Ratio 3.189 1 .074   
Fisher's Exact Test    .117 .117 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .68. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.417 .051 
Cramer's V .417 .051 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Michigan Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 1 5 
R 14 2 16 
Total 18 3 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .014a 1 .905   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .014 1 .905   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .675 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.026 .905 
Cramer's V .026 .905 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Michigan Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 5 0 5 
R 11 5 16 
Total 16 5 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.903a 1 .168   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.597 1 .440   
Likelihood Ratio 2.985 1 .084   
Fisher's Exact Test    .290 .235 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.14. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .294 .168 
Cramer's V .294 .168 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Michigan Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 4 1 5 
R 10 6 16 
Total 14 7 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .417a 1 .519   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.010 1 .921   
Likelihood Ratio .443 1 .506   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .477 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.59. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .138 .519 
Cramer's V .138 .519 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Michigan Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No 
Party ID D 5 5 
R 16 16 
Total 21 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Michigan Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No 
Party ID D 5 5 
R 16 16 
Total 21 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
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Party ID * Tenure 
Michigan Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 5 0 5 
R 12 4 16 
Total 17 4 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.438a 1 .230   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.291 1 .589   
Likelihood Ratio 2.312 1 .128   
Fisher's Exact Test    .535 .325 
N of Valid Cases 21     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .256 .230 
Cramer's V .256 .230 
N of Valid Cases 21  
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Michigan Party ID and Voucher Program Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No 
Party ID D 5 5 
R 16 16 
Total 21 21 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Party ID and Voucher Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 21 
a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant. 
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APPENDIX G:  OKLAHOMA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
Table:  Oklahoma Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
56 100.0% 0 0.0% 56 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 10 3 13 
R 38 5 43 
Total 48 8 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .997a 1 .318   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.301 1 .583   
Likelihood Ratio .914 1 .339   
Fisher's Exact Test    .376 .279 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.89. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.135 .318 
Cramer's V .135 .318 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 11 2 13 
R 34 9 43 
Total 45 11 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .227a 1 .634   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.006 1 .937   
Likelihood Ratio .237 1 .626   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .486 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .064 .634 
Cramer's V .064 .634 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 13 0 13 
R 42 1 43 
Total 55 1 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .315a 1 .574   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .545 1 .460   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .764 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .076 .574 
Cramer's V .076 .574 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 12 1 13 
R 34 9 43 
Total 46 10 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.259a 1 .262   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.505 1 .477   
Likelihood Ratio 1.460 1 .227   
Fisher's Exact Test    .421 .248 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .151 .262 
Cramer's V .151 .262 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 8 5 13 
R 30 13 43 
Total 38 18 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .254a 1 .614   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.028 1 .868   
Likelihood Ratio .250 1 .617   
Fisher's Exact Test    .738 .426 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.068 .614 
Cramer's V .068 .614 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 13 0 13 
R 42 1 43 
Total 55 1 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .315a 1 .574   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .545 1 .460   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .764 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .076 .574 
Cramer's V .076 .574 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 11 2 13 
R 36 7 43 
Total 47 9 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .012a 1 .913   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .012 1 .913   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .642 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .015 .913 
Cramer's V .015 .913 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 13 13 
R 43 43 
Total 56 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma and Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 56 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 56 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 13 0 13 
R 41 2 43 
Total 54 2 56 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .315a 1 .574   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .545 1 .460   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .764 
N of Valid Cases 56     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .24. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .076 .574 
Cramer's V .076 .574 
N of Valid Cases 56  
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APPENDIX H:  GEORGIA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Table : Georgia Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
16 100.0% 0 0.0% 16 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No 
Party ID D 2 2 
R 14 14 
Total 16 16 
 
 
 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Table :  Georgia Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 1 2 
R 8 6 14 
Total 9 7 16 
 
 
 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .036a 1 .849   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .036 1 .849   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .700 
N of Valid Cases 16     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .88. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.048 .849 
Cramer's V .048 .849 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No 
Party ID D 2 2 
R 14 14 
Total 16 16 
 
 
 
 
Table :  Georgia Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Collective Bargaining is a constant. 
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 2 0 2 
R 13 1 14 
Total 15 1 16 
 
 
 
 
Table :  Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .152a 1 .696   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .276 1 .599   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .875 
N of Valid Cases 16     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .098 .696 
Cramer's V .098 .696 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 2 0 2 
R 10 4 14 
Total 12 4 16 
 
 
 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .762a 1 .383   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.243 1 .265   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .550 
N of Valid Cases 16     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .218 .383 
Cramer's V .218 .383 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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Party ID * Tax Credit Scholarships 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 2 0 2 
R 12 2 14 
Total 14 2 16 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .143 .568 
Cramer's V .143 .568 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Table :  Georgia Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 1 1 2 
R 13 1 14 
Total 14 2 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.939a 1 .086   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.327 1 .568   
Likelihood Ratio 2.079 1 .149   
Fisher's Exact Test    .242 .242 
N of Valid Cases 16     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.429 .086 
Cramer's V .429 .086 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Table Georgia Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 2 2 
R 14 14 
Total 16 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: Georgia Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 16 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 2 0 2 
R 13 1 14 
Total 15 1 16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table : Georgia Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .152a 1 .696   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .276 1 .599   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .875 
N of Valid Cases 16     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .098 .696 
Cramer's V .098 .696 
N of Valid Cases 16  
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APPENDIX I:  WISCONSIN CHI SQUARE TESTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
407 
 
Crosstabs 
 
Wisconsin Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No 
Party ID D 8 8 
R 5 5 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Alt. Certification is a constant. 
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Party ID * Charter School 
Wisconsin Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 3 5 8 
R 3 2 5 
Total 6 7 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .627a 1 .429   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.048 1 .826   
Likelihood Ratio .630 1 .427   
Fisher's Exact Test    .592 .413 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 4 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
2.31. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.220 .429 
Cramer's V .220 .429 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 5 3 8 
R 4 1 5 
Total 9 4 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
 (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .442a 1 .506   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.002 1 .962   
Likelihood Ratio .459 1 .498   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .490 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.184 .506 
Cramer's V .184 .506 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 1 8 
R 5 0 5 
Total 12 1 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .677a 1 .411   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.023 1 .312   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .615 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.228 .411 
Cramer's V .228 .411 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 8 0 8 
R 4 1 5 
Total 12 1 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.733a 1 .188   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.061 1 .805   
Likelihood Ratio 2.047 1 .153   
Fisher's Exact Test    .385 .385 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .365 .188 
Cramer's V .365 .188 
N of Valid Cases 13  
 
 
 
 
 
413 
 
Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No 
Party ID D 8 8 
R 5 5 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tax Credits Scholarships is a constant. 
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 1 8 
R 5 0 5 
Total 12 1 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .677a 1 .411   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.023 1 .312   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .615 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.228 .411 
Cramer's V .228 .411 
N of Valid Cases 13  
 
 
 
 
415 
 
Party ID * Tenure 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 8 8 
R 5 5 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 7 1 8 
R 4 1 5 
Total 11 2 13 
 
 
 
 
Wisconsin Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .133a 1 .715   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .130 1 .718   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .641 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .77. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .101 .715 
Cramer's V .101 .715 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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APPENDIX J:  MINNESOTA CHI SQUARE TESTS 
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Crosstabs 
 
Minnesota Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
13 100.0% 0 0.0% 13 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 6 3 9 
R 3 1 4 
Total 9 4 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .090a 1 .764   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .092 1 .761   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .646 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.23. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.083 .764 
Cramer's V .083 .764 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 6 3 9 
R 4 0 4 
Total 10 3 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.733a 1 .188   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.364 1 .546   
Likelihood Ratio 2.588 1 .108   
Fisher's Exact Test    .497 .294 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .92. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.365 .188 
Cramer's V .365 .188 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 8 1 9 
R 4 0 4 
Total 12 1 13 
 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .481a 1 .488   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .772 1 .380   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .692 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.192 .488 
Cramer's V .192 .488 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 8 1 9 
R 3 1 4 
Total 11 2 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .410a 1 .522   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .385 1 .535   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .538 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .62. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .178 .522 
Cramer's V .178 .522 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 6 3 9 
R 2 2 4 
Total 8 5 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .325a 1 .569   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .321 1 .571   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .510 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .158 .569 
Cramer's V .158 .569 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 8 1 9 
R 4 0 4 
Total 12 1 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .481a 1 .488   
Continuity 
Correctionb 
.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .772 1 .380   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .692 
N of Valid Cases 13     
a. 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .31. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.192 .488 
Cramer's V .192 .488 
N of Valid Cases 13  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No 
Party ID D 9 9 
R 4 4 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Digital Learning is a constant. 
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No 
Party ID D 9 9 
R 4 4 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Tenure is a constant. 
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No 
Party ID D 9 9 
R 4 4 
Total 13 13 
 
 
 
 
Minnesota Party ID and Voucher Chi-Square Tests 
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .a 
N of Valid Cases 13 
a. No statistics are computed because Voucher Programs is a constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
 
 
 
APPENDIX K:  NATIONAL CHI SQUARE TESTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
429 
 
 
Crosstabs 
 
Table : National Case Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Party ID * Alt. 
Certification 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Charter 
School 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Collective 
Bargaining 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Evaluation 275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Testing 275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Tax Credits 
Scholarships 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Digital 
Learning 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Tenure 275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
Party ID * Voucher 
Programs 
275 100.0% 0 0.0% 275 100.0% 
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Party ID * Alt. Certification 
 
Table : National Party ID and Alternative Certification Crosstab 
 
Alt. Certification 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 59 7 66 
R 193 16 209 
Total 252 23 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Alternative Certification Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .570a 1 .450   
Continuity Correctionb .250 1 .617   
Likelihood Ratio .542 1 .461   
Fisher's Exact Test    .450 .299 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.568 1 .451   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.52. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.046 .450 
Cramer's V .046 .450 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Charter School 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Charter School Crosstab 
 
Charter School 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 35 31 66 
R 153 56 209 
Total 188 87 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Charter School Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.440a 1 .002   
Continuity Correctionb 8.531 1 .003   
Likelihood Ratio 9.059 1 .003   
Fisher's Exact Test    .004 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.406 1 .002   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.88. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.185 .002 
Cramer's V .185 .002 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Collective Bargaining 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Collective Bargaining Crosstab 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 61 5 66 
R 199 10 209 
Total 260 15 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Collective Bargaining Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .490a 1 .484   
Continuity Correctionb .158 1 .691   
Likelihood Ratio .463 1 .496   
Fisher's Exact Test    .546 .331 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.488 1 .485   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.84. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.042 .484 
Cramer's V .042 .484 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Evaluation 
 
Table : National Party ID and Evaluation Crosstab 
 
Evaluation 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 62 4 66 
R 180 29 209 
Total 242 33 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Evaluation Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.901a 1 .089   
Continuity Correctionb 2.208 1 .137   
Likelihood Ratio 3.301 1 .069   
Fisher's Exact Test    .126 .063 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.890 1 .089   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.92. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .103 .089 
Cramer's V .103 .089 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Testing 
 
Table : National Party ID and Testing Crosstab 
 
Testing 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 50 16 66 
R 149 60 209 
Total 199 76 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Testing Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .608a 1 .435   
Continuity Correctionb .388 1 .534   
Likelihood Ratio .621 1 .431   
Fisher's Exact Test    .530 .269 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.606 1 .436   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .047 .435 
Cramer's V .047 .435 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Tax Credits Scholarships 
 
Table : National Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Crosstab 
 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 62 4 66 
R 197 12 209 
Total 259 16 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Tax Credit Scholarships Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .009a 1 .923   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio .009 1 .923   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .563 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.009 1 .923   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.84. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.006 .923 
Cramer's V .006 .923 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Digital Learning 
 
Table : National Party ID and Digital Learning Crosstab 
 
Digital Learning 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 61 5 66 
R 188 21 209 
Total 249 26 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Digital Learning Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .358a 1 .550   
Continuity Correctionb .128 1 .721   
Likelihood Ratio .375 1 .541   
Fisher's Exact Test    .637 .373 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.357 1 .550   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.24. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .036 .550 
Cramer's V .036 .550 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Tenure 
 
Table : National Party ID and Tenure Crosstab 
 
Tenure 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 66 0 66 
R 202 7 209 
Total 268 7 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Tenure Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .636a 1 .425   
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 1.102 1 .294   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .577 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.634 1 .426   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .048 .425 
Cramer's V .048 .425 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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Party ID * Voucher Programs 
 
Table : National Party ID and Voucher Programs Crosstab 
 
Voucher Programs 
Total No Yes 
Party ID D 64 2 66 
R 192 17 209 
Total 256 19 275 
 
 
Table : National Party ID and Voucher Programs Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.754a 1 .185   
Continuity Correctionb 1.080 1 .299   
Likelihood Ratio 2.046 1 .153   
Fisher's Exact Test    .258 .148 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.748 1 .186   
N of Valid Cases 275     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.32. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .080 .185 
Cramer's V .080 .185 
N of Valid Cases 275  
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